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“Is [the recent mortgage slowdown] a mere irritant in America’s vast economy, or the
start of something much worse? Opinion on Wall Street is divided. Most argue that
the mortgage mess, though a blight on anyone caught up in it, will not spread. The
number of mortgages at risk is too small for defaults to threaten everyone else.”
The Economist, “Cracks in the fac¸ade”, 22 March 2007.
Preface
If you were to ask an economist what the period 2007 to 2009 was all about, the probable
answer would be that this was the time of the Global Financial Crisis, one of the most
severe episodes of financial stress since the Great Depression. The respondent would be
likely to continue that it all started with plummeting house prices in the US, which first
spilled over into global interbank markets before triggering a near-meltdown of the world
financial system. The repercussions eventually caused many economies around the globe
to fall into a sharp recession.
This condensed re´sume´ portrays today’s reading of the Global Financial Crisis very well.
However, as with every summary, it hides some of the underlying stories that add up to the
bigger picture. This is why this dissertation project seeks to address three elements of the
chain of events that might deserve more careful attention. The selection is driven by one
key question: how could a downturn in a rather small segment of the US housing market
turn into a large-scale global financial crisis? In other words, the common theme of the
analysis is the dissemination of the economic source shock across markets and regions. For
reasons of clarification we distinguish three major phases of propagation: (i) the spreading
from the US “subprime” housing market to the country’s entire residential real estate
market; (ii) the proliferation across large banks and investors via secured money markets;
and (iii) the dissemination of financial turbulence across domestic financial sectors.
The first and barely noticed sign of an imminent crisis appeared in September 2006. The
prices of US residential houses had just started to slide, in particular in the so-called
“subprime” market. This segment is characterised by the typically lower creditworthi-
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ness and higher leverage of homeowners compared with the traditional “prime” segment
(cf. Frame et al., 2008; Mian et al., 2009; Demyanyk and van Hemert, 2011). In many
cases, the original decline drove market prices below the value of outstanding mortgages
(Duke, 2012). Since residential mortgages are mostly non-recourse in the US, the affected
homeowners had an incentive to default on their obligations voluntarily (Harris, 2010).
This incentive unfolded a wave of uncoordinated foreclosures. A vicious circle ensued,
in which lower prices led to higher foreclosures, which reinforced the initial price drop
(cf. Campbell et al., 2011; Frame et al., 2008; Mian et al., 2014). At this point, the down-
ward spiral spilled over and harmed the prices of unforced sales (Campbell et al., 2011)
in the “prime” segment. These homeowners chose to postpone a sale in order to preserve
their long-run profitability. Hence, the overall home sales including both “prime” and
“subprime” became increasingly dominated by the worst-performing segment (cf. Wall
Street Journal, 2009; CoreLogic, 2010). Chapter 1 examines the observed market dynam-
ics from a game-theoretical perspective. The developed model explains several stylised
facts of the recent US housing market crash. The analysis concludes that homeowners usu-
ally postpone home sales during a market downturn to escape its negative consequences.
However, the typical non-recourse financing of residential real estate in combination with
high leverage temporarily damaged the usual market mechanism. This paved the way
for the subsequent nationwide housing crisis. On the other hand, the interventions pol-
icy makers pursued to find a way out of the crisis (e.g. loose monetary policy, financial
stimuli, urban planning) are consistent with the attempt to restore this mechanism.
How could turmoil in the US housing market spread further towards financial markets?
Recent research guides us to look into short-term secured funding markets (cf. Brun-
nermeier, 2009; Gorton and Metrick, 2012): with house prices deteriorating, short-term
obligations holding houses as collateral lost value, too. Short-term secured funding was
squeezed as a result in the autumn of 2007 (Brunnermeier, 2009). Given the material
dependence of market participants on this funding source prior to the crisis (cf. Allen and
Carletti, 2008; Gorton and Metrick, 2012), the implications for this and related market
segments were grave. The borrowing rates peaked, thereby aggravating the initial funding
problems while creating further uncertainty and scepticism among the market participants
with respect to the creditworthiness of their counterparties (cf. Allen and Carletti, 2008;
Brunnermeier, 2009; Taylor and Williams, 2009; Gorton and Metrick, 2012;). Hedge
funds and prime brokers are traditionally the key players involved in short-term securities
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borrowing and lending (Gorton and Metrick, 2012). The analysis of Chapter 2 therefore
concentrates on the consequences of adverse shocks for this particular financial inter-
mediation chain. The results demonstrate that the intermediation activity diminished
significantly in periods of exceptionally high levels of uncertainty. The reduction itself
seems to have been driven primarily by the securities hoarding of prime brokers trying to
preserve their liquidity position. On top of this, rises in prime brokers’ securities hold-
ings show the most devastating impact on financial intermediation activity among all the
investigated shocks. Hence, the turmoil in the US housing market spread to short-term
funding markets through plummeting collateral values, which caused prime brokers to
build up precautionary security buffers at the cost of impaired financial intermediation
activity.
After the collapse of the investment bank Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008, the
financial turmoil that had recently been limited to money markets suddenly spilled over
and endangered entire domestic financial sectors around the globe (cf. Brunnermeier,
2009;Eichengreen et al., 2009; Bekaert et al., 2014). The Global Financial Crisis was
born. Chapter 3 investigates the sources of this unanticipated and forceful global propa-
gation of financial turbulence. As the analysis reveals, even elaborate factor asset pricing
models are insufficient to describe the most severe episodes of the Global Financial Cri-
sis. Further taking into account continuous time-dependent co-movement patterns adds
precious information. Not only does it help to identify contagion—defined as residual
co-movement unaccounted for by fundamentals—, but it also allows us to quantify its
magnitude and to detect timing patterns. Indeed, contagion spread financial turmoil to
most examined countries only after the investment bank Lehman Brothers dissolved. It
was also forceful as the average size was 16.3% in terms of unconditional correlations. A
closer examination of what lies behind contagion reveals that US and global shocks are
the primary sources of excessive co-movement. By contrast, domestic and residual shocks
consistently abate the extent of contagion. Hence, similar to the tumbling house prices
that had previously spooked secured money markets, contagion undermined domestic fi-
nancial sectors worldwide, thereby eventually bringing the Global Financial Crisis to a
peak.
The three events investigated in this thesis are indispensable for understanding some of
the key economic forces that supposedly lay behind the escalation of the Global Financial
3
Crisis. They tell a story of what went wrong and why. For instance, had mortgage
contracts not been “ill-designed” in the sense that they facilitated deliberate defaults,
the drag on the wider US housing market would have been less dramatic. Had large
financial institutions not relied that heavily on short-term funding backed by US housing
collateral, they might have been able to sufficiently roll over their obligations. Had the
hoarding of liquid securities by prime brokers not harmed financial intermediation, the
secured funding market might not have squeezed. Consequently, Lehman Brothers would
perhaps have been intact today. No financial contagion would have been released. But
unfortunately, all of these events did occur. Nonetheless, this experience gives policy
makers, professionals and researchers the opportunity to learn how comparable episodes
of turbulence might be better coped with. Therefore, studying the individual stories of
the Global Financial Crisis that add up to the bigger picture is crucial for the future.
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Chapter 1
On Housing Market Downturns and
Optimal Seller Behaviour
Abstract
Housing market downturns typically clear through home sales rather than prices, since
homeowners tend to postpone a sale to avoid fire sale prices. The experience of the
2006-2009 US housing crisis challenges this paradigm. We develop a housing market
model that allows downturns to unwind through home sales or prices by linking the
severity of slowdowns to the timing of home sales by homeowners and the market clearing.
Homeowners are heterogeneous, rational and profit-maximising. House prices plummet,
only if a sufficiently large housing overhang compromises their sales strategy. The model
explains several stylised facts of the recent US housing crisis.
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1.1 Introduction
A widely shared economic paradigm states that house prices are downwardly sticky
(cf. Leamer, 2007; Case, 2008; Case and Quigley, 2008; Lazear, 2010). In this reading,
housing downturns are better characterised by slowing home sales and soaring housing
inventory. Case (2008) called this the “quantity clearing mechanism”. Earlier empirical
evidence seemingly confirmed this perception. After the Great Depression when an eight-
year housing recession finally came to halt in 1933 (-30.5%), house price declines became
increasingly rare. Besides, housing downturns resulted merely in mild price depreciations,
if any, between 1945 and 2006. The largest drop in national house prices did not exceed
2.9% on a year-to-year basis.1 Instead housing downturns unwound through receding
housing starts (Case, 2008) and humble residential investment (Leamer, 2007). Even re-
gional housing market slowdowns tended to clear this way, as the example of the “first
California boom” from 1975 to 1980 illustrates (Case and Quigley, 2008). Survey evi-
dence (cf. Case and Shiller, 1988, Case et al., 2003, Case et al., 2012) further consistently
suggested that homebuyers would respond to the sluggish demand by retarding their sales
rather than lowering their asking prices.2 This led to the emergence of a paradigm that
Ben Bernanke so famously concluded (CNBC, 1 July 2005): “We’ve never had a decline
in house prices on a nationwide basis. So, what I think what is more likely is that house
prices will slow, maybe stabilise, (...).”
The US housing market crash between 2006 and 2009 challenges the traditional paradigm,
as house prices collapsed outright over the course of this crisis, giving rise to a “price clear-
ing mechanism”. From peak to trough, the S&P/Case-Shiller National House Price Index
plummeted by roughly 32.0% (a later decrease added another 3.8%), which translates into
a compound annual growth rate of -13.1%. This was the most violent house price cor-
rection ever documented in the US. The eight-year housing recession that extended into
the Great Depression saw house prices depreciate by merely 4.4% per year. Even more
intriguingly, despite a simultaneous nosedive of 41.0% in home sales, house prices depre-
ciated even faster for a large part of the crisis (see Figure 1.1). Only in the early phase
1 The historical house price data stem from Robert Shiller’s website:
www.econ.yale.edu/ shiller/data/Fig2-1.xls. The author uses the Grebler House Price Index
and the S&P/Case-Shiller National House Price Index. For details, please consult his seminal work
“Irrational Exuberance” (Shiller, 2009).
2 In a related survey study, Blinder (1982) found evidence of producers of durable goods responding
to excess supply by increasing their inventories.
6
(Q2/2006 to Q3/2007) home sales declined quicker than house prices (26.6% vs. 5.2%).
Following a brief transition phase (Q3/2007 to Q1/2008) when both decreased roughly
at the same rate (10.4% vs. 10.9%), house prices growth outpaced home sales (4.4%
vs. 15.9%) in the final phase of the crisis. The paradigm of primarily quantity-driven
market clearing is therefore difficult to justify. Instead, the US housing market crash calls
for a complementary “price clearing mechanism”.
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Figure 1.1: US house prices and home sales from peak to trough (Q2/2006 to Q1/2009). This
figure illustrates the evolution of US house prices and home sales from peak to trough during the recent US
housing market crash (Q2/2006 to Q1/2009). In the initial phase of the crisis, home sales decline steeper
than house prices. Over the transition phase both depreciate at roughly the same rate. In the final phase
of the crisis, the decline in house prices exceeds the one in home sales. Growth rates are computed since
inception of the crisis (Q2/2006) based on the S&P Case/Shiller National House Price and existing home
sales, respectively. Data sources: Robert Shiller (www.econ.yale.edu/shiller/data/Fig2-1.xls), National
Association of Realtors.
This fresh evidence reveals a major gap in the theoretical housing literature. Most existing
housing market models fail to account for material price drops. For they are designed
in accordance with the “quantity clearing mechanism”. In this reading, homeowners
avoid marketing their homes during housing downturns for various reasons. Some models
attribute their reluctance to sell to matching issues (cf. Wheaton, 1990; Williams, 1995;
Glower et al., 1998; Albrecht et al., 2007; Chernobai and Hossain, 2012) and others
to downpayment constraints (cf. Stein, 1995; Genesove and Mayer, 1997), loss aversion
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(Genesove and Mayer, 2001) or anchoring (Bokhari and Geltner, 2011). One notable
exception from the mainstream is Qian (2013) who argued in favour of an embedded real
option in housing. Another exception is Lazear (2010). The author took the position
that homeowners set asking prices strategically to determine the probability of a sale,
because they enjoy some monopolistic power. However, all of the above approaches focus
a priori on the supply of houses as the predominant factor in the housing market. A
theory comprehensive enough to explain material falls in house values or even a reversal
of the market clearing mechanism is so far lacking.
In this paper, we therefore develop a novel game-theoretical rationale that features sticky
house prices (“quantity clearing mechanism”) during some housing downturns and major
price drops (“price clearing mechanism”) during others. The connecting element is the
optimal sales strategy of leveraged homeowners. In simplified terms, homeowners possess
two options: they either sell immediately at potential fire sale prices or they postpone a
sale until their mortgage matures to sit out the negative consequences of the slowdown.3
The best response arguably depends on the severity of the slowdown. Homeowners are
inclined to retard a sale under low to moderate excess supply, because the present value
of the future sales price plus rent income tends to exceed the immediate short-term house
price. However, they lose any interest in delaying a sale strategically once a sufficiently
large overhang destroys the home value at maturity. The subsequent uncoordinated sell-off
of houses allows prices to plummet in the short term. The model consequently establishes
a causal link between the severity of slowdowns, the timing of home sales by homeowners
and the way in which housing markets clear.
However, homeowners face a non-trivial decision problem. On one side, they possess
some monopolistic power, because housing is durable. They might even postpone a sale
for years. This obviously shifts the negotiation power in their favour during market
downturns. In fact, their situation is reminiscent of a durable good monopolist, who
can freely set the offered quantity.4 On the other side, there are limitations to this
strategic behaviour. First, homeowners face external competition as well as rivalling
3 Comparable decision problems relate to the non-participation in labour markets (Murphy and Topel,
1997) or the dynamic pricing of durable goods (Blinder, 1982). Lazear (2010) implicitly pointed in
the same direction.
4 In his seminal paper, Coase (1972) conjectures that such a monopolist cannot profit from market
power due to time inconsistency. However, extensive research shows ways out of this dilemma, e.g. by
monopolizing the after-market, product differentiation or planned obsolescence. For an overview refer
to Belleflamme and Peitz (2010).
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other incumbents in an oligopolistic fashion. Second, prospective homebuyers, too, gain
bargaining power during a market slowdown due to the emergence of excess housing
supply. Third, homeowners need to take out a mortgage to finance their initial investment
in a similar way to any other capital-intensive durable good. Once their mortgage expires,
homeowners are forced to sell (or, equivalently, rollover their mortgage) at the then-house
prices. Fourth, homeowners will not postpone a sale, if the short-term house price exceeds
the present value of a postponed sale plus rent income. After all, homeowners face a
multi-dimensional optimization problem when assessing their best response to a housing
downturn.
The presented model examines the optimal sales strategy of homeowners in a framework
tailored to accommodate the specifics of housing. The envisioned housing market is
segmented. This reflects the market’s heterogeneity across homeowners and regions in
reality. Homeowners vary by age, creditworthiness, cultural background, gender, income
or marital status. Regions differ by density, infrastructure or macro-economic conditions.
Moreover, homeowners are rational and profit-maximising. They do not suffer a priori
from behavioural biases such as loss aversion (Genesove and Mayer, 2001) or anchoring
(Bokhari and Geltner, 2011). Homeowners further need to take out a mortgage to finance
the initial purchase of a house as houses are highly capital-intensive. Similar financial
restrictions are imposed by Stein (1995), Genesove and Mayer (1997) and Brueckner et
al. (2011). Finally, the model mimics some of the key characteristics of the US housing
market: the market is divided among prime and subprime homeowners, their leverage
matches realistic levels, and borrowing is non-recourse (cf. Frame et al., 2008; Harris,
2010, Gao and Li, 2013). The heterogeneous model accordingly portrays various specifics
of the housing market.
The simulations of the heterogeneous housing model deliver rich insights. Above all,
homeowners may stabilise or compromise house price growth depending on the severity of
the slowdown. On one hand, homeowners support short-term house prices by strategically
postponing home sales to preserve their medium-term financial interests. The consequent
reduction in home sales eventually stabilises the short-term price. On the other hand, as
soon as a sufficiently large overhang harms the medium-term financial interests of home-
owners their willingness to retard a sale vanishes. This may elicit uncoordinated sell offs
spilling over to the competing segment and impairing the short-term house price. Besides,
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a segmented housing market is more resilient to low and moderate oversupply, but more
vulnerable to substantial overhangs. This is because cross-segment competition provides
homeowners with leeway for responding strategically even to segment-specific downturns.
But it also impairs the overall market depth and thus the capacity to absorb substantial
overhangs. Hence, the way in which a market clears depends on its fragmentation and on
the severity of the crisis: Low to moderate excess supply results in a “quantity clearing
mechanism” and a substantial overhang of houses in a “price clearing mechanism”.
Furthermore, a model version accounting for deliberate defaults of homeowners, a lack of
available lending volume and other US-specific aspects, well explains several stylised facts
of the US housing market crash from 2006 to 2009. The model projections are compatible
with the observed house price growth, its negative correlation with foreclosures (Frame et
al., 2008), the concentration of foreclosure in the subprime segment (cf. Mian et al., 2009;
Demyanyk and van Hemert, 2011), and the built-up in housing inventory (cf. CoreLogic,
2010; Lazear, 2010). Most notably, both the observed and projected house prices exhibit a
“double drop”—two briefly interrupted consecutive slides. In the model, house price drops
occur whenever homeowners deliberately default on their mortgages. The subsequent sell-
off of foreclosed homes damages house prices in both segments. Therefore, the negative
correlation between house price growth and foreclosures. Besides, subprime homeowners
are the first to default since they are particularly leveraged and worst affected by the
downturn. This explains the concentration of foreclosures in the subprime segment. The
nonetheless material housing inventory is either due to a strategic shortage of prime
houses or the inefficient and harmful crowding-out of non-distressed home sales as a
result of lacking lending volume. Thus, a model customised to reflect the specifics of the
US housing market well explains several stylised facts of the country’s devastating recent
housing crisis.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1.2 outlines the fundamental game-
theoretical idea in a homogeneous setting. This model version is best suited to elucidating
the primary dynamics, despite its overly simplistic structure. It also serves as a bench-
mark later on. Next, Section 1.3 cultivates the analysis in a more realistic heterogeneous
framework. Section 1.4 simulates both model versions and compares the numerical re-
sults. Subsequently, we investigate how varying inputs affect the heterogeneous model.
Section 1.5 revisits the recent US housing market crash (2006-2009). We refine the het-
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erogeneous model in such a way that it portrays the key characteristics of the country’s
housing market at the time: most notably its prime and subprime segments. Finally, we
conclude and briefly discuss the policy interventions in the housing market throughout
Section 1.6.
1.2 Homogeneous Housing Market
We initially describe the decision problem of homeowners in the least complex setup.
Housing, homeowners and prospective homebuyers are all homogeneous. Later on, hous-
ing will become heterogeneous.
1.2.1 Static Equilibrium
Suppose a competitive housing market populated by i ∈ 1, ..., n homogeneous and profit-
maximising homeowners, each owning one unit of identical housing worth p. The housing
stock is consequently similar to the number of homeowners, h = n. However, since not
all houses must necessarily trade on the market, home sales, x ≥ 0, may be smaller than
the housing stock, h ≥ x.
Homeowners invest in housing to realise positive returns over the investment horizon, T ,
so they need substantial external financing to raise the purchase price (cf. Brueckner et
al., 2011). For simplicity, they take on a 100 percent mortgage with a constant interest
rate, r, and the same maturity as the investment horizon. Both the principal and the
compound interest are due at redemption. The terminal balance due equals p(1 + r)T
accordingly. On the other hand, homeowners earn income from their property. For
one thing, they realise or save periodical rent, ωp, which is directly proportional to the
house price, ω ∈ (0, 1).5 By reinvesting the proceeds until maturity, homeowners further
accumulate capital gains of I(T ) =
∑T
k=1(1 + r)
k so that the capitalised rent income
amounts to ωpI(T ).6 For another thing, homeowners sell their house at redemption and
earn p. Thus, they have funds of p
(
1+ωI(T )
)
at hand to settle their outstanding liabilities
5 This formulation allows me to express that the amount of rent and the house price are typically tied
to one another (Gallin, 2008).
6 I(T ) follows a geometrical sequence, I(T ) =
∑T
k=1(1 + r)
k = [1− (1 + r)T+1]/[1− (1 + r)] > 0.
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eventually. Equation 1.1 summarises the investment motive:
p
(
1 + ωI(T )
) ≥ p(1 + r)T . (1.1)
An important corollary is that the fraction of the house price that homeowners periodically
extract as rent must never violate ω ≥ ((1 + r)T − 1)/I(T ) to be compatible with the
investment motive. In addition, the amount of rent entirely depends on the interest rate
and maturity of the mortgage.
Homeowners obtain the needed funding from banks. The banking sector is homogeneous
and handles all mortgages. In the tradition of Diamond (1984) and Holmstrom and Tirole
(1997), the lending costs comprise the loan volume and monitoring efforts. The aggregate
lending volume of the banking sector, lx, is proportional to the individual loan volume,
l ≥ 0, and the number of home sales, x. Furthermore, monitoring efforts contain a fixed
component, ν > 0, to cover the administrative expenses and a variable transaction-linked
component, φ > 0. In economic terms, φ is similar to an agio being paid by borrowers
for the service of financial intermediation. The resultant total costs of the banking sector
amount to lx+ν+φx, while the marginal lending costs are l+φ. To keep matters simple,
the individual loan volume, l, is standardised to one, l = 1.
Prospective homebuyers have the following inverse demand function, which decreases
linearly in home sales:
p = α− βx, (1.2)
where α > 0 denotes the reservation price and β > 0 the supply elasticity. In a competitive
market, participants have no bargaining power (cf. Belleflamme and Peitz, 2010). The
good is supplied at marginal costs, p∗ = 1+φ, and the entire housing stock is for sale, h∗ =
x∗. Substituting these two expressions in Equation 1.2 yields the long-run equilibrium
housing stock:
h∗ =
1 + α− φ
β
. (1.3)
Both the long-run equilibrium house price, p∗ = 1 + φ, and the housing stock, h∗ = (1 +
α− φ)/β, play a pivotal role in the subsequent discussion on housing market downturns.
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1.2.2 Housing Market Downturns
We define a housing market downturn as a situation of excess supply, i.e. when the existing
housing stock exceeds the level that is sustainable in the long run. Since the housing stock
barely adjusts in the immediate short term (cf. Case, 2008; Leamer, 2007)—the typical
depreciation rate, δ ≥ 0, is merely about 1.9% (Harding et al., 2007)—even small declines
in the demand might drag house prices below their long-run level. On the other hand,
homeowners have the option to postpone home sales to a later date, thereby resisting
some of the downward pressure. Therefore, how should homeowners respond to housing
market downturns and how does their behaviour affect the house price in the immediate
short term?
Dates 
0 1 2 
logical second T 
• Market is in long-run 
equilibrium 
• Initial housing stock 
develops 
• Demand declines 
permanently 
• Temporary excess supply 
of houses 
• Homeowners decide on 
whether to stay in the 
market or postpone a sale 
• Mortgages expire 
• Postponing homeowners 
must sell their houses to 
redeem their mortgages 
• Market may (or not) have 
completed adjustment to 
long-run equilibrium 
Figure 1.2: Course of events. This figure illustrates how a market downturn evolves in the model.
Time between dates is not equidistant.
In order to characterise the reaction of homeowners to market downturns, we illustrate
their decision problem in a dynamic setting (cf. Figure 1.2). The game proceeds on
three dates, t = 0, 1, 2, and the time between them is not equidistant. To distinguish
between dates, we add corresponding subscripts to all the time-dependent parameters
and variables.
On date 0, the market is in long-run equilibrium. The long-run equilibrium house price
accordingly equals p∗0 = 1 + φ with housing stock h
∗
0 =
(
α0 − (1 + φ)
)
/β. On date
1, a logical second later, an exogenous shock permanently decreases the homebuyers’
reservation price by ε ∈ (0, 1) percent to α1 = α0(1 − ε).7 As a consequence, the new
7 The assumption of a permanent decline of housing demand is meant to reflect existing rigidities in
housing markets. For instance, even eight years after the start of the US housing crisis demand for
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housing stock that is sustainable to the long run reduces to h∗1 =
(
α1 − (1 + φ)
)
/β and
creates an oversupply of houses in the amount of ∆h1 = h
∗
0 − h∗1. This oversupply lasts
until continuous depreciation, Tδh∗0, eliminates it over time. However, the new long-
run equilibrium house price remains unchanged since the marginal costs stay the same,
p∗1 = 1 + φ. Short-term home sales, x1, and the house price, p1, are unknown for the
time being as the sales decision of homeowners is pending. On date 2, T periods later,
all mortgages expire since lenders demand repayment. All homeowners have to sell their
properties eventually, independent of the prevalent market conditions. Thus, the entire
housing stock is for sale, x2 = h2, and the then-house price equals p2 = α1 − βh2. In the
best case, all of the earlier excess supply has disappeared, h2 = h
∗
1. Then, homeowners
sell their property without a loss at the long-run equilibrium house price. However, if
the housing stock remains elevated, h2 = h
∗
0(1 − Tδ) > h∗1, they will realise a house
price below the long-run equilibrium level. The housing stock can be described as h2 =
max
{
h∗1, h
∗
0(1− Tδ)
}
. Figure 1.3 portrays the market dynamics.
1 + φ 
Δh1 
�଴∗, �ଵ∗, �ଵ, �ଶ �଴ 
�଴∗ = �ଵ∗ �ଵ, �ଶ 
�ଵ 
ℎଵ∗  ℎ଴∗  ℎ଴∗ , ℎଵ∗, �ଵ, �ଶ �ଵ, �ଶ 
Figure 1.3: Housing market dynamics. This figure portrays demand and supply of housing over
time. Demand permanently declines. Marginal costs are constant. Housing supply is fixed in the
short-term, but elastic in the long-run. Two bold dots define the original and new long-run equilibrium
allocations. The bold line denotes the set of potential short-term allocations.
This situation strongly affects the bargain between incumbent homeowners and prospec-
tive homebuyers. On one side, the excess supply temporarily frees homeowners from
houses remains below historical levels. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that the extent of the housing
downturn—and thus its impact on the behaviour of homeowners and house prices—would be smaller,
if the initial demand shock were to be temporary in nature.
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external competition, because building new dwellings is unprofitable as long as the over-
supply exists. Therefore, homeowners enjoy some, though limited room for manoeuvre.
Simply put, they either sell immediately at potential fire sale prices, or they postpone
a sale until the overhang reduces and the sales prices recover. On the other side, the
excess supply lends homebuyers bargaining power to beat down prices, but their bargain-
ing power vanishes over time as the oversupply is highest immediately after the demand
declines, since the oversupply dissolves over time. Since both homeowners and home-
buyers profit to some extend from oversupply the outcome of the bargaining struggle is
ambiguous.
To resolve this conundrum, homeowners maximise their individual immediate short-term
profits, πi1(p1, x1, c), depending on the house price, p1, home sales, x1, and opportunity
costs, c.8 Opportunity costs depend on the benefits and costs of the two strategic options:
selling immediately or postponing a sale. If homeowners sell immediately, they realise the
short-term market price p1 plus first-period rent ωp0. This amounts to (p1+ωp0)(1+ r)
T
at maturity including compound interest. However, this comes at the cost of foregoing
the late market price p2, first-period rent ωp0, and subsequent periodical rent income
proportional to the late price, ωp2.
9 Including interest earnings this equals p2(1+ωI(T −
1)) + ωp0(1 + r)
T at redemption. In both cases, homeowners face an identical amount
of repayment costs p0(1 + r)
T and constant transaction costs λ ≥ 0. Condition 1.4
summarises the trade-off between the two options:
(p1 + ωp0)(1 + r)
T − p0(1 + r)T − λ︸ ︷︷ ︸
capitalised net earnings of immediate sale(t = 1)
≥ p2(1 + ωI(T − 1)) + ωp0(1 + r)T − p0(1 + r)T − λ.︸ ︷︷ ︸
capitalised net earnings of postponed sale (t = 2)
(1.4)
Homeowners only sell immediately, if the short-term price outweighs at least the proceeds
to be realised until redemption. Otherwise, they postpone a sale. Solving Equation 1.4
8 Departing from typical definitions, costs in this particular context refer to opportunity costs rather
than marginal costs, because the latter form sunk costs from a homeowner’s point of view. Home-
owners have already bought their house at the original long-run equilibrium house price. These
earlier expenses do not affect the pending sales decision of homeowners. What really matters is the
present value of a postponed sale which homeowners forego were they to sell immediately.
9 Rent income is proportional to p2 so that rent contracts reflect a potentially depressed late price:
p2 ≤ p∗1.
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for the short-term price p1 accordingly returns the opportunity costs of an immediate sale,
c =
1
(1 + r)T
(
1 + ωI(T − 1))p2 ≥ 0, lim
p2→0
c = 0. (1.5)
The opportunity costs equal the present value of the capitalised net proceeds, if home-
owners were to postpone their sales.
Meanwhile, short-term home sales x1 depend on external and internal competition, as
well as the participation of homeowners. External competition ensures that the house
price never exceeds the marginal costs in the immediate short-term. This implies that
homeowners cannot drive home sales below the new long-run equilibrium housing stock,
x1 ≥ h∗1. Otherwise, external investors would seize the profitable opportunity to construct
new homes. The bargaining power of homeowners is therefore entirely linked to the
oversupply, ∆h1. Internal competition further limits the influence homeowners have on
short-term home sales. Let s ∈ (0, 1) denote the share of the offered oversupply. Due to
the assumed distribution of houses each homeowner controls an equal stake, si, of this
share. The remainder, s−i, is commanded by the n − 1 competitors: s = si + s−i. So,
homeowners have merely humble effect on bargaining power. Also, the participation of
homeowners is conditional. For homeowners only participate as long as the house price
at maturity is positive, p2 > 0. Otherwise, p2 = 0, they sell anyway, s = 1, because
houses neither have a short-term nor a medium-turn value. After all, external (h∗1) and
internal competition (∆h1s
−i) as well as the conditional participation of homeowners (s)
considerably influence short-term home sales, x1 = h
∗
1 +∆h1(s
i + s−i).
This leads us eventually to the optimization problem of homeowners. They maximise
their individual short-term profits, πi1 = (p1 − c)∆h1si, taking these factors into account:
argmax
s
πi1 =
(
α1 − βx1 − c
)
∆h1s
i
s.t. s ∈ (0, 1),
p2 > 0,
where x1 = h
∗
1+∆h1(s
i+s−i) denotes short-term home sales. Differentiating with respect
to si yields a homeowner’s reaction function:
si =
1
2β∆h1
(
(1 + φ)− β∆h1s−i − c
)
. (1.6)
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�ଶ > Ͳ Δℎଵ ≥ Ͳ 
Sales strategy. 
 
Type j and k homeowners 
decide simultaneously. � = ? 
No sales strategy. 
 
Type j homeowners sell 
immediately.  � = ͳ 
�ଶ = Ͳ Δℎଵ ≥ Ͳ 
Figure 1.4: Decision problem in a homogeneous housing market. This figure portrays the
decision problem of homeowners in a homogeneous housing market in extensive form. Homeowners have
an incentive to postpone a sale, as long as houses have an economic value even after retarding a sale,
pj2 > 0. Otherwise, they sell immediately anyway, p2 = 0.
By summing for all n individuals,
∑n
i s
i = s and
∑n
i s
−i = s(n − 1), and solving for s,
we obtain the Nash-equilibrium share of the offered oversupply, s∗:
s∗ =


n
(n+1)
(1+φ)−c
β∆h1
, if p2 > 0,
1, if p2 = 0,
(1.7)
provided that s ∈ (0, 1) lies in the defined area.
Equation 1.7 demonstrates that the willingness of individual homeowners to sell their
homes in the immediate short term decreases with the size of the oversupply, ∆h1, and
opportunity costs, c. Since opportunity costs in turn decline with growing excess supply,
the optimal sales strategy of homeowners remains ambiguous after all, which is why we
perform simulations at a later stage to ascertain how different levels of excess supply affect
home sales and the house price in the immediate short term.
1.3 Heterogeneous Housing Market
We now generalise our analysis to portray a heterogeneous housing market. In the new
setting, homeowners and prospective homebuyers are also heterogeneous as they have
different preferences for the different types of housing.
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1.3.1 Static Equilibrium
There are two heterogeneous types of competitively traded housing. To distinguish be-
tween them we add subscript j = 1, 2 to all relevant parameters and variables. The
housing market is populated by i, ..., n1 type 1 homeowners and i, ..., n2 type 2 homeown-
ers. The respective housing stock is hj = nj. Home sales may be lower than the housing
stock, xj ≤ hj.
As before, homeowners invest in housing to economise on rent, pj
(
1+ωjI(T )
)
. They need
external financing for the initial purchase of a house. The funding is bullet so that the
balance due at maturity is pj(1 + r)
T including compound interest. Besides, the funding
stems from a homogeneous banking sector serving each type of homeowner a customised
mortgage to accommodate their specific capital needs, lj, and monitoring needs, φj. Thus,
the marginal lending costs equal lj + φj. Given the market’s competitive nature houses
trade at marginal costs, p∗j = lj + φj.
Prospective homebuyers have the following inverse demand which linearly decreases in
home sales of both types of housing:
pj = αj − βjxj − γjxk, j 6= k. (1.8)
γj > 0 is the supply elasticity concerning the competing type of housing. This way, each
housing segment experiences cross-segment competition. The house prices are positively
correlated via home sales.10 Thus, even market downturns limited to one housing segment
could spread to the other. Since both types of housing are imperfect substitutes the
spillover satisfies βj > γj. For γj = 0 homogeneous housing emerges as a special case of
Equation 1.8.
Changes in cross-segment competition unwind via home sales. To illustrate this, we re-
arrange Equation 1.8 and obtain xj = (αj − pj − γjxk)/βj, j 6= k. By substituting the
corresponding symmetric expression of xk into xj, we illustrate homes sales in terms of
10 This assumption reflects that the two types of housing, even though they represent different qualities
or regions, are to a large degree similar since they serve the same needs. Thus, they should largely
underlie similar economic dynamics.
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house prices:
xj =
βk
(
αj − pj
)− γj(αk − pk)
βjβk − γjγk , j 6= k. (1.9)
This formulation demonstrates that an isolated increase in house prices prompts ceteris
paribus a substitution effect: If type k housing becomes more expensive (cheaper), type j
housing becomes relatively more (less) popular with homebuyers. This is because home
sales xj rise (decrease). Therefore, changes in cross-segment competition dissipate through
home sales.
Furthermore, Equation 1.8 allows us to characterise the long-run housing stock. Since
both types of housing are traded competitively, houses are supplied at marginal costs,
p∗j = lj + φj, with the entire housing stock being up for sale, x
∗
j = h
∗
j . Thus, the long-run
equilibrium housing stock is: h∗j =
(
βk(αj−(lj+φj))−γj(αk−(lk+φk))
)
/(βjβk−γjγk), j 6=
k. Notice that the new long-run housing stock is always smaller than in the homogeneous
case. To see this, imagine that the difference in parameters vanishes (i.e. subscripts
disappear) and the loan volume is again standardised to l = 1. Then, the long-run
housing stock simplifies to h∗j =
(
(β − γ)(α − (1 + φ))/(β2 − γ2). Thus, the present and
previous housing stock merely differ in terms of (β − γ)/(β2 − γ2) ≶ 1/β. Since β > γ,
it follows that β(β − γ)/(β2 − γ2) < 1. Hence, 1/β > (β − γ)/(β2 − γ2). The intuitive
reason for this finding is that heterogeneity interferes with competition since spillovers
are imperfect (βj > γj). Accordingly, the home sales are higher when we abstract from
heterogeneity.
1.3.2 Housing Market Downturns
In a heterogeneous setting, a market downturn denotes a situation of excess supply in at
least one housing segment. The affected homeowners must decide whether to exploit the
durability of housing and postpone a sale or not.
Again, there are three dates, t = 0, 1, 2, and the dates are not equidistant. To distinguish
the dates, we add another subscript to all time-dependent parameters and variables.
The housing downturn evolves in the same way as before. On date 0, the market is
in long-run equilibrium. The house prices and home sales accordingly equal their static
equivalents: p∗j0 = lj+φj and h
∗
j0 =
(
βk(αj0−(lj+φj))−γj(αk0−(lk+φk))
)
/(βjβk−γjγk),
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j 6= k. On date 1, a logical second later, the demand for houses declines permanently. To
emphasise the heterogeneity of the housing market, the drop in reservation prices ε ∈ (0, 1)
may affect each segment differently depending on the shock co-movement ρ ∈ (0, 1).11
The new reservation prices are αj1 = αj0(1− ε) for type j houses and αk1 = αk0(1− ρε)
for type k houses. Type j housing is therefore worst affected by the slowdown. The
new long-run equilibrium house prices and home sales become p∗j1 = lj + φj and h
∗
j1 =(
βk(αj1−(lj+φj))−γj(αk1−(lk+φk))
)
/(βjβk−γjγk), j 6= k. Short-term home sales, xj1,
and house prices, pj1, are unknown for the time being as the sales decision of homeowners is
pending. On date 2, T periods later, all outstanding mortgages expire thereby compelling
homeowners to sell their houses. Thus, home sales match the housing stock, xj2 = hj2.
The resultant house prices are pj2 = αj1 − βjhj2 − γjhk2.
However, a housing downturn may unwind very different from before due to cross-segment
competition. The latter interferes with the initial size and direction of excess supply, the
depreciation dynamics and how homeowners maximise their profits. First of all, a down-
turn provokes an overhang only in the worst-hit housing segment while the other might
even witness a lack of houses because of the cross-segment substitution effect described
earlier. If a negative demand shock makes a certain housing segment less attractive, the
other becomes ceteris paribus more popular. Therefore, only the worst-hit housing seg-
ment suffers excess supply in any event, ∆j1 ≥ 0.12 What happens to the competing
segment k is ambiguous, since the latter is potentially less affected by the demand shock.
Type k housing only witnesses an oversupply, ∆k1 ≥ 0, if the shock co-movement is both
positive and outweighs the cross-segment substitution effect, ρ ≥ γkαj0/βjαk0 > 0.13 Oth-
erwise, the segment lacks houses, ∆h21 < 0. Hence, only the worst-hit type of housing
faces an oversupply with certainty during a housing downturn, whereas the other segment
may even lack houses.
Second, the cross-segment competition may complicate the depreciation dynamics de-
pending on the initial excess supply. For one thing, if a given segment still suffers a
surplus of houses at maturity, ∆hj1 ≥ Tδh∗j1 ≥ 0, the housing stock in the other seg-
ment may equilibrate the aggregate housing market, by temporarily depreciating below
11 We limit the correlation to non-negative values in order to ensure that any housing downturn has
at least a tendency to negatively affect the housing market in general.
12 Under the given assumptions, h∗j0, h
∗
j1 ≥ 0 and αj0 ≥ αj1. Hence, h∗j0 ≥ h∗j1, so that ∆hj1 ≥ 0
follows independent of the shock co-movement.
13 Rewriting the respective excess supply gives ∆k1 = ε(βjαk0ρ − γkαj0)/(βjβk − γjγk) ≥ 0. Solving
the expression for ρ returns the condition.
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its long-run equilibrium level. For another thing, if a given housing segment even lacks
houses, ∆hj1 < 0, it has no need for depreciations at all. We distinguish four scenarios:
hj2 =


max
{
h∗j1, h
∗
j0(1− Tδj)
}
, if ∆hj1 ≥ 0 and
Tδkh
∗
k0 ≥ ∆hk1 ≥ 0,
max
{
αj1−(lj+φj)−γjh∗k0(1−Tδk)
βj
, h∗j0(1− Tδj)
}
, if ∆hj1 ≥ 0 and
∆hk1 ≥ Tδkh∗k0 ≥ 0,
max
{
h∗j1, h
∗
j0(1− Tδj)
}
, if ∆hj1 ≥ 0 and
∆hk1 < 0,
max
{
h∗j0,
αj1−(lj+φj)−γjh∗k0(1−Tδk)
βj
}
, if ∆hj1 < 0.
Suppose that both markets witness an initial excess supply. (a) If the depreciation in
segment k is sufficient to offset the excess supply until maturity, the type j housing stock
also moves towards its long-run equilibrium level: hj2 = max
{
h∗j1, h
∗
j0(1 − Tδj)
}
. (b)
However, if the depreciation in segment k are insufficient to balance the surplus, the
depreciation dynamic in segment j might temporarily overshoot to compensate for any
imbalances on the aggregate level. The only condition is that house prices must not
exceed marginal costs: hj2 = max
{αj1−(1+φj)−γjh∗k0(1−Tδk)
βj
, h∗j0(1 − Tδj)
}
. Now assume
that only one segment suffers oversupply, while the other lacks houses. (c) If this lack
of houses materialises in the competing segment k, the type j housing stock gradually
moves towards the long-run level: hj2 = max
{
h∗j1, h
∗
j0(1−Tδj)
}
. (d) However, if segment
j itself lacks houses, its housing stock equilibrates any imbalances on the aggregate level,
unless house prices do not exceed marginal costs: hj2 = max
{
h∗j0,
αj1−(1+φj)−γjh∗k0(1−Tδk)
βj
}
.
As these scenarios illustrate the worst-hit segment guides the adjustment process towards
the new long-run equilibrium. The other segment tends to accommodate any imbalances
in the aggregate housing stock. Thus, cross-segment competition divides the pressure to
adjust among the different housing segments.
Third, the direction of the initial oversupply influences the way in which homeowners
maximise their profits during a downturn (cf. Figure 1.5). On one hand, the type j
homeowners may consciously waive some of their bargaining power, if their segment lacks
houses, ∆hj1 < 0, while the competing segment sees an overhang, ∆hk1 ≥ 0. Then,
they await the decision of the type k homeowners and serve the residual short-term
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housing demand, xj1 =
(
αj1 − γjxk1 − (lj + φj)
)
/βj, without risking a loss. If, on the
other hand, the type j homeowners suffer an excess supply of houses, ∆hj1 ≥ 0, they
maximise their profits by influencing short-term home sales, xj1 = h
∗
j1 +∆hj1sj, through
the share of offered oversupply, sj = s
i
j+s
−i
j . Then, we differentiate three cases: (a) Under
rare circumstances, the medium-term house price becomes zero, pj2 = 0, at which point
retarding a sale no longer pays out and homeowners sell immediately, sj = 1. (b) Type j
homeowners have a first-mover advantage, if the competing housing segment lacks supply,
∆hk1 < 0, allowing type k homeowners to waive some of their bargaining power. (c) The
type j and k homeowners may decide simultaneously, if both housing segments experience
an overhang. As these examples illustrate, the direction of oversupply interferes with the
profit maximization of homeowners. After all, the cross-segment competition considerably
enriches several model dynamics—initial oversupply, depreciation dynamics and the profit
maximization—, allowing housing downturns to unwind very different than before.
Type j homeowners meet  
residual housing demand: �௝ሺ�௞ሻ = ? 
�௝ଵ 
�௝ଵ = ℎ௝ଵ∗ + �ℎ௝ଵ�௝ሺ�௝� , �௝−�ሻ �௝ଵ = �௝ଵ − ߛ௝�௞ଵ �௞ − �௝ + �௝ߚ௝  
�ℎ௝ଵ < Ͳ �ℎ௝ଵ ≥ Ͳ 
�ℎ௞ଵ ≥ Ͳ 
�௝ଶ = Ͳ �௝ଶ > Ͳ 
Type j homeowners enjoy  
first-mover advantage. �௝ = ? Type j and k homeowners  decide simultaneously. �௝ = ? 
No sales strategy.  
Type j homeowners  
sell immediately. �௝ = ͳ 
Sales strategy. 
Δℎ௞ଵ < Ͳ Δℎ௞ଵ ≥ Ͳ 
Figure 1.5: Decision problem in a heterogeneous housing market. This figure portrays the
multi-layered decision problem of type j homeowners in a heterogeneous housing market in extensive
form. Type j homeowners meet the residual demand unsatisfied by the competing type, if their segment
lacks houses, ∆j1 < 0. Only in the opposite case, ∆j1 ≥ 0, homeowners may have an incentive to
strategically postpone a sale. They only do so as long as houses have an economic value even after
retarding a sale, pj2 > 0. Otherwise, they sell immediately anyway, pj2 = 0. However, provided that
homeowners consider deciding strategically they still face two case dependent options: If the competing
housing segment lacks houses, ∆k1 < 0, type j homeowners have a first-mover advantage. But if both
housing segments suffer an overhang, ∆k1 ≥ 0, type j and k homeowners make their sales decision
simultaneously.
Furthermore, the opportunity costs, cj, homeowners face with respect to an immediate
sale remain as before. Homeowners maximise their profits by weighing the benefits of
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an immediate sale against those of a postponed one. The benefits of a postponed sale
access their decision problem through opportunity costs, cj. Since the factors behind an
immediate home sale—house prices pj1 and pj2, rent income ωjpj0(1+r)
T +pj2ωjI(T −1),
balance-due pj0(1 + r)
T and transaction costs λj—do not change, opportunity costs look
as before: cj = 1/(1 + r)
T
(
1 + ωjI(T − 1)
)
pj2.
We now turn to characterising the optimal sales decision of homeowners during a downturn
in a heterogeneous housing market. The maximization is described from the perspective of
an individual type j homeowner. At first, we derive the best responses of homeowners who
enjoy a first-mover advantage. This implies that housing segment j suffers an overhang,
∆hj1 ≥ 0, while the competing segment lacks houses, ∆hk1 < 0. Type j homeowners take
it as given that competing homeowners offer the residual demand. The corresponding
individual optimization problem of a type j homeowner reads:
argmax
sj
πij1 =
(
αj1 − β1xj1 − γ1αk1 − γ2xj1 − (lj + φj)
βk
− cj
)
∆hj1s
i
j,
s.t. sj ∈ (0, 1),
pj2 > 0.
Short-term home sales are xj1 = h
∗
j1+∆hj1(s
i
j+s
−i
j ) and xk1 =
(
αk1−γkxj1−(lk+φk)
)
/βk.
Differentiation with respect to sij returns a homeowner’s reaction function:
sij =
βk(αj1 − cj)− (βjβk − γjγk)(h∗j1 +∆hj1s−ij )− γj
(
αk − (lk + φk)
)
2(βjβk − γjγk)∆hj1 (1.10)
On these grounds, the aggregate response of type j homeowners can be found by summing
for all nj individuals,
∑nj
i s
i
j = sj and
∑nj
i s
−i
j = sj(nj − 1), and solving for sj:
s∗j =
nj
(nj + 1)
βk(αj1 − cj)− (βjβk − γjγk)h∗j1 − γj
(
αk − (lk + φk)
)
(βjβk − γjγk)∆hj1 , (1.11)
imposing that sj ∈ (0, 1) lies in the defined area. In this context, the behaviour of type j
homeowners does not at all depend on the actions taken by type k homeowners. Besides,
the solution collapses to the one of homogeneous housing for γj = 0.
Next, we examine the more complex case, in which homeowners maximise their short-
term profits simultaneously, taking into account their competitor’s reaction. This setting
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applies, if both housing segments suffer an overhang, ∆hj1 ≥ 0 and ∆hk1 ≥ 0. The
individual optimization problem of a type j homeowner reads:
argmax
sj
πij1 =
(
αj1 − βjxj1 − γjxk1 − cj
)
∆hj1s
i
j,
s.t. sj ∈ (0, 1),
pj2 > 0.
Short-term home sales xj1 = h
∗
j1+∆hj1(s
i
j+s
−i
j ) and xk1 = h
∗
k1+∆hk1(s
i
k+s
−i
k ) depend on
the sales decision of the respective type of homeowner. The two players have symmetric
maximization problems, because they move at the same time and also share symmetric
inverse demand functions and marginal costs. Therefore, all the calculations analogously
hold for type k 6= j homeowners. The partial derivative with respect to sij specifies a
homeowner’s reaction function:
sij =
1
2βj∆hj1
(
(lj + φj)− βj∆hj1s−ij − γj∆hk1sk − cj
)
, (1.12)
since αj1 − βjh∗j1 − γjh∗k1 = lj + φj. Summing for all nj individuals,
∑nj
i s
i
j = sj and∑nj
i s
−i
j = sj(nj − 1), and solving for sj further gives:
sj =
nj
(nj + 1)
(lj + φj)− γj∆hk1sk − cj
βj∆hj1
. (1.13)
As one can see, sj still depends on the competing homeowner’s share of offered oversupply.
We therefore derive sk based on symmetry considerations, sk =
nk
(nk+1)
(lk+φk)−γk∆hj1sj−ck
βk∆hk1
,
and substitute the resultant expression into Equation 1.13 to determine the optimal re-
sponse of type j homeowners:
s∗j =
nj
∆hj1
(nk + 1)βk
(
(lj + φj)− cj
)− nkγj((lk + φk)− ck)
(nj + 1)(nk + 1)βjβk − njnkγjγk , (1.14)
imposing that sj ∈ (0, 1) lies in the defined area. The behaviour of type j homeowners
depends on the the opportunity costs of competing homeowners, ck. Accordingly, the
future price trajectory of the competing housing segment, pk2, indirectly affects the sales
decision of type j homeowners today. Besides, the solution nests the one of homogeneous
housing for γj = 0.
On these grounds, we reassemble the optimal sales strategy of homeowners in two steps.
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In line with Figure 1.5, we first establish whether or not the housing segment j suffers
an oversupply. If not, ∆hj1 < 0, type j homeowners meet the residual housing demand
unsatisfied by their competitors, xj1 =
(
αj1− γjxk1− (lj +φj)
)
/βj. Otherwise, ∆hj1 ≥ 0,
short-term home sales in this segment, h∗j1 +∆hj1s
∗
j , depend on the willingness s
∗
j of the
incumbent homeowners to sell immediately:
x∗j1 =


αj1−γjxk1(sk)−(1+φj)
βj
, if ∆hj1 < 0 ,
h∗j1 +∆hj1s
∗
j , if ∆hj1 ≥ 0 .
(1.15)
Provided that type j homeowners face an oversupply, ∆hj1 ≥ 0, they need to determine
the optimal share of offered oversupply, s∗j , in the second step. The type j homeowners
only decide strategically, if houses have an economic value even after retarding a sale,
pj2 > 0. Otherwise, pj2 = 0, they sell immediately anyway, sj = 1. However, if the
housing downturn supports a positive economic value, pj2 > 0, homeowners need to
account for how the downturn distributes bargaining power across the two competing
housing segments. They enjoy a first-mover advantage, if the competing segment lacks
houses, ∆hk1 < 0. On the other side, type j and k homeowners decide simultaneously, if
both segments experience excess supply. This leads to:
s∗j =


nj
(nj+1)
βk(αj1−cj)−(βjβk−γjγk)h∗j1−γj(αk1−(lk+φk))
(βjβk−γjγk)∆hj1 , if pj2 > 0, and
∆hj1 ≥ 0, ∆hk1 < 0,
nj
∆hj1
(nk+1)βk((lj+φj)−cj)−nkγj((lk+φk)−ck)
(nj+1)(nk+1)βjβk−njnkγjγk , if pj2 > 0, and
∆hj1 ≥ 0,∆hk1 ≥ 0,
1, if pj2 = 0,
(1.16)
as long as s∗j ∈ (0, 1) is satisfied.
In summary, homeowners are confronted with a multi-stage decision problem. The struc-
ture of the decision problem depends on the housing market conditions. Sometimes home-
owners enjoy a first-mover advantage or a simultaneous decision problem, sometimes they
simply serve the residual housing demand or do not decide strategically at all. In the
case that homeowners consider to strategically postpone a sale during downturns, their
willingness to sell immediately declines in the size of excess supply, ∆hj1, and in the
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opportunity costs, cj. At the same time, the opportunity costs rise in the oversupply,
while the cross-segment competition diffusely interferes with the optimal share of offered
oversupply in the numerator and the denominator. Therefore, any definite solution to the
outlined multi-stage decision problem rests upon simulations.
1.4 Simulation Analysis
We now explore in depth how different parameter and variable values affect the optimal
sales decision of homeowners during downturns. This is necessary for two reasons. First,
the supposed market structure frames the final outcome a priori because it defines the
direction and extent of cross-segment dependence. Hence, understanding how variations
in the parameterization work out is indispensable. Second, the variables considered form
potential policy instruments as they derive from economic and political processes out-
side the housing market. This might open up new, though possibly indirect, ways of
intervening in struggling housing markets.
Some words of caution are in place before continuing with the simulations. Please re-
member that in the model the initial demand shock is supposed to be permanent. This
is of course overly simplistic as compared to a temporary demand shock. It also implies
a tendency to overestimate the extent of the simulated downturn and, hence, its impact
on the behaviour of homeowners and house prices. However, given the multitudes of
rigidities in housing markets, e.g. demand remains subdued even eight years after the US
Housing Crisis has started, a permanent demand shock appears to be a farily reasonable
approximation.
In order to characterise the sales decision of homeowners subsequent to declining housing
demand, we investigate four different properties. The first property is the aggregate
share of withdrawn oversupply, wsj = 1 − sj, wsj ∈ (0, 1). This reports the number of
homeowners who should optimally postpone a sale in the immediate short term and the
extent to which they actually exercise their market power. The next property considered
is the discounting of the immediate short-run price and the Bertrand price, i.e. when
no strategic decision making is possible (sj = 0), versus the initial market price, dj1 =
pj1/pj0 − 1, and dBj = pBj /pj0 − 1. The third property is the logarithmic supply elasticity
of prices, ηj1 = log
(
(pj1 − pj0)/(xj1 − xj0) × xj0/pj0
)
, which summarises whether the
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immediate short-term adjustment is primarily shouldered through the house prices or the
home sales. A value of the supply elasticity above (below) zero suggests that prices (home
sales) bear the bulk of the immediate short-run adjustment. This form of market clearing
corresponds to the “quantity clearing mechanism” (“price clearing mechanism”) defined
by Case and Quigley (2008). The last property is the housing inventory expressed in
terms of home sales, hij = hj0/xj1 − 1. It portrays how a strongly hidden supply skews
home sales during a downturn.
For ease of illustration, we further concentrate on demand shocks, ε, of up to 0.5. Not
only do shocks of that size hardly ever occur in reality, but also there are no remarkable
dynamics beyond this threshold. Moreover, some inputs are generally used for model cali-
bration purposes: the depreciation rate, δ, equals 2.0% (net of maintenance) in accordance
with a recent empirical study (Harding et al., 2007). The long-run risk-free rate, r, is set
to 5.0% to be reasonably close to the 5.3% historical average of the US Federal Funds
Rate between 1955 and 2012. The assumed ten-year maturity of mortgages, T , mimics
the typical loan arrangements (before refinancing). All the other inputs are discussed in
the relevant context below. A summary of all the applied parameterizations is given in
Table A.1 in the appendix.
The simulation exercise indicates that homeowners typically have a strong incentive to
postpone a sale in housing downturns. This optimal sales strategy, however, fails to
deliver a reasonable explanation for the spillovers observed in the “Subprime Crisis”.
More precisely, homeowners tend to postpone a sale rather than realizing an immediate
loss, consistent with survey evidence (cf. Case and Shiller, 1988; Case et al., 2003; Case
et al., 2012). Home sales accordingly carry the majority of the immediate short-term
adjustment. House prices are therefore rather sticky. Serious spillovers transpire, only if
the demand for one segment is not sustainable in the long-term. However, this condition
appears unfit to describe even the recent “Subprime Crisis”. Thus, we need to refine
the model assumptions further in the subsequent section, where appropriate. Further
investigation of the potential policy instruments shows that fiscal stimuli, monetary policy
and urban policy might strengthen the incentive of homeowners to delay their sale. This
sales strategy indirectly stabilises tumbling housing markets.
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1.4.1 Homogeneous Housing Market
The homogeneous housing market serves as a starting point due to its simplicity. The
model specific parameters are α = 2, β = 1, and φ = 3.0%. In this way, we ascertain
that house price increases translate into similar reductions in home sales. Besides, the
reservation price equals roughly twice the size of the marginal costs.
The simulations in Figure 1.6 portray the optimal sales strategy of homeowners and its
implications for house prices. Homeowners start to postpone their sales strategically if the
negative demand shock exceeds 1.2%. The peak of deliberate withdrawals is reached for
an exogenous shock of 9.0%. At this stage, homeowners artificially shorten the existing
oversupply by roughly 88.0%. For higher levels of oversupply they withdraw increasingly
less because a late sale is also less favourable. Nonetheless, homeowners remove at least
60% of the housing surplus for as long as their property holds a positive long-term value.
In this way, homeowners effectively smooth the available excess supply for sale during
housing downturns. The resulting short-term price discount is therefore less depressed
than in the absence of strategic withdrawals.
Furthermore, the optimal sales strategy of homeowners implies that house prices remain
rather sticky leaving most of the adjustment to home sales. Indeed, the predominantly
negative sign of the supply elasticity indicates that home sales bear the bulk of the imme-
diate short-term adjustment in most scenarios (“quantity clearing mechanism”). Only for
demand decreases below 2.0% does the relation reverse (“price clearing mechanism”). The
supply elasticity reaches its minimum precisely when the share of strategically postponed
sales peaks. At this point, the contraction in home sales is more than eight times the drop
in house prices. Besides, the build-up of the housing inventory necessary to accommodate
withdrawals is economically significant. For instance, decreases in the reservation price
of 5.0% already yield a double-digit build-up of the housing inventory. Hence, the model
predicts sticky house prices facilitated by a corresponding reduction in home sales and
respective growth in the housing inventory.
1.4.2 Heterogeneous Housing Market
Next, we repeat the simulation analysis for the heterogeneous model. To keep matters
simple, we apply all of the previous parameter and variable values symmetrically to both
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(a) Share of withdrawn oversupply.
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0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
Decline of Reservation Price in Percent
P
ri
c
e
 E
la
s
ti
c
it
y
 o
f 
T
ra
n
s
a
c
ti
o
n
 V
o
lu
m
e
 (
in
 l
o
g
s
)
(c) Price elasticity of home sales.
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(d) Inventory over Home Sales.
Figure 1.6: Homogeneous housing market. This figure characterises the optimal sales decision of
homeowners in a homogeneous market. Sections (a) to (d) exhibit different properties of the model: the
share of withdrawn oversupply, price discounts, price elasticity and housing inventory. The respective
properties are depicted on the vertical axis. The percentage decline in the reservation price is on the
horizontal axis. For details on the parameterization please confer to Table A.1 in the appendix.
segments. The newly introduced spillovers are uniformly set to γj = 0.5, so they are
economically relevant, but do not dominate the outcome. With a co-movement of ρ = 0.5,
the exogenous shock primarily hits type 1. Under these conditions, only type 1 houses
face an initial oversupply, because the substitution effect neutralises the correlated decline
in demand of type 2 housing. This setting constitutes the standard calibration.
The simulation results exhibited in Figure 1.7 characterise the optimal sales strategy of
homeowners in the two segments and on an aggregated level. The homogeneous model
results are also included as a natural benchmark. The exercise reveals profound disparities
regarding how the two types of homeowners respond to a downturn. Type 1 homeowners
show an optimal sales strategy that is qualitatively similar to the homogeneous case. The
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extent to which they postpone a sale strategically is initially more pronounced. However,
type 1 homeowners also stop deciding strategically at a lower level of oversupply (33.0%
vs. 48.5%) since their market segment is already failing. By contrast, type 2 homeowners
do not postpone a sale until then. However, since at least 95.0% of their oversupply
should be withdrawn, they have an optimally higher motivation to delay. Nonetheless,
the sales strategy of type 1 homeowners dominates the share of withdrawn oversupply on
an aggregated level.
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(a) Share of withdrawn oversupply.
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(b) Price discount vs. long-run house price.
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(c) Price elasticity of home sales.
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(d) Inventory over home sales.
Figure 1.7: Heterogeneous housing market. This figure characterises the optimal sales decision of
homeowners in a heterogeneous market. Sections (a) to (d) exhibit different properties of the model: the
share of withdrawn oversupply, price discounts, price elasticity and housing inventory. The respective
properties are depicted on the vertical axis. The percentage decline in the reservation price is on the
horizontal axis. For details on the parameterization please confer to Table A.1 in the appendix.
These findings suggest that cross-segment competition plays a critical role in the optimal
sales decision of homeowners. The reason is that it causes a substitution effect, which rises
with the intensity of cross-segment competition. The substitution effect mitigates the size
of the aggregate oversupply. This in turn provides homeowners with greater discretion in
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exercising their market power. Thus, cross-segment competition to some extent supports
the incentive of homeowners to postpone a sale. On the downside, fierce cross-segment
competition reduces the market depth. Therefore, the capacity of the housing market
to absorb oversupply decreases and the threshold at which a market segment dissolves
falls. This compromises the strategic sales decision of homeowners. Hence, cross-segment
competition bolsters the exercise of bargaining power by homeowners for low to moderate
excess supply, but harms it in the presence of a substantial overhang.
House prices respond to cross-segment competition accordingly. The price discount of type
1 houses is consistently larger than that of type 2 houses. The aggregated transactions-
based price discount is skewed towards type 2 housing, since the withdrawals of type 1
homeowners undermine their weight in the aggregation. More importantly, the prices in
both segments are higher than the homogeneous benchmark, unless the type 1 housing
segment dissolves, but then the collapse of the worst-affected segment instantly spills
over, as both segments witness a considerable drop in the short-term price below the
homogeneous benchmark. Hence, house prices might suddenly plummet under extreme
conditions provided that the excess supply grows sufficiently large.
Cross-segment competition also interferes with the aggregate supply elasticity and hous-
ing inventory. Prior to a collapse of the market for type 1 housing, the aggregate elasticity
not only strongly resembles that of this segment, but is also smaller than for the homoge-
neous benchmark. However, once the market for type 1 housing dissolves, the aggregate
elasticity is more closely tied to type 2 housing and higher than that for the homogeneous
benchmark. The supply elasticity further jumps to positive values following the segment’s
demise. Thus, discontinuities in the share of withdrawn oversupply turn the “quantity
clearing mechanism” into a “price clearing mechanism”. In addition, the housing inven-
tory reveals that the magnitude of aggregate supply shortages is generally lower than in
the homogeneous case. This is astonishing insofar as the implied price discounts are lower
in the heterogeneous setting after all. Thus, the benefits resulting from cross-segment
competition also affect the extent of housing inventory formation.
In summary, a heterogeneous housing market resists small to moderate demand declines,
but is prone to sudden and intense price drops for large decreases in the housing demand.
First, the incentive for homeowners to withdraw from the market is more pronounced
but collapses at lower levels of oversupply than in a homogeneous context. Second, the
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aggregate house price experiences a smaller discount than in the benchmark scenario,
unless one segment dissolves. Third, in case that a segment dissolves, the housing market
clears through a “quantity clearing mechanism” rather than a “price clearing mechanism”.
This illustrates that house price spillovers are the result of a collapse of strategic decision
making in one segment and are spread via cross-segment competition. Hence, a segmented
housing market tends to be more stable for small to moderate levels of oversupply, but at
the cost of increased vulnerability for high levels.
1.4.3 Cross-Segment Competition and Shock Co-Movement
In order to explore how the newly introduced factors—quantity spillovers and shock
correlation—influence the short-term market allocation and accordingly the fragility of
housing markets, we repeat the simulation for varying levels of γj and ρ. Both times,
the respective parameters are ceteris paribus set to 0.1, 0.5 and 0.9. We summarise the
simulation results in Figure 1.8 by means of strategic interaction and price discounts.14
We first investigate the impact of different quantity spillovers. In accordance with our
earlier simulation results, higher cross-segment competition promotes house price stability
for low and moderate oversupply, but it increases the fragility of house prices faced with
a large overhang, too. The reason is that cross-segment competition alleviates the aggre-
gate oversupply at the cost of lower market depth. The latter increases the sensitivity
of a homeowner’s sales strategy to the size of excess supply. The house prices behave
accordingly. They are higher than in the homogeneous setting as long as homeowners
decide strategically. However, once one market segment breaks down, the price discount
is far more elevated in the presence of high cross-segment competition. Hence, from a
risk perspective, quantity spillovers contribute to the fragility of house prices in times of
substantial downturns.
Varying levels of shock co-movement affect the sales decision of homeowners in three
ways. First, the lower the shock correlation, the higher the incentive for homeowners to
retard a sale unless no market segment collapses. This is because the shock correlation
erodes the substitution effect. However, the substitution effect provides homeowners with
a greater discretion in exercising market power. Thus, a smaller co-movement translates
14 The simulation results regarding the supply elasticity and housing inventory are included in Fig-
ures A.1 and A.2 in the appendix.
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(a) Cross-segment competition: Share of with-
drawn oversupply.
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(b) Cross-segment competition: Price discount
vs. long-run house price.
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(c) Shock co-movement: Share of withdrawn
oversupply.
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Figure 1.8: Cross-segment competition and shock co-movement. This figure illustrates how
the optimal sales decision of homeowners responds to changes in cross-segment competition and shock
co-movement by means of the share of withdrawn oversupply and the associated price discounts. The
respective properties are depicted on the vertical axis. The percentage decline in the reservation price is
on the horizontal axis. For details on the parameterization please confer to Table A.1 in the appendix.
into a higher incentive to postpone a sale. Second, for a small shock co-movement, the
incentive to time a sale takes a nosedive at lower levels of oversupply. Since a low shock
correlation bolsters the substitution effect, it also abates the market depth, but a thin
market is less capable of absorbing oversupply. It dissolves more easily. Thus, a low shock
correlation reduces the threshold at which homeowners lose any interest in strategically
keeping a house away from the market. Third, the higher the shock co-movement, the
more the strategic sales decision of homeowners resembles the homogeneous benchmark.
This is due to the fact that the otherwise symmetric market segments are increasingly
affected in the same way. Again, the house prices act accordingly. As long as homeowners
behave strategically, the discounts are lower. However, the aggregate market prices fall
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noticeably short of their homogeneous benchmark, once this condition is violated in (at
least) one segment. Hence, a low shock co-movement features rather stable house prices
in small to moderate oversupply scenarios, but material price drops when the overhang is
substantial.
In a nutshell, both cross-segment competition and shock co-movement considerably inter-
fere with the stability of the housing market. It turns out that a heterogeneous housing
market is more stable than its homogeneous equivalent as long as strategic decision mak-
ing is intact. On the other side, the threshold at which this precondition is no longer
satisfied rises with the two factors. The reason is that both factors alleviate the aggregate
oversupply at the cost of lower market depth, but the latter increases the sensitivity of
a homeowner’s sales strategy to the size of the excess supply. After all, cross-segment
competition and shock co-movement influence how a given level of oversupply affects the
ultimate sales decision of homeowners and thus the entire housing market.
1.4.4 Influencing Seller Behaviour
Now, we turn to three key exogenous variables, the adjustment of which might be influ-
enced by policy makers: the interest rate, r, the time to maturity, T , and the depreciation
rate, δj. We explore how policy interventions could diminish the negative consequences of
market downturns for house prices through influencing the sales decision of homeowners.
For the analysis we concentrate on the aggregate share of withdrawn oversupply (cf. Figure
1.9. We start by examining the impact of monetary policy. Subsequent to a cut (mark-up)
in the interest rate to r = 1.0% (r = 9.0%) more (less) homeowners ceteris paribus retreat
from the market. This is because a lower (higher) interest rate raises (decreases) the
opportunity costs of staying in the market. Selling later (immediately) therefore becomes
more attractive. Besides, the effect is most pronounced for a rather small oversupply
(ε ≤ 7.5%). However, even lower interest rates cannot prevent homeowners from ceasing
to time their sale strategically at some point. Besides, the threshold at which the strategic
sales decision making of homeowners takes a nosedive remains unchanged. After all,
though, monetary policy constitutes one way in which central banks might intervene in
struggling housing markets.
Two other fields of interest are urban policy and financial stimuli. Urban policy might
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(a) Monetary policy: Adjusting interest rate r.
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(b) Urban policy: Adjusting replacement rate δj .
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(c) Fiscal stimuli: Adjusting maturity T .
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(d) Policy scenarios.
Figure 1.9: Policy interventions. This figure characterises the optimal sales decision of homeowners
in a heterogeneous market under policy interventions. The homogeneous market allocation serves as a
benchmark. The percentage decline in the reservation price is on the horizontal axis and the share of
withdrawn housing units on the vertical axis. Sections (a) to (c) delineate the effect of policy inter-
ventions by instrument (r, δ, T ). Section (d) defines concerted policy interventions. For details on the
parameterization please confer to Table A.1 in the appendix.
affect the depreciation rate, δj, by encouraging either the formation or the demolition
of the housing stock. Financial stimuli could further incentivise mortgage creditors and
debtors to modify the time to maturity, T , of existing mortgages where appropriate.
Changing the depreciation rate, δj, or the time to maturity, T , has a very similar effect on
the sales decision of homeowners. In both cases, a reduction (increase) in the respective
factor by half causes strategic interaction to peak at lower (higher) levels of oversupply.
Until then, the trajectory of optimal homeowner behaviour evolves almost identically to
the baseline case. This results from the fact that both variables primarily govern the
same model dynamic: total depreciation Tδjhj1.
15 As before, the two factors have no
influence on the threshold at which a temporary breakdown of strategic behaviour occurs.
15 T further affects the capital formation, I(T ), and the discount factor, 1/(1 + r)T .
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Therefore, urban policy and financial stimuli may indirectly stabilise house prices in the
immediate short term.
In order to explore the limits of policy interventions in stabilizing a heterogeneous hous-
ing market during downturns, we define a best-case (r = 1.0%, δj = 3.0%, T = 15) and
a worst-case scenario (r = 9.0%, δj = 1.0%, T = 5). Under the best-case scenario, the
joint effort of monetary policy, urban policy and financial stimuli raises both the extent
and the persistence of shortened oversupply. In particular, prior to a nosedive in strategic
behaviour far more homeowners avoid selling immediately. Moreover, the peak of strate-
gically postponed sales shifts outwards. Under the worst case scenario both conclusions
reverse. Hence, concerted policy interventions are capable of significantly strengthening
the incentive of homeowners to retard a sale strategically during market downturns. This
indirectly stabilises house prices in both market segments.
1.5 Revisiting the 2006-09 US Housing Market Crash
This section examines the collapse of the US housing market between 2006 and 2009,
taking into account some of the key market features at the time, such as the division into
a “subprime” and a “prime” segment, high leverage, and non-recourse financing. Under
the recalibrated model, destructive spillovers occur when homeowners lose the incentive
to postpone a sale, because they default. Besides, should banks see a need to allocate
capital to foreclosed homes first non-distressed home sales might also be crowded out. In
both cases, house prices are forced down.
1.5.1 Non-Recourse Financing and Credit Quality
The US housing market is made up of two segments. By 2006, the “subprime” segment ac-
counted for roughly one-fifth of the market and the “prime” segment for the remainder.16
The subprime segment is defined by the typically lower creditworthiness of homeowners
compared with their prime counterparts. For the same reason, subprime houses are typ-
ically smaller, while the mortgage rates are more expensive (abstracting from so-called
16 According to Frame et al. (2008), the entire US residential mortgage market had an estimated value
of USD 10.0 tn at year-end 2007. The subprime segment accounted for USD 1.2 tn in first-lien
mortgages and another USD 1.1 tn in second-lien mortgages.
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teaser rates, which defer the interest burden for some time).17 Interestingly, despite the
lower credit quality, subprime homeowners often obtain higher leverage since they require
a smaller initial downpayment. For instance, in 2006, the median (average) loan-to-value
ratios of newly issued (existing) subprime and prime mortgages were about 0.93 (0.85)
and 0.80 (0.73) (cf. Frame et al., 2008; Gao and Li, 2013; Palmer, 2013).
Another missing element in our analysis is the possibility of strategic defaults of homeown-
ers. In accordance with US bankruptcy, law retail mortgages are typically non-recourse
Harris (2010). This practice prevents creditors from seizing the remaining property of
debtors in the case of default. Thus, homeowners possess an option to stop serving their
mortgage once the future loan payments surpass the expected proceeds. Let a home-
owner’s outstanding obligation at maturity equal ltvjpj0(1 + r)
T , where ltvj denotes the
loan-to-value ratio (LTV). Her capitalised proceeds are pj2
(
1+ωI(T −1))+ωpj0(1+ r)T .
Thus, if the following participation condition is violated,
ltvjpj0(1 + r)
T ≥ pj2
(
1 + ωI(T − 1))+ ωpj0(1 + r)T ,
all respective homeowners default on their mortgages.18
Taking these characteristics into account we re-calibrate the heterogeneous model. Type
1 housing is referred to as “subprime” and type 2 housing as “prime”. The corresponding
loan sizes are l1 = 1 and l2 = 2 to reflect the differentials in credit quality. The lever-
age that subprime and prime homeowners obtain by borrowing against collateral closely
matches that prior to the crisis, ltv1 = 0.9 and ltv2 = 0.8. The agio paid for the service
of financial intermediation equals φj = 0.06 in both cases. In this way, the marginal costs
of (high risk) subprime homeowners in terms of house size are still higher than those
for (low-risk) prime homeowners: 1.06 = c1/v1 > c2/v2 = 1.03. We set the reservation
price of subprime homeowners to α1 = 2.0 and choose that of prime homeowners so that
the subprime segment accounts for roughly 20.0% of the housing market. The remaining
parameters and variables remain unaltered: βj = 1, γj = 0.5, ρ = 0.5, δj = 2%, T = 10,
and r = 5%.
17 For details, see Figures 1 and 12 in Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross (2006).
18 For simplicity, we abstract from the fact that in reality a violation of this condition, often referred
to as negative equity, is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for borrower default as Foote et al.
(2008) point out. Besides, Harris (2010) explained that roughly 20.0% or 588,000 of all foreclosures
in 2008 were due to strategic defaults.
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(a) Share of withdrawn oversupply.
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(b) Price discount vs. long-run house price.
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(c) Price elasticity of home sales.
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(d) Inventory over home sales.
Figure 1.10: Foreclosures and house prices. This figure characterises the optimal sales decision of
homeowners in a heterogeneous framework customised to the specifics of the US housing market. Sections
(a) to (d) exhibit different properties of the model: the share of withdrawn oversupply, price discounts,
price elasticity and housing inventory. The respective properties are depicted on the vertical axis. The
percentage decline in the reservation price is on the horizontal axis. For details on the parameterization
please confer to Table A.1 in the appendix.
The introduction of a participation constraint considerably undermines the incentive of
homeowners to postpone a sale strategically compared with a projection abstracting from
deliberate defaults. While their efforts to delay home sales are undisturbed for low levels
of overhang, the participation constraint of subprime homeowners soon becomes binding.
They consequently default. Despite a simultaneous increase in strategic withdrawals by
prime homeowners, the aggregate share of the withdrawn oversupply is nearly halved. In
the same way deliberate defaults prematurely compromise the strategic rationale of prime
homeowners once their participation constraint is violated for high levels of oversupply.
Thus, as soon as the participation constraints of homeowners are effectively binding,
subprime and prime homes may suddenly flood the housing market.
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The house prices react accordingly. They remain relatively stable unless a participation
constraint is no longer satisfied and a sell-off occurs. For instance, in the case that
moderate oversupply unleashes a sell-off of subprime homes, the price drop in this segment
is particularly pronounced and also dominates the aggregate house price, notwithstanding
its small market share. This is because exclusively prime homeowners postpone a sale,
whereas all subprime houses are thrown onto the market. Moreover, in the case that
a large oversupply even triggers a sell-off of prime houses, the quantity shock directly
translates into another plunge in house prices. This time, the aggregate house price
decline is dominated by the prime segment. Hence, house prices are vulnerable to sell-offs
as a result of deliberate defaults by either of the two types of homeowners.
A look at the supply elasticity further shows that strategic defaults turn the traditional
“quantity clearing mechanism” into a “price clearing mechanism” (cf. Case, 2008). On one
side, the aggregate supply elasticity abruptly turns positive after the participation con-
dition is violated. On the other side, the projected elasticity ignoring deliberate defaults
remains negative, even for more sluggish demand. Hence, without the default option pro-
vided by the US bankruptcy law, housing markets would remain quantity-driven except
for large excess supply. Only after deliberate defaults prompt a sell-off in the subprime
segment does the housing market as a whole clear through prices. Even a far above-
average formation of housing inventory, shouldered by prime homeowners cannot reverse
this. The way in which a market clears in the immediate short term therefore strongly
depends on the actual design of the bankruptcy law and mortgage contracts.
In summary, the re-calibrated heterogeneous housing market model portrays fairly well
several key characteristics of the 2006-09 housing market crash. First, the decline in house
prices accelerated over time (Financial Times, 2008). This observation is compatible with
the gradually declining demand for housing in the model—at first slowly, then increasingly
pronounced. At some point, the sell-offs predicted by the simulation for moderate and
large oversupply speed up the price drops. Second, the house price declines were closely
intertwined with the rising foreclosure rates, which concentrated in the subprime segment
(cf. Campbell et al., 2011; Frame et al., 2008; Mian et al., 2014). From a model perspec-
tive, this relates to strategic defaults. Once the oversupply becomes sufficiently large,
future house prices no longer cover the outstanding obligations of homeowners. In antici-
pation of a loss, they exercise their non-recourse default option. As a result, house prices
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slump precisely when foreclosure rates jump up. Moreover, foreclosures concentrate in the
subprime segment because its above-average leverage makes the participation constraint
of homeowners particularly binding. Thus, the subprime segment is more sensitive to
oversupply. Third, home sales, which became increasingly dominated by distressed sales
in the subprime segment, slumped, while the housing inventory surged (CoreLogic, 2010).
The model draws the same conclusion: while prime homeowners prefer to keep out of the
market and wait for higher future sales prices, subprime homes in foreclosure trade on the
market (Case, 2008). Hence, when accounting for the strategic defaults of homeowners,
their strategic sales decision establishes a link between oversupply, house price declines,
mortgage defaults and the rising housing inventory, which is consistent with the recent
US housing crash.
1.5.2 Mortgage Losses and House Prices
Finally, we investigate how banks sustaining mortgage losses interfere with house prices.
The empirical evidence suggests that banks with branches in several regions shifted scarce
lending capacity to those branches that experienced the most devastating mortgage losses
during the US housing market crash Berrospide et al. (2013). In this way, they tried
to balance the burden of mortgage losses. The subsequent question is how this pecking
order, which favours distressed home sales, affects house prices?
For this purpose, we conduct another simulation. In order to reflect reality as closely
as possible, we refine some further assumptions. First, the banking sector pursues a
lending policy that prefers distressed home sales (cf. Berrospide et al., 2013). Second,
the banking sector is leveraged. In fact, US commercial banks held about 10.0% of their
assets in equity prior to the crisis.19 Third, the banking sector maintains its leverage.
Otherwise, bank regulators would intervene in troubled institutions. The Federal Deposit
Insurance Company alone assisted 181 US commercial banks between 2006 and 2009. 20
Moreover, the exercise proceeds as follows: initially, the immediate short-term prices are
computed for each segment. Next, we determine the resulting losses per segment. Losses
19 According to the Federal Deposit Insurance Company’s SDI database, US commercial banks had
total assets of USD 10.1bn and held total equity capital of USD 1.0bn as of 31 December 2006:
http://www2.fdic.gov/sdi/main.asp.
20 The data stem from the Federal Deposit Insurance Company’s “Failures and Assistance Transac-
tions” database: http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/HSOBSummaryRpt.asp?BegYear=2007&EndYear=2009&
State=2&Header=0.
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occur, if the short-term house price falls below the original mortgage volume (i.e. the
initial house price times its LTV) of a given type of homeowner. The difference between
the two defines the loss that the banking sector realises per type of homeowner. Summing
over the individual losses returns the aggregate loss of the banking sector. Its equity
decreases accordingly.21 Thus, the banking sector needs to slacken its lending to keep its
leverage constant. Following the above pecking order, the banking sector allocates the
reduced lending volume to distressed home sales first before distributing the remainder
to less affected ones.
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(a) Bank losses and lack of mortgage volume.
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(b) Price discount vs. long-run house price.
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(c) Price elasticity of home sales.
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(d) Inventory over home sales.
Figure 1.11: Mortgage losses and house prices. This figure characterises the optimal sales decision
of homeowners under crowding-out of non-distressed home sales due to the inefficient provision of lending
capacity by the banking sector. The model framework is customised to the specifics of the US housing
market. Sections (a) to (d) exhibit different properties of the model: bank losses and the lack of mortgage
volume, price discounts, price elasticity and housing inventory. The respective properties are depicted on
the vertical axis. The percentage decline in the reservation price is on the horizontal axis. For details on
the parameterization please confer to Table A.1 in the appendix.
The simulations indicate that losses in the banking sector may impair home sales and
21 Similar to Hatzius (2008), we implicitly assume that banks are not able to recapitalise instantly to
offset their initial losses.
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house prices at the same time if the lending capacity becomes insufficient. However,
note that the banking sector suffers no losses unless subprime borrowers default (cf. Fig-
ure 1.11). As implied by the above pecking order, any lack of lending volume solely impairs
the execution of pending sales in the prime segment. Home sales for which no credit is
available are suspended. With home sales being skewed in such a way, the transaction-
weighted aggregate house price also departs downwards from its unconstrained equivalent.
Besides, under crowding out, the quantity clearing mechanism dominates the price clearing
mechanism. The transaction-based elasticity is not only smaller than without crowding
out, but also becomes negative again once the phenomenon comes into effect. However,
the most eye-catching consequence, apart from skewed house prices, is the size of the ad-
ditional ramp-up in inventory formation, once a lack of lending capacity occurs. Hence,
the unintended reduction in home sales due to a shortage of available lending volume
strains the aggregate house price rather than stabilizing it.
The close resemblance of the observed and the model-implied house price over the cri-
sis period corroborates the perception that the deliberate defaults of homeowners and
an insufficient lending volume supported the US housing market collapse. Figure 1.12
exhibits the observed and projected trajectory of US house prices from peak to trough.
They reveal an astonishingly close resemblance. In particular, declining house prices
gained momentum subsequent to an initial five-percent drop. Moreover, the house price
growth temporarily slowed down before accelerating again. This delayed “double drop”
matches the idea of deliberately defaulting homeowners in the subprime and prime seg-
ments prompting sell-off waves of foreclosed homes. Moreover, this observation suggests a
causal link between the severity of a slowdown and the way in which the housing market
clears. Small price discounts are compatible with a low overhang and quantity clearing.
However, substantial price discounts do not materialise unless a sufficiently large excess
supply lets the market clear through prices. Finally, the brief time gap between the first
and the second price drop (Q3/2007 and Q3/2008) hints at either an accelerating over-
hang or a mounting lack of mortgage credit. In our view, these insights underpin the
case for the disastrous effects of deliberate defaults and insufficient lending volume on the
stability of the US housing market over the course of the recent crisis.
In essence, a disruption in financial intermediation caused by falling house prices could
“infect” the price discovery in the housing market even further, because it forces house
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Figure 1.12: Observed and projected US house price growth. This figure portrays the observed
and projected house price growth from peak to trough during the recent US housing crisis (2006-2009).
Growth rates are computed since inception of the crisis (Q2/2006) based on the S&P Case/Shiller Na-
tional House Price and on simulations of the US-specific heterogeneous model with crowding-out of
non-distressed home sales. Data sources: Robert Shiller (www.econ.yale.edu/shiller/data/Fig2-1.xls),
own calculations.
prices and home sales below their fundamental levels. Besides, under the given assump-
tions, the projected bias should define a lower boundary. Since the banking sector is
assumed to be uniform, the lending capacity can easily be transferred across segments.
However, in reality, the banking sector is fragmented. Hence, a lack of lending capacity
might actually harm the housing market more gravely. In fact, there were signs of lack-
ing mortgage volume during the US housing market crash. Professional commentators
argued that prospective homebuyers faced serious difficulties in obtaining bank funding
to purchase a house, despite very favourable financing terms (CoreLogic, 2010).
1.6 Conclusions
This paper explores how homeowners should optimally respond to the typical excess sup-
ply during housing market downturns. Should they sell immediately at potential fire
sale prices or should they postpone a sale for some time to sit out the negative conse-
quences of a slowdown? The presented game-theoretical model provides a comprehensive
seller-oriented explanation. Homeowners ought to retard a sale, as long as the immediate
short-term house price is lower than the expected total cash flows of the property. In
this way, homeowners effectively shorten the housing overhang and help to stabilise house
prices in the immediate short term. However, under rare circumstances, their financial
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objective are no longer met. Then, homeowners lose any interest in retarding a sale strate-
gically. The subsequent uncoordinated sell-off sends negative spillovers to other market
segments and allows house prices to plummet. Hence, the model establishes a causal link
between the severity of slowdowns, the timing of home sales and the way in which housing
markets clear.
This constitutes a major extension of our theoretical understanding of housing downturns
compatible with observations made over the course of the recent US housing market crash.
Under the traditional “quantity clearing mechanism’ (Case and Quigley, 2008)’, housing
downturns would primarily unwind through lower home sales. However, as the final
phase of the recent US housing crisis (2006 and 2009) revealed, the house price growth
may considerably outpace the depreciation in home sales (cf. Figure 1.1). This decisive
experience gives rise to a “price clearing mechanism” (Case and Quigley, 2008). The
housing market model presented in this paper is the first to integrate both mechanisms
into the same framework.
The numerical simulations further demonstrate that the degree of heterogeneity of the
housing market is another relevant factor for the stability of house prices. For instance,
on one side, the less fragmented the housing market is, the more stable the aggregate house
price is for low to moderate oversupply. On the other side, the house price becomes more
vulnerable to substantial excess supply. These two observations reflect that cross-segment
competition splits the burden of adjustment across housing segments. This provides
homeowners with leeway for responding strategically to even segment-specific downturns.
By contrast, the market depth and thus the capacity of the market to absorb an overhang
decreases. Hence, a strongly fragmented housing market is more resilient in the presence
of a low to moderate housing overhang, but prone to substantial excess supply. The degree
of heterogeneity across segments is therefore critical during housing downturns.
Moreover, a US-specific model version imitating the country’s 2006-2009 housing crisis
shows that high leverage non-recourse mortgages and an undercapitalised banking sec-
tor may add to the fragility of the housing market. Each source undermines either the
incentive of homeowners to retard a sale or their ability to pursue the optimal sales strat-
egy. First, high-leverage non-recourse mortgages are destabilising, because they facilitate
deliberate mass foreclosures at relatively low levels of demand reduction. In fact, US
bankruptcy law prevents creditors from seizing the residual property of debtors in the
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case of default. Homeowners accordingly possess an option to stop serving their mortgage
once the expected loan payments surpass the proceeds. Waves of deliberate foreclosures
might consequently devastate house prices. The risk is particularly elevated in combina-
tion with a high LTV as the incentive to continue with the contract responds sensitively
even to small excess supply. Consistent with the empirical evidence, our results corrobo-
rate an accelerating fall in house prices (cf. Financial Times, 2008; Huang, 2012) caused
by subprime homeowners and a strong negative correlation between house price growth
and foreclosure rates (cf. Campbell et al., 2011; Frame et al., 2008; Mian et al., 2014).
Second, an undercapitalised banking sector might reinforce house price declines. The
reason is that losses in its mortgage portfolio require the banking sector to allocate loans
more selectively. Since US commercial banks prioritised distressed home sales during the
crisis (Berrospide et al., 2013), non-distressed transactions were crowded out. Thus, the
aggregate house price was downward biased. It no longer accurately reflected the sales
decision of homeowners, but the insufficient lending capacity of the banking sector.22 The
associated build-up of the housing inventory is consequently inefficient and contaminates
house prices. After all, a US-specific housing model illustrates that both high-leverage
non-recourse mortgages and an undercapitalised banking sector particularly impaired the
stability of the housing market.
Our numerical results further explore possible ways for policy makers to stabilise strug-
gling housing markets via monetary policy, urban policy and financial stimuli by encour-
aging homeowners to postpone a sale deliberately until house prices recover in the future.
The first option is to expand the monetary policy. This would alleviate the opportunity
costs of a delayed sale. Homeowners would therefore find it more attractive to retreat
from the market temporarily. An advantage of this approach is its comparatively easy
implementation. Another option is to incentivise banks financially to prolong outstand-
ing mortgages, giving homeowners more time to postpone a sale. Technically, this option
involves negotiations between the parties involved, namely banks and borrowers. The
role of policy makers would be to facilitate the negotiations by offering financial stimuli.
The last and admittedly most radical option is to reduce abundant supply by demolishing
houses in the context of urban policy. However, this instrument should only be carefully
used and under very strict conditions. Demand needs to decline either permanently, say
22 The argument follows those of Shleifer (1992), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Krishnamurthy (2003)
and Lorenzoni (2008).
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following an excessive creation of housing space without sustainable long-term use, or
continue to decline in the long-term, similar to an agglomeration steadily losing popula-
tion over time. Urban planners further need to take steps to avoid excessive demolitions.
Moreover, given the apparent interference with private property rights this instrument
requires considerable financial resources to earn the consent of affected homeowners. But
in any case, monetary policy, urban policy and financial stimuli provide indirect ways for
policy makers to stabilise struggling housing markets.
In fact, US policy makers implemented closely related policies over the course of the US
housing market crash. In October 2008, the Federal Reserve cut interest rates to historical
lows. Among other aims, the objective was to stabilise asset prices, such as house prices.23
This move was accompanied by purchases of MBS of about USD 1.25 tn.24 At about the
same time, the US federal government implemented the “Troubled Asset Relief Program”
worth USD 700 bn (later reduced to USD 475 bn). One of the primary objectives to
be achieved by this programme was to “prevent avoidable foreclosures” by purchasing a
wide range of assets.25 Finally, the US housing market crash pushed the city of Detroit
over the edge following decades shrinking population and urban decline. In 2010, the
city eventually decided to demolish about 10,000 houses to reduce the city’s abundant
long-term supply of homes (Wall Street Journal, 2010). Hence, US policy makers made
considerable use of the policy instruments explored.
Ultimately, the presented game-theoretical framework may be useful in the wider context
of capital-intensive and rent-producing durable goods. Beyond housing, this may include
freighters, planes, trains or trucks. These industries are also prone to lengthy periods
of oversupply, which threaten the immediate short-term prices. An example of such a
downturn is the as yet unresolved “Container Crisis”. It had its origin in the bubble-
like overproduction of container ships accompanied by a sharp contraction of world trade
over the course of the global economic crisis of 2009-2010 (Hoffmann, 2010). The author
concluded that shipowners indeed responded to the overhang precisely as predicted by
23 The Federal Reserve noted that “[l]ow interest rates help households and businesses finance new
spending and help support the prices of many other assets, such as stocks and houses”. Federal
Reserve website: http://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/money 12849.htm
24 The FRBNY noted that “[t]he goal of the program was to provide support to mortgage and housing
markets and to foster improved conditions in financial markets more generally. (...) The FOMC
directed the Desk to purchase $1.25 trillion of agency MBS. Actual purchases by the program effec-
tively reached this target”. FRBNY website: http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/mbs faq.html
25 Website of the US Treasury: http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-
Programs/Pages/default.aspx#
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the heterogeneous model: they shut down and even demolished ships to reduce the excess
supply of cargo space. Hence, the presented model might also be useful for analysing
transport economics.
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Chapter 2
The Systemic Dimension of Hedge
Fund Illiquidity and Prime
Brokerage
This chapter is joint work with Frank Hespeler.
The authors thank Tarun Ramadorai for his critical review of this paper.
Abstract
We analyse the potentially vulnerable and systemically relevant financial intermediation
chain established by hedge funds and prime brokers in. Our dataset covers the 306 largest
global hedge funds and their prime brokers over the period July 2001 to December 2011.
The study illustrates that hedge funds and prime brokers act as complementary trading
partners in normal times. However, we observe that this form of financial intermediation
may be severely impaired in times of market distress. This can be explained by the
hoarding of liquid securities by prime brokers who are eager to avert runs by their clients.
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2.1 Introduction
The recent global financial crisis is, among other features, characterised by the near drying
out of the market for securitised funding Gorton and Metrick (2012). The repo market was
among those market segments which were most badly affected. Our analysis highlights a
potential reason for that incident: the indispensable flow of collateral assets was severely
impaired by the break-down of a financial intermediation chain jointly formed by hedge
funds and prime brokers. To shed some light on those events we investigate the dynamic
aspects of the vulnerable relationship between hedge funds and prime broker activity by
using a heteroskedasticity-robust vector error correction (VEC) model.
Usually, hedge funds deal with prime brokers for the purpose of receiving cash loans
which enable them to purchase assets.26 In this process they frequently pledge previously
acquired assets as collateral with prime brokers. In addition, in many cases they authorise
prime brokers to re-hypothecate those assets in order to obtain more favourable borrowing
terms. Prime brokers exercise this right and enter into repos which are collateralised by
their clients’ assets. Collateralised lending does not only constitute the main refinancing
source of both hedge funds and prime brokers (Singh, 2011), but also turns hedge funds
into the major genuine providers of collateral assets to the bilateral repo market (Singh
and Aitken, 2010). In addition, this specific form of financial intermediation involves a
high degree of maturity transformation. As a matter of fact, according to the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York’s (FRBNY) primary dealer database (cf. Section 2), in recent
years prime brokers were continuously term net lenders and overnight net borrowers. This
strategy allows prime brokers to reduce their funding costs and to profit from interest
differentials between tenors.
However, for the same two reasons, leverage and maturity transformation, this form of
financial intermediation is particularly vulnerable to liquidity shortages and eventually
runs. In fact, recent research strongly suggests that these risks materialised over the
2007-2008 global financial crisis, when the market for securitised funding partially ran
dry. On this reading, rising haircuts gradually impaired the ability of prime brokers to
use securities as collateral to rollover their short-term debt (Brunnermeier, 2009; Gor-
26 Since hedge funds are fairly unregulated institutional investors and exclusively open to sophisticated
investors, they usually apply more aggressive leverage levels and trading strategies than other types
of mutual funds. For a more detailed characterisation of hedge funds see King and Maier (2009).
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ton and Metrick, 2012). Once haircuts reached a point where the collateral value fell
short of the outstanding repo volume, lenders at last had an incentive to call in on all
their claims similar to classic depositors (Martin et al., 2012). Beyond that, disconcerted
hedge funds wishing to withdraw their liquid wealth from prime brokers susceptible to
bankruptcy added another threat to the stability of prime brokers (Brunnermeier, 2009)
by repaying loans prematurely and forcing prime brokers to return the collateral. In case
the value of the collateral for prime brokers was higher than the margin of the underlying
debt contract, this inflicted losses on prime brokers. In line with this argument, Aragon
and Strahan (2012) indeed document that clients of Lehman Brothers arriving too late
to redeem their assets before the prime broker’s bankruptcy, realised significantly lower
subsequent returns than their peers. Finally, as Liu and Mello (2011) show, hedge funds
are further vulnerable to runs by their investors. In a nutshell, the financial intermedi-
ation chain established by prime brokers and hedge funds appears fragile due to their
considerable involvement in leverage and maturity transformation.
We contribute to this literature by exploring all aspects of the fragile intermediation chain
established by hedge funds and prime brokers in a dynamic setting. For this purpose, we
exploit a dataset covering the 306 largest global active hedge funds and their prime brokers
over the period July 2001 to December 2011. The dataset includes the five endogenous
variables hedge fund illiquidity, prime broker excess profitability and three proxies for
prime brokerage activities (lending, financing and securities holdings).
Our results suggest that hedge funds and prime brokers act as complementary trading
partners in normal times, i.e. hedge fund illiquidity initiates prime broker activity, which,
in turn, raises their excess profitability. However, whenever the volatility of prime broker
excess returns and hedge fund illiquidity switched to exceptional high levels during the
recent global financial crisis, we discover that this specific form of financial intermediation
was severely impaired. Under these conditions, prime brokers’ financing activity and
securities holdings increased, while their lending did not. At the same time, hedge fund
illiquidity rose. This discrepancy indicates that prime brokers hoarded liquid assets.
Building on the above findings, the evidence found suggests that during the crisis prime
brokers were indeed eager to prevent a run by their clients. But by following this incentive
they impaired the flow of collateral assets to the repo market. Thus, it turns out that this
particular behaviour of prime brokers adds to systemic risk in securities markets, since,
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in times of crisis, they have an incentive to withdraw liquidity from an already weakened
market. Hence, they potentially impair the value of their clients’ assets and contribute to
the potential spreading of stress, because, within their decision, they do not consider the
negative externalities of their liquidity hoarding on general asset prices.
Our findings reconfirm several empirical results from different strands of previous research.
First, we substantiate the view that prime brokers hoarded liquid securities, as was hy-
pothesised by Singh and Aitken (2009a) and actually documented by Berrospide (2012)
for commercial banks. Second, the empirical evidence implies that the flow of collateral
assets to the repo market came under pressure over the course of the crisis, thereby incen-
tivising hedge funds to deleverage. Earlier studies consistently report that hedge funds
deleveraged in the wake of the financial crisis (Ang et al., 2011), while the repo activity of
primary dealers considerably declined Adrian and Shin (2010). In fact, Singh and Aitken
(2010) compute that the actual reduction in re-hypothecation amounted to roughly USD
2.5 trillion in 2008, of which USD 1.7 trillion stem from major prime brokers alone. We
deliver the rationale behind this behaviour. Third, our results provide an explanation
for the unusual clustering of hedge fund returns on the height of the crisis (Billio et al.,
2012; Boyson et al., 2010). Thus, the compiled empirical evidence sheds new light on the
important role of hedge funds and prime brokers in the recent financial crisis.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 describes our set of endogenous variables and
control variables. In Section 2.3 we explain the model selection procedure. Next, Section
2.4 characterises the intermediation chain composed of hedge funds and prime brokers by
examining the dynamic interaction of hedge fund illiquidity and prime brokerage. Various
robustness checks are presented in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 briefly discusses our findings
in light of systemic risk, and Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Data
Our paper is based on monthly data from July 2001 to December 2011 and uses five
endogenous variables for its econometric model. This data is presented below.27
27 If not otherwise indicated all data originates from Thomson Datastream.
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2.2.1 Hedge Funds — an Illiquidity Premium
For the construction of an illiquidity premium of the hedge fund sector, i.e. a measure
for that fraction of the sector’s profit which can be explained by its willingness to hold
illiquid assets, this paper employs consolidated data on the 100 largest funds identified
by assets under management (AuM) as of December 2011, out of each of four hedge
fund databases: Barclayhedge, Eurekahedge, Hedge Fund Research, TASS. The use of
consolidated data helps to avoid any selection bias generated by a limited coverage of
the hedge fund universe in individual data sources (Fung and Hsieh, 2001; Patton and
Ramadorai, 2013; Joenvaara et al., 2012). On the other hand, consolidation allows for
data overlaps. To eliminate those, a structured consolidation process similar to those
used in Patton and Ramadorai (2013) and Joenvaara et al. (2012) is used to identify and
remove duplicates.28 Following this method, our final dataset comprises 306 hedge funds,
which all belong to the so-called “billion dollar club”29 frequently used for classifying
funds into risk categories.
We restrict our analysis to large hedge funds, because they exhibit some important charac-
teristics of systemically important financial institutions (SIFI). As King and Maier (2009)
explain, i.) large hedge funds impose a concentrated risk on their prime brokers, ii.) they
are highly interconnected by maintaining many prime broker relations, and iii.) they pro-
vide liquidity in global asset markets. However, the focus on large hedge funds implies
potential deviations in the composition of our sample from the hedge fund universe. Nev-
ertheless, the method provides the advantage that our dataset exclusively covers large
and currently active funds which are important for systemic risk analysis.
Based on this dataset we aggregate returns using uniform weights since alternative weights,
such as net asset values or AuM turn out to be unreliable or biased by differing leverage
levels of funds (Ang et al., 2011).30 To control for hedge fund-specific liquidity factors
and the capability to generate alpha, we regress the aggregated hedge fund return on five
asset-based strategy factors (Fung and Hsieh, 2001), the negative portion of the MSCI
world index as an approximation of a put option (Agarwal and Naik, 2004) and a con-
stant.31 The resulting residual (HFILLIQ) comprises roughly 80% of the total variation
28 A more detailed description is provided in the appendix.
29 See Edelman et al. (2012)
30 Until October 1, 2011, the popular HFR index was computed using uniform weights.
31 The asset-based strategy factors were collected from David Hsieh’s website:
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and reflects the return attributed to hedge funds’ illiquid asset holdings, as the mentioned
factors provide liquidity insurance whenever market liquidity is low. By removing their
contribution from hedge fund returns we thus obtain the intrinsically illiquid part.32 This
variable is the first in our set of endogenous variables.
2.2.2 Prime Brokers
To describe the performance and activities of prime brokers we use several variables. As
a performance measure the excess return of prime brokers relative to commercial banks
is employed. Therefore, we first identify the reported prime broker relations within our
hedge fund sample. Then, we aggregate the monthly stock price returns for those prime
brokers for which data is available, to a uniformly weighted index return.33 Since many
prime brokers also offer other banking services, it is important to filter out the excess
return from prime brokerage (PBER). For this purpose, we regress the aggregated prime
broker return on the return of the Datastream global bank index and use the residual
as our variable PBER.34 This last step reveals a high contribution of banking activities
outside of prime brokerage for our constituents’ performance (adj. R-Squared about 0.87).
Furthermore, we capture prime brokers’ securities trading activities by three variables
reported by the FRBNY’s primary dealer database.35 Our first variable, the net outright
position of primary dealers (NETPOS), describes the excess volume of securities held
to meet delivery obligations (Adrian and Fleming, 2005). This position measures the
risk-taking behaviour of primary dealers. Net financing defined as the difference between
outgoing and incoming securities approximates the financing and lending activity of prime
brokers. When differentiating between overnight and term agreements, it turns out that
prime brokers are overnight net borrowers and term net lenders which is why we denote
both indicators correspondingly FINANCING and LENDING. This first empiric evidence
http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/ dah7/DataLibrary/TF-FAC.xls
32 Getmansky et al. (2004) propose the serial correlation of hedge fund returns as an alternative measure
of portfolio illiquidity attributable to difficult-to-market or immobile asset holdings. A closely related
paper following this approach is Kruttli et al. (2013). Our approach goes beyond this illiquidity
concept, because besides the described filtration our econometric model automatically captures serial
correlation in the sense of Getmansky et al. (2004).
33 For details on prime brokers please refer to the appendix.
34 An alternative methodology which aggregates the residuals generated by regressing individual returns
on the Datastream global bank index, yielded weak results, as outliers tend to dominate the sample.
35 The majority of prime brokers in our sample also registers with the FRBNY as primary dealers and
thus contributes to the database.
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indicates that prime brokers generate profits by engaging in maturity transformation.36
All three variables are normalised as of July 2001.
2.2.3 Macroeconomic and Financial Control Variables
As control variables we include several macroeconomic and financial indicators. To con-
sider the frequent use of mortgage backed securities as collateral in the repo market
(Adrian and Fleming, 2005) we use the monthly growth of the S&P Case/Shiller 20-
city composite house price index (HOUSE). In addition, the yearly growth of the same
index which cannot be explained by monthly growth (roughly 49% of variation), mea-
sures potential asset price bubbles (HOUSETREND). The annual growth of the MSCI
World total-return index (EQUITY) proxies the expected profitability of firms and global
economic activity. The monthly growth of the Barclays aggregate bond index (BOND)
grasps global financial market conditions and yield trends. To account for commodity
price fluctuations that affect global economic growth, we also factor in the annual gold
price (GOLD) and oil price (OIL). The monthly growth of the TED spread (LIQRISK)
and Moody’s Baa spread (DEFRISK) control for funding liquidity risk and default risk. As
a measure of currency risks, we consider the EUR/USD exchange rate (CURRENCY).37
2.2.4 Turmoil Control Variables
Periods of financial turmoil are reportedly related to unusual negative hedge fund re-
turns (Billio et al., 2012; Boyson et al., 2010) and prime broker difficulties (Aragon and
Strahan, 2012). Therefore, following the approach of Hendry and Juselius (2001), we
include two transitory blip variables to account for unexpected extreme movements in the
endogenous variables. Both blip variables are constructed from the residuals of the es-
timated VEC model (cf. Section 3); one using the residuals of the performance proxies
(RETURN VOLA: PBER, HFILLIQ) and the other those of prime broker activity (AC-
TIVITY VOLA: LENDING, NETPOS, FINANCING). A turmoil state is a situation, in
which the variances of the residuals of all variables associated with the one of the groups
described above simultaneously fall into the highest deciles at a given point in time. The
36 For a detailed discussion on the data reported in the FRBNY’s primary dealer database please see
Adrian and Fleming (2005)
37 Please refer to Table A.1 in the appendix for an exact definition of the various exogenous variables.
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final blip variables take on the value 1 if the associated group enters into a state of high
volatility, -1 if the associated group leaves a state of high volatility and 0 otherwise. By
this procedure we are able to factor in the potentially disruptive effect of turmoil-related
events without impairing the model’s stationarity. Incidences of volatility switches are
rare and mostly occur in times of financial turmoil, i.e. between 2007 and 2011.
2.3 Model Selection
An analysis of the raw data of our endogenous variables reveals that all variables are auto-
correlated and three of them clearly exhibit non-stationarity (LENDING, NETPOS, FI-
NANCING). Beyond that, HFILLIQ shows signs of non-stationarity as heteroskedasticity-
robust auxiliary regressions on a constant and time trend are nearly significant on the 5%
level. We therefore opt for a VEC model (Johansen and Juselius, 1990) for estimation
purposes,
∆yt = α(c
′
+ β
′
yt−1) +
p−1∑
i=1
Φ∗i∆yt−i +BXt + ǫt, (2.1)
where yt denotes a vector of endogenous variables, Xt the set of exogenous information
and p the lag order of the associated vector autoregressive representation (VAR). In what
follows, we apply our set of endogenous and control variables.
In order to determine which specification fits our dataset best, we initially evaluate 60
different model estimates based on a large set of criteria. Those include the cointegration
rank statistics based on Johansen (1991) (maximum likelihood, trace statistic, Akaike and
Schwarz information criteria), measures for the model fit (average adjusted R-Squared),
test statistics for the residuals (autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity, lag exclusion, normal-
ity) and structural break statistics (Chow breakpoint tests). The alternatives differ by
lag length, cointegration rank and specification of the cointegration equation.
Our results displayed in Table 2.2 suggest strong serial correlation in the residuals of
models including one or three lags. They are therefore rejected.38 From the remaining
38 We acknowledge that critical values of the maximum likelihood statistic and trace statistic based on
Johansen (1991) are potentially distorted as a result of the inclusion of exogenous factors. However,
given the consistency with either the Akaike or Schwarz information criterion and the tests on
residuals and model robustness both rank criteria appear to operate fairly well.
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Table 2.1: Data characteristics. This table portrays various characteristics of the endogenous and exogenous variables. Descriptive statistics include the mean,
median, minimum, maximum and standard deviation. The skewness, kurtosis and p-values of the Jarque-bera statistics are reported to test for normality. The
p-values of the Ljung-Box test statistics give indicative information on serial correlation. Assessments of individual and joint stationarity are based on p-values of
the Augmented-Dickey Fuller and Fisher-ADF tests (both with constant). The correlations between the endogenous and exogenous variables illustrate co-movement
patterns.
Endogenous variables Exogenous variables
Descriptive PBER HFILLIQ LENDING NETPOS FINANCING HOUSE HOUSE- EQUITY BOND GOLD OIL DEF- LIQ- CURR- RET. ACT.
Statistics TREND RISK RISK ENCY VOLA VOLA
Mean -0.537 0.000 2.097 1.963 1.944 2.735 0.128 5.264 0.023 18.863 20.160 0.411 5.869 -0.319 0.000 0.000
Median -0.563 0.037 2.239 1.908 1.844 4.456 0.381 11.616 0.080 17.237 24.000 -0.641 1.828 -0.456 0.000 0.000
Max 8.544 2.546 3.327 3.768 3.670 17.121 1.993 64.283 2.663 52.459 113.576 39.992 198.176 9.743 1.000 1.000
Min -8.174 -2.480 0.884 0.822 1.000 -19.006 -2.790 -48.906 -2.736 -8.054 -61.373 -20.819 -69.231 -9.387 -1.000 -1.000
Std. dev. 2.493 1.103 0.654 0.643 0.603 10.943 1.155 22.255 0.873 13.484 35.969 7.357 38.536 3.148 0.219 0.179
Normality (Jarque-Bera)
Skewness 0.046 -0.094 -0.084 0.401 0.638 -0.495 -0.661 -0.327 -0.235 0.434 -0.214 1.333 2.253 0.398 0.000 0.000
Kurtosis 4.693 2.680 1.959 2.548 2.892 2.077 2.624 2.821 3.157 2.675 2.720 8.922 11.511 3.959 21.000 31.500
Probability 0.001 0.696 0.054 0.108 0.013 0.008 0.007 0.300 0.526 0.105 0.503 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.000
Autocorrelation (Ljung-Box)
LB(1) 0.460 0.070 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.043 0.826 0.000 0.000
LB(2) 0.759 0.114 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.092 0.878 0.000 0.000
LB(3) 0.068 0.070 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.098 0.375 0.000 0.000
Unit root
Individual: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)
Level 0.000 0.000 0.557 0.457 0.570 0.000 0.002 0.100 0.000 0.005 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Difference 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Common: Fisher-ADF
Level 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.065 0.000 0.013 0.003 0.061 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Difference 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Correlations
PBER 1.000 0.180 -0.105 -0.128 -0.008 0.035 -0.055 0.053 0.062 -0.091 -0.024 -0.263
HFILLIQ -0.139 1.000 0.033 0.010 -0.185 0.239 -0.365 -0.349 -0.243 -0.115 -0.156 0.244 0.095
LENDING 0.011 -0.056 1.000 -0.314 -0.574 0.028 -0.140 0.264 0.032 0.118 -0.025 0.128 0.066 0.070
NETPOS -0.090 0.008 0.760 1.000 -0.353 -0.687 -0.027 0.087 0.318 0.110 0.248 0.064 0.053 0.060 0.093
FINANCING -0.037 0.018 0.875 0.845 1.000 -0.299 -0.687 -0.069 -0.163 0.263 0.049 0.241 0.051 0.047 0.068 0.072
Observations 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126
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Table 2.2: Selection of VEC model. This table reports cointegration rank criteria and diagnostic
test statistics on a variety of model specifications ordered by lag length, cointegration rank and type of
estimation. Estimation is based on Johansen and Juselius (1990). The type of estimation represents the
treatment of constants and trends in the long-run and short-run part of the VEC model (1: No constants,
no trends; 2: Constant in long-run part; 3: Two constants in long-run and short-run part; 4: Two
constants and linear trend; 5: Two constants and quadratic trend). The maximum eigenvalue statistic
(ME), trace statistic (TR), Akaike (AIC) and Schwarz (SIC) information criteria are cointegration rank
criteria (Johansen and Juselius, 1988). Residual diagnostic tests on serial correlation (Lagrange Multiplier
test: LM(p)) heteroskedasticity (White test), normality (generalised Jarque-Bera (Urzua) statistic) and
lag exclusion (Wald test: LE(p)) are based on Luetkepohl (2005). The cumulated number of rejections
of Chow breakpoint tests (July 2005 and December 2007) indicate model instability. ∗∗∗ (∗∗,∗) denotes
significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level.
Specifications Cointegration Rank Model Fit Autocorrelation
Lag Rank Type ME TR AIC SIC aver. adj. R2 LM(1) LM(2) LM(3)
1 1 1 2 2 6.620 7.416 0.354 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 3 3 6.557 7.375 0.353 0.000 0.000 0.000
3 5 3 6.608 7.518 0.347 0.000 0.000 0.000
4 4 4 6.576 7.509 0.356 0.000 0.000 0.000
5 4 4 6.627 7.651 0.352 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 1 2 2 6.290 7.314 0.406 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 3 3 6.241 7.310* 0.406 0.000 0.000 0.000
3 5 3 6.285 7.422 0.400 0.000 0.000 0.000
4 4 4 6.227 7.410 0.422 0.000 0.000 0.000
5 4 4 6.265 7.515 0.420 0.000 0.000 0.000
3 1 2 2 6.315 7.566 0.407 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 3 3 6.169 7.488 0.446 0.000 0.006 0.000
3 5 3 6.197 7.562 0.441 0.000 0.007 0.000
4 4 4 6.012 7.444 0.500 0.001 0.051 0.000
5 4 4 6.036 7.514 0.496 0.000 0.046 0.000
4 1 2 2 6.440 7.919 0.403 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 3 3 6.252 7.821 0.458 0.000 0.053 0.000
3 5 3 6.264 7.856 0.453 0.000 0.056 0.000
4 4 4 5.976* 7.659 0.509 0.005 0.134 0.000
5 4 4 5.987 7.693 0.504 0.004 0.129 0.000
2 1 1 2 2 5.733 7.105 0.593 0.008 0.360 0.003
2 2 2 5.740 7.135 0.590 0.010 0.228 0.003
3 2 2 5.792 7.278 0.590 0.017 0.382 0.008
4 2 3 5.797 7.306 0.588 0.045 0.380 0.054
5 3 3 5.841 7.442 0.589 0.034 0.476 0.018
2 1 2 2 5.377 6.977* 0.633 0.077 0.362 0.059
2 2 2 5.368 7.015 0.633 0.068 0.356 0.135
3 2 2 5.409 7.124 0.629 0.102 0.350 0.159
4 2 3 5.390 7.151 0.630 0.090 0.460 0.184
5 3 3 5.434 7.263 0.627 0.093 0.424 0.218
3 1 2 2 5.423 7.252 0.635 0.086 0.276 0.074
2 2 2 5.398 7.296 0.637 0.119 0.368 0.129
3 2 2 5.426 7.369 0.634 0.154 0.356 0.135
4 2 3 5.353* 7.365 0.637 0.104 0.615 0.136
5 3 3 5.383 7.440 0.634 0.106 0.628 0.158
4 1 2 2 5.562 7.620 0.632 0.090 0.236 0.070
2 2 2 5.552 7.701 0.634 0.122 0.352 0.133
3 2 2 5.567 7.739 0.631 0.127 0.342 0.129
4 2 3 5.461 7.724 0.636 0.070 0.604 0.047
5 3 3 5.475 7.761 0.633 0.071 0.622 0.055
3 1 1 2 2 5.848 7.801 0.594 0.002 0.367 0.066
2 2 2 5.835 7.812 0.588 0.009 0.034 0.053
3 2 2 5.878 7.947 0.584 0.262 0.006 0.066
4 2 2 5.834 7.925 0.590 0.554 0.020 0.170
5 3 3 5.892 8.076 0.588 0.611 0.023 0.174
2 1 2 2 5.562 7.745* 0.631 0.457 0.129 0.096
2 2 2 5.549 7.779 0.631 0.537 0.083 0.102
3 2 2 5.586 7.884 0.627 0.638 0.087 0.101
4 2 2 5.550 7.894 0.628 0.555 0.169 0.208
5 3 3 5.593 8.006 0.624 0.594 0.157 0.245
3 1 2 2 5.623 8.036 0.632 0.484 0.080 0.104
2 2 2 5.593 8.075 0.635 0.612 0.102 0.138
3 2 2 5.621 8.149 0.632 0.650 0.097 0.127
4 2 2 5.529* 8.127 0.634 0.645 0.119 0.188
5 3 3 5.558 8.201 0.631 0.661 0.136 0.232
4 1 2 2 5.755 8.398 0.629 0.512 0.071 0.101
2 2 2 5.739 8.474 0.631 0.631 0.108 0.180
3 2 2 5.752 8.510 0.628 0.659 0.107 0.182
4 2 2 5.620 8.470 0.635 0.609 0.152 0.230
5 3 3 5.633 8.506 0.631 0.624 0.174 0.279
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Table 2.2 continued
Specifications Heteroskedasticity Normality Lag exclusion Robustness
Lag Rank Type Prob. Prob. Skewness Kurtosis LE(1) LE(2) LE(3) 10% 5% 1%
1 1 1 0.000 0.728 0.409 0.630 0.000 17 4 0
2 0.002 0.768 0.232 0.729 0.000 3 0 0
3 0.003 0.848 0.283 0.802 0.000 0 0 0
4 0.009 0.622 0.257 0.789 0.000 0 0 0
5 0.005 0.542 0.350 0.700 0.000 0 0 0
2 1 0.000 0.001 0.118 0.306 0.000 0 0 0
2 0.001 0.003 0.069 0.406 0.000 0 0 0
3 0.001 0.009 0.074 0.466 0.000 0 0 0
4 0.004 0.102 0.069 0.620 0.000 0 0 0
5 0.003 0.069 0.111 0.593 0.000 0 0 0
3 1 0.003 0.003 0.054 0.354 0.000 0 0 0
2 0.029 0.010 0.036 0.355 0.051 0 0 0
3 0.030 0.024 0.040 0.389 0.059 0 0 0
4 0.019 0.010 0.004 0.087 0.161 0 0 0
5 0.015 0.003 0.005 0.067 0.146 0 0 0
4 1 0.004 0.001 0.068 0.253 0.000 0 0 0
2 0.045 0.022 0.008 0.324 0.325 0 0 0
3 0.049 0.049 0.009 0.354 0.348 0 0 0
4 0.128 0.018 0.001 0.125 0.366 0 0 0
5 0.097 0.009 0.002 0.114 0.361 0 0 0
2 1 1 0.004 0.265 0.249 0.751 0.000 0.000 0 0 0
2 0.008 0.370 0.208 0.709 0.000 0.000 0 0 0
3 0.006 0.317 0.255 0.755 0.000 0.000 0 0 0
4 0.002 0.006 0.210 0.278 0.000 0.000 0 0 0
5 0.002 0.050 0.314 0.658 0.000 0.000 0 0 0
2 1 0.009 0.104 0.098 0.295 0.000 0.000 8 2 0
2 0.010 0.099 0.061 0.286 0.000 0.000 2 0 0
3 0.010 0.190 0.061 0.315 0.000 0.000 2 0 0
4 0.016 0.053 0.118 0.380 0.000 0.000 0 0 0
5 0.017 0.045 0.141 0.311 0.000 0.000 0 0 0
3 1 0.055 0.080 0.033 0.044 0.000 0.000 8 4 0
2 0.060 0.068 0.042 0.109 0.000 0.000 8 8 0
3 0.060 0.129 0.046 0.117 0.000 0.000 8 7 0
4 0.110 0.019 0.004 0.030 0.000 0.000 8 6 0
5 0.040 0.015 0.005 0.033 0.000 0.000 7 3 0
4 1 0.029 0.078 0.050 0.030 0.000 0.000 7 1 0
2 0.035 0.053 0.050 0.060 0.000 0.000 8 8 0
3 0.037 0.068 0.045 0.058 0.000 0.000 8 3 0
4 0.122 0.017 0.003 0.027 0.000 0.000 8 7 0
5 0.038 0.014 0.003 0.029 0.000 0.000 7 3 0
3 1 1 0.049 0.151 0.147 0.566 0.000 0.000 0.254 8 6 0
2 0.058 0.047 0.130 0.435 0.000 0.000 0.150 9 7 4
3 0.031 0.007 0.191 0.274 0.000 0.000 0.143 8 6 4
4 0.022 0.001 0.353 0.225 0.000 0.000 0.102 0 0 0
5 0.013 0.001 0.444 0.239 0.000 0.000 0.108 0 0 0
2 1 0.059 0.358 0.252 0.482 0.000 0.000 0.824 0 0 0
2 0.044 0.379 0.165 0.507 0.000 0.000 0.836 0 0 0
3 0.043 0.423 0.171 0.530 0.000 0.000 0.831 0 0 0
4 0.039 0.453 0.229 0.487 0.000 0.000 0.631 0 0 0
5 0.040 0.530 0.327 0.543 0.000 0.000 0.639 0 0 0
3 1 0.119 0.247 0.117 0.187 0.000 0.000 0.891 1 0 0
2 0.068 0.164 0.098 0.280 0.000 0.000 0.890 1 0 0
3 0.068 0.195 0.110 0.287 0.000 0.000 0.900 1 0 0
4 0.052 0.121 0.021 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.721 1 0 0
5 0.036 0.135 0.030 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.724 0 0 0
4 1 0.074 0.269 0.264 0.138 0.000 0.000 0.868 0 0 0
2 0.057 0.182 0.178 0.205 0.000 0.000 0.865 3 0 0
3 0.056 0.211 0.170 0.227 0.000 0.000 0.870 0 0 0
4 0.061 0.127 0.025 0.024 0.000 0.001 0.654 3 0 0
5 0.031 0.143 0.034 0.025 0.000 0.001 0.659 0 0 0
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specifications we subsequently exclude those for which our ME and TR cointegration
rank criteria are inconsistent. Only four models pass this test. Neither the average model
fit39, nor the information criteria or residual tests provide conclusive evidence in favour
of any of these four specifications. However, the Chow breakpoint test on structural
breaks indicate that the most robust and parsimonious model features two cointegration
equations including a constant.40 Thus, we choose the specification with two cointegration
equations including also constants.
Interestingly, the test results in Table 2.2 indicate no violation of the normality assumption
despite significant heteroskedasticity. Indeed, a subsequent visual inspection suggests
that the residuals may occasionally cluster. Hence, the model standard errors tend to
underestimate the true standard deviation. This is why we switch to heteroskedasticity-
robust estimation procedures following the methodology provided in Newey and West
(1987), and present only results corrected for heteroskedasticity issues. As an additional
precaution we completely ignore the 10% significance level for statistical inference.
Finally, we employ Granger causality tests41 in order to explore whether lagged endoge-
nous variables are contributing to the forecast of contemporaneous realisations of the
other endogenous variables. Given our VEC specification the test considers two lags.
The results presented in Table 2.3 confirm that the chosen specification is appropriate,
since each of the significant parameters in the short-run equation (cf. Table 2.4 below) is
matched by some forecasting power of the respective pair of lagged variables.
Table 2.3: Granger causality. This table depicts Wald test results on granger causality (block
exogeneity). Reported values are the p-values of the null hypothesis of no Granger causality. ∗∗∗ (∗∗, ∗)
indicates statistical significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level.
PBER HFILLIQ LENDING NETPOS FINANCING
PBER — 0.903 0.358 0.165 0.202
HFILLIQ 0.500 — 0.092* 0.913 0.223
LENDING 0.241 0.068* — 0.000*** 0.000***
NETPOS 0.811 0.499 0.003*** — 0.023**
FINANCING 0.378 0.380 0.324 0.178 —
JOINT 0.616 0.262 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
39 Despite the non-stationary nature of some of the endogenous variables, the adjusted R-Squared
delivers some information here, since the model fit never exceeds an adjusted R-Squared of 70%
neither in VAR-form nor in VEC-form.
40 Each restricted model requires a minimum of 48 dated observations. Given that all suspected
breakpoints materialise when the number of required observations converges to that minimum, while
only few rejections are significant at the 1% level, the results suggest a generally high level of model
robustness.
41 Please note that the error correction terms and therefore the cointegration equations are excluded
in the tests.
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2.4 The Dynamic Interaction of Hedge Fund Illiquid-
ity and Prime Brokerage
We structure the analytical results presented below along our five main conclusions. Each
of those is individually connected to the empirical evidence. This evidence comprises the
model’s cointegration and error correction parts as well as impulse responses to shocks
on the endogenous variables. To interpret how these shocks disseminate in the system we
perform variance decompositions, which also help to mitigate the endogeneity problem
inherent in all VAR models by providing some idea about eventual causalities within the
system. For the sake of brevity, we ignore variables whose contribution to the variance of
another variable stays below 10%. Within the analysis of impulse responses and variance
decompositions we account for different risk dimensions and sources—i.e. shocks to hedge
funds, money markets and prime brokers’ risk aversion—by changing the ordering in which
shocks are able to affect our endogenous variables.
2.4.1 In Periods with no Stress in Financial Markets, Hedge
Funds and Prime Brokers Act as Complementary Trading
Partners.
Periods without exceptionally high level of financial distress tend to be depicted by the
model’s cointegration equation, expressing the model’s long-run trend. This view, which
departs from the traditional perspective, reflects that the two blip variables in the short-
run equation are specifically designed to account for financial market turbulences. There-
fore, the effect of financial turbulences on the long-run equation should be limited to a
minimum.
An accurate economic interpretation of this cointegration equation requires an econom-
ically reasonable normalisation. We select prime broker excess returns and hedge fund
illiquidity as normalisation variables, because both are likely to depend on the securities
trading activities involved in prime brokerage.42 The resulting cointegration equations
42 While it seems at first glance odd to include stationary variables in the cointegration equation, the
use of the less non-stationary variables as normalization variables has the advantage that the inter-
dependence between our non-stationary business activity variables is not restricted. Hence, we do
not fix down the exogenous driving process to an arbitrarily chosen variable. In addition, we observe
that in the first cointegration equation we encounter an estimator for the variable FINANCING
which is on the border of significance. Assuming significance for that border case, the resulting pa-
rameter almost completely compensates for the negative influence of LENDING on PBER. Hence,
PBER would remain a stationary process.
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are,
(
PBERt
HFILLIQt
)
=
(
c1
c2
)
+
(
β11 β12 β13
β21 β22 β23
) LENDINGNETPOS
FINANCING

 . (2.2)
The estimates of the long-run relations reported in Table A.6 suggest that both are eco-
nomically relevant and plausible. The first reflects a positive long-run link between the
lending activity and excess returns of prime brokers. Prime brokers benefit from granting
more collateralised loans or performing more securities lending. By implication, excess
returns of prime brokers should rise with an expansion of their balance-sheets which in-
dicates the exploitation of economies of scale. The second link reveals that hedge fund
illiquidity positively relates to the net position and financing activity of prime brokers,
but negatively to their lending activity. Thus, if prime brokers accept higher risks asso-
ciated with securities holdings and increase their overnight liabilities, hedge funds earn
higher returns attributable to portfolio illiquidity due to an increase in the demand for
illiquid assets. Similarly, an increase in prime brokers’ balance sheets driven by additional
intermediation generates a positive net effect for hedge funds’ excess returns. But an iso-
lated increase in the lending volume of prime brokers reduces hedge funds’ excess return
on illiquidity, since higher indebtedness tends to raise haircuts and tightens borrowing
conditions. Thus, in general, hedge funds as well as prime brokers generally profit from
an extension of the volume transmitted through this financial intermediation chain.
Our results indicate that the benefits from prime brokerage accrue to a larger extent to
prime brokers than to their hedge fund clients. This is indicated by a sizeable negative
constant in the equation for hedge funds’ excess returns (-1.454) and the relative size of
the estimators in the two cointegration equations. In addition, the net benefit of lending
also clearly favours prime brokers over hedge funds (1.446 vs. -0.740). However, an ex-
pansion in the balance sheet of prime brokers due to financial intermediation (LENDING,
FINANCING) benefits hedge funds slightly more than prime brokers (0.093 vs. 0.054).
Thus, hedge funds pay a substantial premium on the access to term liquidity, but still
benefit from an increase in the scale of the transfer of funds from repo markets via prime
brokers to themselves. Since both cointegration equations negatively feed back into the
short-run (cf. Table A.6), an expansion of the intermediation activity results in mod-
erating effects on excess returns in case those are above their long-run trends. Hence,
in general terms, the argument of increasing marginal costs of financial intermediation
applies to the business model in the short run.
The central position of prime brokers is also reconfirmed by netting out the feed-back from
the first cointegration equation and serial correlation (0.275) in the short-run equation
determining prime brokers’ excess returns. The serial correlation is substantially positive
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Table 2.4: VEC model estimates. This table contains VEC model estimates:
∆yt = α(c
′
+ β
′
yt−1) +
∑p−1
i=1 Φ
∗
i∆yt−i +BXt + ǫt,
where yt = [PBER, HFILLIQ, LENDING, NETPOS, FINANCING]t denotes a vector of endoge-
nous variables and Xt = [HOUSETREND, HOUSE, EQUITY, BOND, GOLD, OIL, DEFRISK,
LIQRISK, CURRENCY, RETURN VOLA, ACTIVITY VOLA]t the set of exogenous variables. Esti-
mation is based on Johansen and Juselius (1990). The adj. R-squared informs about the overall model
fit. ∗∗∗ (∗∗) indicates statistical significance at the 1% (5%) level. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation robust (Newey and West, 1987).
Panel A: Long-run relationship
LENDING NETPOS FINANCING Constant
PBER 1.446 -0.096 -1.392 -0.811
HFILLIQ -0.740 0.978 0.833 -1.454
Panel B: Short-run relationship
PBER HFILLIQ LENDING NETPOS FINANCING
Error Correction 1 -1.262*** 0.009 -0.021 -0.008 -0.025
(-5.01) (0.08) (-0.73) (-0.29) (-0.96)
Error Correction 2 0.314 -1.045*** -0.060 0.056 -0.017
(0.70) (-5.48) (-1.17) (1.12) (-0.35)
PBER(-1) 0.304 -0.016 0.021** 0.009 0.016
(1.33) (-0.49) (2.14) (0.64) (1.38)
PBER(-2) 0.275*** 0.000 0.010 0.018 0.017**
(3.83) (0.01) (1.24) (1.57) (2.26)
HFILLIQ(-1) -0.262 -0.042 0.062** 0.010 0.035
(-0.98) (-0.34) (2.09) (0.39) (1.54)
HFILLIQ(-2) -0.237 -0.103** 0.052** 0.010 0.037**
(-1.90) (-2.07) (2.52) (0.48) (2.11)
LENDING(-1) 0.511 -0.125 -0.600*** -0.393*** -0.366***
(0.44) (-0.29) (-4.60) (-3.10) (-2.61)
LENDING(-2) 2.338*** -1.282*** -0.801*** -0.598*** -0.564***
(4.48) (-6.41) (-13.57) (-9.76) (-8.55)
NETPOS(-1) -0.496 -0.510 -0.429*** -0.226 -0.292**
(-0.39) (-1.08) (-2.73) (-1.68) (-2.37)
NETPOS(-2) 0.619 -0.329 -0.324*** -0.433*** -0.219***
(1.10) (-1.56) (-4.42) (-6.79) (-3.80)
FINANCING(-1) -0.631 0.178 0.007 -0.341 -0.277
(-0.36) (0.28) (0.03) (-1.64) (-1.46)
FINANCING(-2) -3.172*** 1.272*** 0.410*** 0.267*** 0.102
(-4.17) (4.70) (4.82) (2.98) (1.26)
HOUSETREND 0.068*** 0.066*** 0.010*** 0.005 0.009***
(2.61) (8.11) (4.60) (1.85) (4.26)
HOUSE -0.145 0.307*** 0.036 -0.005 0.019
(-0.84) (3.94) (1.54) (-0.26) (0.99)
EQUITY -0.034*** 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-3.37) (0.41) (-0.91) (-0.52) (-0.98)
BOND -0.238 0.116 0.025 0.011 0.009
(-1.11) (1.08) (0.77) (0.43) (0.32)
GOLD 0.017 -0.027*** 0.000 0.002 0.001
(1.41) (-7.28) (0.40) (1.78) (0.58)
OIL 0.000 -0.010*** -0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.06) (-4.16) (-0.85) (0.67) (-0.34)
DEFRISK 0.029 -0.031** 0.002 0.013*** 0.005**
(0.96) (-2.39) (0.62) (4.62) (2.46)
LIQRISK 0.007 -0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.18) (-1.66) (0.00) (-0.01) (0.83)
CURRENCY -0.147*** -0.077*** 0.005 0.002 -0.006
(-2.74) (-2.93) (0.72) (0.26) (-0.97)
RETURN VOLA -0.695 1.714** 0.201 0.263*** 0.285***
(-0.49) (19.23) (1.51) (4.88) (3.27)
ACITIVITY VOLA -3.239*** 0.663*** 0.465*** 0.512*** 0.497***
(-2.68) (3.06) (4.06) (10.66) (5.42)
Adj. R-squared 0.559 0.597 0.635 0.693 0.68062
in the first and third lag (0.262 and 0.275).43 Hence, at an aggregated level, the excess
return of prime brokers displays positive serial correlation rather than mean reversion.
This result illustrates that prime brokers are to some degree exercising market power in the
short run, as the entire sector is persistently able to generate positive excess returns which
are not immediately eliminated by competition. Analogously, the feed-back of the second
cointegration equation into the short-run dynamics for hedge funds’ illiquidity reconfirms
the well-established serial correlation pattern in hedge fund returns (Getmansky et al.,
2004).
2.4.2 In the Short Run, Excess Returns on Prime Brokerage and
Hedge Fund Illiquidity are Mainly Determined by Asset
and Commodity Prices and Perceived Financial Risks.
In the short-run, several contemporary exogenous variables are employed to control for
macroeconomic and financial conditions. We find that the trend in house prices (our
indicator for asset price bubbles) relates positively to all endogenous variables except for
the net securities holdings of prime brokers. Thus, hedge funds in search-for-yield are
willing to hold increasingly illiquid real estate-related assets (e.g. junior MBS tranches,
CDOs44), while prime brokers profit from the financial intermediation involved in the
associated securitisation process. Prime brokers nevertheless effectively limit their net
exposure to house price trends thereby reconfirming evidence provided by Adrian and
Fleming (2005). By contrast, the sizable effect of monthly house price growth on hedge
funds’ illiquidity premium unveils that hedge funds attempt successfully to profit from
short-run price movements as well.
Looking at the other exogenous variables, equity price growth has a negative impact
on prime broker excess returns, since a more favourable macroeconomic environment
diminishes the relative earnings contribution from prime brokerage given that it raises
bank profits and therefore reduces the excess returns of prime brokers. Surges in the
prices for gold, oil and foreign exchange decrease the hedge fund illiquidity premium,
since the contribution of business activities in the respective liquid markets to hedge fund
profits increases. We find the same negative relation for the default risk of corporate
bonds. This might reflect that risk-averse investors substitute bonds with other assets
thereby pushing up prices and liquidity for the latter and, hence, indirectly lowering
the hedge fund illiquidity premium.45 Supposedly due to growing haircuts and margin
43 Please note, that we report here the coefficients of the model’s VAR representation, which represent
the serial correlations in the levels.
44 A CDO (Collateralised Debt Obligation) is a structured financial product used to repackage and
securitise mortgage loans among other things.
45 We acknowledge the possibility of collinearity issues between the exogenous variables of our model.
However, alternatives such as decomposing the exogenous variables’ information content by principal
component analysis or successive individual orthogonalisation steps would generate information pools
which are no longer economically interpretable. Nonetheless, we run additional consistency checks.
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requirements (Gorton and Metrick, 2012), prime brokers augment their securities holdings
and financing activity when experiencing increases in the default risk.
Finally, as will be discussed in detail in the next subsection, all endogenous variables
react to at least one of two variables (RETURN VOLA, ACTIVITY VOLA), each of
which represents the risk of entering a high volatility state of either excess returns or of
the business activity of prime brokers respectively. Hence, to summarise, the analysis of
our control variables confirms that asset prices and risks strongly interfere with the risk
premia attached to prime brokerage and hedge funds.
2.4.3 High Levels of Stress in Financial Markets Tend toWeaken
the Intermediation Chain, since Prime Brokers Start to
Hoard Liquid Securities.
According to Table 2.4, the two variables RETURN VOLA and ACTIVITY VOLA, our
measures for the risk of entering financial distress periods, exercise a strong negative ef-
fect on prime broker excess returns and a considerable positive influence on hedge fund
illiquidity. Thus, investors apparently require higher risk premia for investments in fi-
nancial intermediaries such as prime brokers or hedge funds during times of exceptional
uncertainty.46 This is consistent with Boyson et al. (2010) who find that extremely neg-
ative hedge fund returns cannot be explained by common risk factors. In general, the
increase in risk premia reduces the attractiveness of prime brokerage business for banks
and burdens hedge funds with the need to generate higher returns on the illiquid, risky
part of their business.
Interestingly, the premium on prime brokerage increases much more than the one on
hedge fund illiquidity (in absolute terms: 3.239 vs. 2.374). Hence, in times of market
stress, market power is shifted from prime brokers to hedge funds. In addition, the effect
on prime brokers is driven by the volatility in their business activities, while the one on
hedge funds’ illiquidity premium is primarily driven by the volatility in the excess return
variables (1.714). Hence, more uncertainty about profitability forces hedge funds to offer
higher risk premia. Similarly, a volatile pattern of funding liquidity within the financial
intermediation chain formed by both types of institutions hurts the excess return of prime
brokers. Thus, prime brokers are able to deflect price risks on hedge funds, but need to
Since these checks show that our main findings remain unimpaired and the levels of explained
variations remain to a large extent stable, the original model is not exposed to serious collinearity
issues. We perform two types of checks. First, we subsequently drop exogenous variables starting
from the last variable until the model exclusively comprises the trend in house prices as exogenous
variable. In a second step we successively orthogonalise the information contained by the exogenous
variables and replace the original variables by their orthogonalised equivalents. In both cases the
alternative specifications remain qualitatively identical to the original model with merely few and
minor exceptions.
46 Some readers might be surprised by the notion of investing into prime brokers. Nevertheless, extend-
ing a secured loan in form of a repo is comparable to a short-term investment into prime brokers.
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accept the major part of the liquidity risks of the joint intermediation chain.
Moreover, when the volatility of excess returns (volatility of prime broker activities)
switches to an exceptionally high level, prime brokers’ securities holdings and financing
activity (all three business activity variables) also rise. Since there is a trade-off between
being vulnerable to extraordinary asset withdrawals by hedge fund clients and the ex-
posure to fluctuations of securities prices, the result reflects prime brokers’ preference to
mitigate the former risk. In other words, prime brokers tend to fend off the risks of runs
on their collateral position by increasing their stock of collateral (cf. Singh and Aitken,
2009a; Berrospide, 2012). Hence, in times of market stress, they start hoarding collateral.
These conclusions are corroborated by the dissemination of shocks through the financial
intermediation chain. Analysing the consequences of a shock to prime brokers’ securities
holdings by means of impulse responses (cf. Figure 2.1), we find that an unexpected
increase in the risk buffers of prime brokers is highly persistent over time. Simultaneously,
the lending and financing volumes of prime brokers decrease for three months. This is
also reflected by a short-run reduction of their profits, whereas the liquidity premium of
hedge funds persistently rises. Thus, growing risk aversion generates a persistent increase
in the risk buffers of prime brokers and reduces their intermediation activity temporarily.
Prime brokers are even willing to pay for this risk hedging with a substantial short-run
decrease in their excess returns. Hedge funds, on the other hand, are able to exploit
the increased demand for illiquid assets or their securitised equivalents used as collateral
irrespective of the deleveraging effect generated by the decrease in term lending. They
raise their illiquidity premium and are thus able to offer their shareholders an adequate
risk premium.
In order to interpret, how this shock disseminates in the system, we perform variance
decompositions as a complementary tool. This requires a split-up of the analysis into two
cases, because accelerating risk aversion might disseminate through either prime broker
lending or financing. We first assume the dominance of prime broker financing over lending
in the shock dissemination process (Cholesky order: NETPOS, FINANCING, LENDING,
HFILLIQ, PBER). In a second step the emphasis is assigned to the transmission via prime
broker lending (Cholesky order: NETPOS, LENDING, FINANCING, HFILLIQ, PBER).
Taken together both cases depict the aggregated consequences.
As depicted in Figure 2.4.3, the variance decomposition illustrating the dissemination of
a shock to the risk-position via prime broker refinancing is mainly driven by the security
holdings of prime brokers and their refinancing volume in repo markets. In detail, the
variation of securities holdings is mostly due to serial correlation (roughly 70%). The
remainder stems from financing (around 20%) and to a lesser extent from hedge fund
illiquidity and lending (both around 5%). Securities holdings of prime brokers explain
almost as much variation in prime broker financing than does serial correlation (50%
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Figure 2.1: Impulse responses. This Figure displays impulse responses of the endogenous variables
to shocks in (a) HFILLIQ, (b) NETPOS, (c) FINANCING. Dotted lines denote confidence levels at the
5% significance level. Vertical axes are scaled in Cholesky innovations, horizontal axes are in months.
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vs. 40%), while lending activity accounts for the major part of the rest (about 8%).
Financing activity picks up most of the variation of prime broker lending (57%) with
the remaining variation being almost equally shared by serial correlation and a spill-
over from securities holdings (slightly above respectively below 20%). Variation in hedge
fund illiquidity rests upon declining serial correlation (90% to 56%) complemented by
cross-effects from prime broker securities holdings (up to 23%), prime broker lending
and financing (up to 9 and 7% respectively). The excess return of prime brokers results
primarily from serial correlation (85%) with the remainder almost entirely due to lending
activity (up to 10%).
To the contrary, the variance decomposition illustrating the risk-related shock dissemi-
nation via prime broker lending (see Figure 2.3), appears to be mainly driven by prime
brokers’ securities holdings and lending. The contribution of serial correlation to the vari-
ation of securities holdings accounts for roughly 70% with the remainder being mostly
due to prime broker lending (around 25%). The variation of prime lending is driven by
serial correlation (slightly less than 80%), but reacts also to securities holdings (around
15%). Refinancing operations are hardly serially correlated (20% to 30%). Instead, their
variation is mainly generated by securities holdings (around 50%) and lending activity
(30% to 20%). The two remaining variables, the excess return of prime brokers and hedge
fund illiquidity, are both strongly serially correlated (90% and 90 to 56%), but do also
covariate with lending activity (6% respectively up to 17%) and securities holdings (3%
respectively up to 23%).
The aggregation of the two effects discussed above reconfirms that the contribution of
securities holdings dominates all other cross-effects. This holds in particular for prime
broker financing and lending activity. Moreover, the contributions of securities holdings
tend to be highly persistent. Thus, the high relevance of securities holdings for the
transmission of the shock throughout the system is further reconfirmed.
To summarise, incidents of exceptional uncertainty about the profitability of institutions
and/or the volume of business involved in prime brokerage have the potential to prompt
sudden interruptions in the associated financial intermediation. Those interruptions are
mainly caused by collateral hoarding of prime brokers.
2.4.4 Disruptions in the Financial Intermediation Chain Force
Hedge Funds to Deleverage.
For all three cases of shocks associated with risks to the analysed intermediation chain,
hedge funds reduce their leverage obtained through borrowing from prime brokers. Those
cases include (i) a negative shock to the illiquidity premia of hedge funds associated with
an unexpected decrease in the market value of their assets, (ii) an increase of prime
brokers’ securities holdings, and (iii) a negative shock to prime brokers’ financing volume
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Figure 2.2: Risk shock (prime broker financing). This Figure displays variance decompositions of the endogenous variables. Results are based on Luetkepohl
(2005). Cholesky Order: NETPOS, FINANCING, LENDING, HFILLIQ, PBER. Vertical axes are in percentages, horizontal axes are in months.
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representing an unexpected decrease of liquidity in repo markets.
The last two shocks generate a temporary reduction in the lending volume of prime
brokers and a simultaneous built-up in their securities holdings for up to three months
(cf. Figure 2.1), displaying still some persistence afterwards. With lending down and risk
buffers up, hedge funds face gradually mounting pressure in rolling over their expiring debt
tranches. Hence, they need to deleverage in order to preserve their liquidity positions. As
already observed in the previous section, in case of an increase in the risk aversion of prime
brokers hedge funds profit from this deleveraging through outright sales of assets to prime
brokers, whereas prime brokers are not willing to engage in additional borrowing. On the
other hand, hedge funds are forced by shocks to repo markets into a deleveraging process
accompanied by decreasing profits. The ambiguity observed in the effects of deleveraging
emphasises the importance of the initial shock source: a risk shock benefits hedge funds by
generating additional demand for collateral and hence their assets, while a liquidity shock
strengthens the position of prime brokers as the intermediary for scarce funding. Thus,
as already pointed out before, mounting risks and the incentive to insure against them
have the potential to interrupt the particular financial intermediation chain discussed in
this paper.
Similarly, a negative shock to the illiquidity premium of hedge funds generates a persistent
decrease in the securities holdings of prime brokers as well as negative short-run reactions
in both their lending and refinancing activities (cf. Figure ?? and Table 2.4). These
effects are driven by a perceived decrease in the value of hedge fund assets. Hedge funds
need to deleverage by selling assets, while lower collateral values induce prime brokers
to reduce their intermediation activity. However, looking forward to long-run reactions
reveals that the negative influence of this rapid devaluation is not persistent, because
hedge funds are able to restore their illiquidity premium after a delay of one month
almost completely. In response to the valuation shock hedge funds see the opportunity to
enter the market again at the now lower level of asset prices. Their demand for additional
lending increases. The strong fluctuations observed for this variable indicate that hedge
funds continuously receive weakly performing assets back as outstanding collateralised
loans expire. Their ability to take on new loans is therefore considerably moderated over
longer horizons. Prime brokers, on the other hand, are generally interested in meeting
the additional credit demand of hedge funds, and therefore accept new collateral. But
these collateral inflows do not suffice to balance the loss in collateral value caused by the
initial short-term price decline and the increased haircuts in repo markets. Hence, the
refinancing of prime brokers remains flat, even if it displays persistent fluctuations for
up to 6 months. Consequently prime brokers meet the increased credit demand of hedge
funds only partially; the remaining excess demand resolves through higher funding costs.
The profits of prime brokers therefore tend to increase in the long run.
All three effects cause hedge funds to deleverage in reaction to market stress at least in
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the short run. However, for the case of valuation shocks hedge funds are able to buffer
price effects and to reverse the deleveraging in the long run, while adverse shocks on risk
perceptions and on repo markets tend to preserve the deleveraging effect due to persistent
liquidity hoarding by prime brokers.
Consulting the variance decompositions associated with the different shock types recon-
firms the broad picture of the analysis above. For risk shocks to securities holdings of
prime brokers, lending is, as already discussed in the previous section, always among the
three variables mostly responsible for the transmission through the system (Figures 2.4.3
and 2.3). Similarly, the variance decompositions of a shock to the hedge fund illiquidity
premium displayed in Figure 2.4 indicate that lending is among the main drivers for the
three business activity variables of prime brokers. In particular, the influence of lending
always dominates the contribution to prime brokers’ financing activities, while all other
variables are to varying degrees dominated by serial correlation.
Regarding negative shocks on hedge funds’ illiquidity premium, the variation in the se-
curities position of prime brokers is, besides the dominance of valuation effects through
serial correlation, initially influenced by deleveraging. Later on, the illiquidity premium
of hedge funds reinforces the serial valuation effect. Both effects reflect the influence
of asset or collateral values on the financial intermediation chain from repo markets to
hedge funds. More precisely, hedge fund illiquidity starts out completely self-dependent,
but over time is also increasingly affected by prime brokers’ securities holdings (up to
23%). Prime broker lending looks pretty similar: roughly 90% of total variation is self-
explained, with the remainder being pre-eminently driven by prime brokers’ securities
holdings. By contrast, prime brokers’ securities holdings are mainly explained by serial
correlation (about 60%) and by hedge fund illiquidity and prime broker lending (both
around 20%). Prime brokers’ financing activity reacts strongly to lending activity (45%
to 70%) as well as to itself and prime brokers’ securities holdings (18%). Finally, the
variation of prime broker excess returns is primarily due to serial correlation (at least
80%). If at all, prime brokers’ securities holdings add some additional explanatory power
(roughly 8%). Thus, under the prevalent Cholesky ordering, a shock to hedge funds in-
deed disseminates mainly via prime broker lending and their securities holdings, whereas
their refinancing operations play only a minor role vice-versa.
Finally, for the case of a negative shock to financing, representing periods of squeezed
money market funding, prime broker financing dominates the transmission of the shock
to all business activity variables (cf. Figure 2.5). Their financing activity is to a consid-
erable degree (around 90%) explained by its own lags, while a minor, if any, cross-effect
originates from their lending activity (up to 10%). The majority of the variation of prime
brokers’ risk position is due to serial correlation (46% to 67%) and prime broker refinanc-
ing operations (53% to 19%). A minor effect stems from hedge fund illiquidity (roughly
5%). By contrast, serial covariance contributes only around 20% of the variation of the
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Figure 2.4: Shocks to hedge funds. This Figure displays variance decompositions of the endogenous variables. Results are based on Luetkepohl (2005). Cholesky
Order: HFILLIQ, LENDING, NETPOS, FINANCING, PBER. Vertical axes are in percentages, horizontal axes are in months.
72
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Prime Broker Excess Return
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Hedge Fund Illiquidity
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Prime Broker Lending
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Prime Broker Securities Holdings
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
PBER HFILLIQ LENDING NETPOS FINANCING
Prime Broker Financing
Figure 2.5: Shocks to money markets. This Figure displays variance decompositions of the endogenous variables. Results are based on Luetkepohl (2005).
Cholesky Order: FINANCING, NETPOS, LENDING, HFILLIQ, PBER. Vertical axes are in percentages, horizontal axes are in months.
73
lending activity of prime brokers. Instead, their financing activity (roughly 60%) and
securities holdings (about 15%) account for most of the variation.
This dominance of prime brokers’ refinancing volume indicates how liquidity in the original
funding markets determines the intermediation volume of the entire chain, even if the
liquidity squeeze is only partially transmitted to lending behaviour, which is also reflected
in a short-term increase of securities holdings within the corresponding impulse responses.
This effect also shows up in the prominent cross-effect (up to 30%) of prime brokers’
securities holdings on the variation in hedge funds’ illiquidity premium. A potential
explanation is that the increase in the risk buffers of prime brokers allows hedge funds to
couple the deleveraging process with improved margin or haircut conditions. Hence they
can hold their illiquidity premium stable. Last, but not least, the excess return of prime
brokers results primarily from serial correlation (at least 85%) with the remainder due to
lending activity (up to 9%).
To summarise, the presented evidence indicates that adverse shocks to the financial in-
termediation chain bring hedge funds about to deleverage independent of the original
source. However, the dissemination of shocks is strongly source-dependent. The three
cases considered above are representative of shocks to hedge fund illiquidity, to the risk
position of prime brokers, and to money markets. The dissemination of shocks to hedge
funds involves prime broker lending and their risk position, whereas money market shocks
spread via prime broker financing and their risk position. A shock to the risk position
of prime brokers would on an aggregated level disseminate through all three prime bro-
ker activities. Hence, our findings support the notion that different shock sources affect
the financial intermediation chain quite differently, even if hedge funds are stimulated
to deleverage, at least in the short run, under all shock cases. The implications of this
diversity for policy measures are to be discussed in section VI.
2.4.5 Adverse Shocks to any Element of the Intermediation Chain
Impair the Profitability of Hedge Funds Stronger than the
one of Prime Brokers.
Inspecting the impulse responses to various adverse shock types, we find that shocks to
refinancing conditions push up prime broker excess returns and lower the hedge funds
illiquidity premium as a result of deleveraging (cf. previous subsection). Vice versa, ad-
verse shocks to the risk buffers of prime brokers raise the illiquidity premium of hedge
funds and reduce prime brokers’ excess returns. Direct negative shocks to the illiquid-
ity premium of hedge funds are only weakly persistent, but spill also over to the excess
returns of prime brokers, even if only to limited degree.
However, further taking into account short-run estimators and variance decompositions,
the positive response of hedge funds’ illiquidity premium to increasing risks is to a sub-
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stantial degree driven by a rise in securities holdings and a simultaneous reduction in
lending. This has two consequences: on one hand hedge funds experience an increasing
rate of return from supplying collateralisable assets. On the other hand, their balance
sheets shrink and returns from liquid components of their balance sheet are lost. In total,
the risks associated with the entire hedge fund industry increase, since profits depend
to a higher degree on successful business with illiquid assets. Thus, investors into hedge
funds increase their risk premia. Consequently, the risk-adjusted profits of the hedge fund
industry do actually fall rather than increase (cf. Subsection 2.4.3). Hence, hedge funds
tend to experience losses in risk-adjusted returns for all shock types. Moreover, compar-
ing the size of the reactions to the standard deviation of the associated residuals reveals
that the impulse responses of the hedge fund illiquidity premium always remain below the
standard deviation of their own residuals. This does not hold for the reaction of prime
brokers’ excess returns, which react up to two times the standard deviation of their own
residuals.
To sum up, hedge funds tend to suffer from all types of shocks on a moderate level. Prime
brokers profit strongly from shocks to financing conditions and weakly from shocks to risk
buffers, but suffer from shocks to lending.
2.5 Robustness checks
We employ a number of robustness checks to pre-empt the threat that the model’s findings
are driven by the model selection procedure, the construction of endogenous variables or
omitted variables.
First, we modify the model selection procedure. Instead of focusing on the consistency
of different cointegration rank criteria, we examine how modifications to the long-run
equations affect the overall model fit and parameter stability. The model fit is measured by
the average adjusted R-Squared, while we assess parameter stability based on the absolute
value of the percentage change in the significant parameters of the short-run equation
(excluding vector error correction). In addition, we use changes in the shock dissemination
(impulse responses and variance decomposition) as indirect proxies of parameter stability,
since no considerable variations should be found, if parameters remain stable.
As shown in Figure 2.6, the overall model fit peaks when including two cointegration
equations with no constants (C2T1) or constants in the long-run part (C2T2). All other
specifications fall either considerably below this benchmark or require much more param-
eters, but fail to improve the model fit. At the same time, parameters seem to be most
stable when considering two cointegration equations excluding deterministic trends; an
impression further supported by our indirect proxies displayed in Figure 2.7. Further-
more, when comparing the remaining two specifications, we find that the latter yields
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at least one significant constant. Hence, favouring a relatively lean model specification,
our results suggest that the inclusion of a constant in the long-run part constitutes a
well-balanced compromise between the model fit and parameter stability. The modified
selection procedure accordingly yields results equivalent to those in Section 3.
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Figure 2.6: Model fit and parameter stability. This figure illustrates deviations in the overall
model fit (adjusted R-Squared) and in parameter stability (absolute percentage changes) of various model
specifications from the benchmark model (C2T1). Character combinations C1 to C3 represent the number
of cointegration equations and character combinations T1 to T5 the inclusion of constants and trends
(T1: no constants, no trends; T2: constant in long-run relation; T3: constants in long-run relation and
short-run error correction; T4: two constants and linear trend; T5: two constants and quadratic trend).
Second, to evaluate the resilience of the benchmark model, we repeat the analysis of
Section 3 using differently constructed endogenous variables and potentially omitted vari-
ables. Again, we employ the average model fit and parameter stability as criteria of model
robustness. The results are presented in Figure 2.8. We start by applying a narrower set
of prime brokersignoring those that do not account for at least 5% of all observed man-
dates.47 As a consequence, the average model fit and parameter estimates moderately
move (around 12%). Next, we vary the construction of the variable hedge fund illiquidity
in several ways: we filter fund-specific returns individually; we include capital inflows
into hedge funds as an exogenous factor into the general model; and we include the same
variable into the individual as well as the aggregate filtering procedure.48 All of these
modifications do hardly produce any reaction in our two robustness criteria. But the
47 The total number of prime brokers shrinks to eleven, since we exclude all prime brokers that do
not include at least five percent of detected mandates, but include those disappearing during the
recent financial crisis (Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch). Hence, we are left with the
following list: Bear Stearns, Deutsche Bank, Credit Suisse, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Lehman
Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Newedge (i.e. Credit Agricole, Societe General), SEB,
UBS.
48 Flows into hedge funds are modelled according to Getmansky (2012).
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Figure 2.7: Indirect proxies of parameter stability. This figure illustrates deviations in the
impulse responses and in the variance decompositions (both 3 lags) of various model specifications from
the benchmark model (C2T1). Character combinations C1 to C3 represent the number of cointegration
equations and character combinations T1 to T5 the inclusion of constants and trends (T1: no constants,
no trends; T2: constant in long-run relation; T3: constants in long-run relation and short-run error
correction; T4: two constants and linear trend; T5: two constants and quadratic trend).
same criteria react quite strongly when the Dow Jones Credit Suisse (formerly: Credit
Suisse Tremont) and the Hedge Fund Research indices are used as alternative measures
for hedge fund profitability. This reflects the higher weight of smaller hedge funds in these
two indices. As documented in the methodologies of both indices, the minimum volume
of eligible funds is between USD 50 million and USD 100 million by AuM, whereas all
of the funds in our sample exceed USD 1 billion AuM. In addition, in case of the Dow
Jones Credit Suisse index, eligible hedge funds are not allowed to have investment lockup
periods and redemption periods of more than one week. But, especially for large hedge
funds, it is common practice to impose significant redemption periods (Fung et al., 2008).
Consequently both indices appear much less representative of large and systemically rele-
vant hedge funds, so that the previous conclusions remain unimpaired. If anything, with
the model fit remaining decent, the modified model characterises the shock dissemina-
tion through the wider hedge fund industry. To conclude, neither the filtering technique,
nor taking fund flows into account, nor changing the selection of considered hedge funds
undermines the robustness of the benchmark model.
Third, to evaluate whether the model produces consistent empirical results with respect
to prime broker activity, we successively replace the overnight and term net financing vari-
ables, LENDING and FINANCING, by their net repo equivalents.49 The latter variables
49 Similar to overnight (term) net financing, overnight (term) net repo is positive (negative). The
interpretation of the alternative proxy for the FINANCING (LENDING) activity of prime brokers
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Figure 2.8: Modified variable constructions and omitted variables. This figure illustrates de-
viations in the overall model fit (adjusted R-Squared) and in parameter stability (absolute percentage
changes) of various model specifications from the benchmark model. Specifications differ in modified en-
dogenous variables: (1) prime broker excess return based on narrower definition (weighted by mandates);
(2) hedge fund illiquidity based on (a) individual filtering; (b) including fund flows as exogenous factor;
(c) including fund flows in individual filtering; (d) including fund flows in aggregated filtering; (e) Credit
Suisse Tremont index; (f) Hedge Fund Research index; (3) prime broker lending proxied by term net repo
volume; (4) prime broker financing proxied by overnight net repo volume.
follow a narrower definition than net overnight financing or net term financing, because
they exclude securities transactions outside of repo—most notably securities borrowing
and lending. In this case, overnight repos dominate term repos in terms of volume, since
they reportedly constitute one of the most important funding sources for prime brokers.
Unsurprisingly, the use of both alternative variables creates considerable shifts in the pa-
rameters, though the effect is less elevated for overnight net repo. Thus, the benchmark
model continues to provide consistent empirical results.
In a nutshell, our robustness checks reveal that the benchmark model estimated in Sec-
tion 3 is stable to modifications in the model selection procedure, in the construction of
endogenous variables and potentially omitted variables. It turns out that the model is
further suitable to even characterise the role of relatively small hedge funds in financial
intermediation. Finally, the model derives consistent empirical evidence with respect to
a narrower definition of prime broker activity.
is accordingly still ensured.
78
2.6 The collapse of the financial intermediation via
prime brokers and hedge funds during the recent
financial crisis
Our findings document that in normal times hedge funds and prime brokers act as com-
plementary trading partners, i.e. hedge funds’ illiquidity generates a demand for prime
broker lending and thus, with some delay, also the need for a refinancing of prime bro-
kers. This increase in prime broker activity raises their long-run excess profitability, since
prime brokers demand compensation for the financial intermediation services provided.
Nevertheless, hedge funds benefit as well, since they are able to transform initially illiquid
assets into new liquidity. Doing this, they are able to leverage the capital received by
the issuance of shares. Since hedge funds invest these additional funds at least partially
into illiquid investments, the capital involved finally finds its way into the economy’s real
sector. However, the finding of a negative short-run feedback of lending on hedge funds’
illiquidity indicates that marginal cost effects limit this leverage process in the short run.
We also illustrate the outstanding role of hedge funds and prime brokers for the supply
of collateral assets to the repo market from an operational point of view. Thereby, we
reconfirm the findings of Singh and Aitken (2010). To recapitulate, hedge funds, prime
brokers and the repo market together comprise an entire chain of financial intermedia-
tion channelling funds from liquid short-term markets into illiquid long-term investments.
This particular chain of financial intermediation belongs to the alternatives to traditional
banking which are often discussed under the term shadow banking.
Our empirical results demonstrate that this form of financial intermediation has been im-
paired on the peak of the turmoil generated by the recent financial crisis. We show that,
whenever the volatility of prices and business activities switch to extraordinary levels,
accelerating securities holdings and financing activity of prime brokers are not accompa-
nied by a rise in lending activity. Hence, we establish that the financial intermediation
chain formed by hedge funds and prime brokers is vulnerable. These disruptions are also
reflected by higher costs of hedge fund illiquidity and deteriorating prime broker excess
returns. Apparently, the drop in financial intermediation affects both the access of hedge
funds to liquidity and the need for prime broker services. Hence, we complement the
findings of (Klaus and Rzepkowski, 2009) who report a negative influence of a deteriora-
tion in the pricing of the associated prime brokers’ CDS and implied volatilities on the
performance of hedge fund returns which is even more pronounced in the crisis years after
2007, with the difference that our results are based on quantitative information rather
than price information.
Furthermore, we find that the impact of a given shock on the intermediation activity of
hedge funds and prime brokers strongly depends on its specific source. In particular, a
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shock to the risk position of prime brokersi.e. fluctuations in their securities holdingstends
to have an unusually severe impact on financial intermediation. The reason is that a prime
broker’s ability to borrow against collateral and to hand out cash loans to hedge funds, in
order to receive collateral, weakens at the same time. Thus, the entity subsequently faces
an even stronger funding need despite a further impaired access to collateral assets. By
contrast, shocks to hedge funds’ illiquidity premia or to money market conditions allow
prime brokers to adjust either their refinancing activity or their lending activity.
Our results support the notion that precautionary hoarding of liquid securities by prime
brokers contributed substantially to this collapse in financial intermediation. Since prime
brokers, similar to traditional banks, frequently refinance long-run investments through
short-run liabilities such as commercial paper or repos, they are vulnerable to shortages
in funding liquidity and runs in a crisis. For instance, rising haircuts might cause a
situation where the outstanding repo volume exceeds the collateral value (Martin et al.,
2012). In this case, lenders have an incentive to call in on their claims similar to bank
depositors. According to Gorton and Metrick (2012), this behaviour has the potential
to unfold a run on repo. Moreover, Brunnermeier (2009) argues that startled hedge fund
clients might withdraw their liquid wealth held with prime brokers in order to escape
negative repercussions for the case that their prime brokers go bankrupt. In analogy to
the previous argument, hedge funds would then have an incentive to balance prime broker
loans and withdraw pledged collateral. Our evidence is consistent with both explanations.
It indicates that prime brokers are aware of the problem and start to raise their liquidity
buffers whenever financial turmoil soared: Conditional on exceptional return volatility
they increased their securities holdings, but kept lending activity relatively flat, even at
the cost of vanishing profitability. Recent studies further substantiate this view. As
Singh and Aitken (2009b) point out the hoarding of liquid assets by major banks and
prime brokers resulted in a decline of at least USD 5 trillion in globally available liquidity
during 2008 alone. In another study, Berrospide (2012) finds corresponding empirical
evidence for precautionary hoarding of US commercial banks in anticipation of unrealised
losses in their securities portfolios.
Moreover, the empirical evidence delivers plausible explanations for the existence of a
common unknown factor in hedge fund returns as well as the collapse in re-hypothecation
during the recent financial crisis. Both Billio et al. (2012) and Boyson et al. (2010)
document a clustering in hedge fund performance which is unaccounted for by traditional
risk factors. Our results suggest that this can be explained by the hoarding of securities by
prime brokers which decreases the flow of liquidity to hedge funds and prevents the re-use
of eligible collateral assets in repo markets in times of market distress. Hedge funds are
therefore left with no choice but to deleverage to remain afloat. According to Ang et al.
(2011) hedge funds indeed rapidly reduced their asset holdings and levels of indebtedness
in response to the surging financial turmoil in the recent crisis. Thus, the uniformly weak
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performance among hedge funds during the financial crisis reflects their attempt to sell
securities simultaneously.
We corroborate that the sharp decline in re-hypothecation over the recent financial crisis—
actual estimates attribute at least USD 1.7 trillion to the largest four global prime brokers
(Singh and Aitken, 2009a) and another USD 750 billion to major custodians (Singh and
Aitken, 2010)—can also be explained by the detected disruption in financial intermedi-
ation. With prime brokers hoarding securities and hedge funds liquidating assets, the
debt capacity and thus volume of collateral available to the wider repo market necessarily
declined. Consistent with this view Adrian and Shin (2010) find that the actual repo
activity (adjusted for M2) of primary dealers’ strongly went down on the height of the
crisis. Hence, our empirical evidence does not only offer a reasonable explanation for the
reduction in re-hypothecation but is also consistent with previous research.
Finally, our results indicate that some of the policy measures implemented by central
banks helped to alleviate the disruptions in the financial intermediation chain between
hedge funds and prime brokers. In particular, in March 2008 the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York created a new facility, the Primary Dealer Credit Facility, which allowed
prime brokers in times of market distress a discount-window like access to central bank
liquidity. In September 2008, this facility was even enhanced by lowering its collateral
eligibility standards (Adrian et al., 2009). The heavy usage of this facility (total of USD
8.95 trillion, thereof USD 1.19 trillion in September 2008 alone) indicates that this specific
policy tool fulfilled its purpose to buffer the 2007-2008 liquidity squeeze in repo markets
by providing an alternative source of short term funding for prime brokers. In addition,
in September 2008 the liquidity swap lines allocated by 15 central banks since late 2007
were also considerably enhanced (USD 830 billion extended in September 2008). Thus,
additional liquidity in foreign currency was provided to interbank markets as well.
Both policy measures fall into the time period in which a high concentration of non-zero
values in our blip variables indicates the occurrence of financial distress. Therefore, we
conclude that our model illustrates some impact of financial distress on the endogenous
variables beyond the down-weighing effects of a simultaneous relief by means of policy
measures. This finding also reveals that liquidity hoarding by prime brokers was alleviated
by the central bank’s provision of liquidity. On the other hand, the limited reaction of
lending to any shock in prime brokers’ financing activity found by our model implies that
those policy measures were nevertheless largely effective. Thus, these measures eventually
helped to support, among other effects, financial intermediation through hedge funds,
prime brokers and repo markets. Hence, the results indicate how crisis-related policy
interventions can mitigate the vulnerability of the financial intermediation chain discussed
in this paper.
81
2.7 Conclusions
We analyse the potentially vulnerable and systemically relevant financial intermediation
chain established by hedge funds and prime brokers in a heteroskedasticity-robust VEC
framework. Our dataset covers the 306 largest global hedge funds and their prime brokers
over the period July 2001 to December 2011. The study reveals that in normal times hedge
funds and prime brokers act as complementary trading partners. Their interconnected
business is mainly driven by asset prices and the risks perceived in relevant markets.
However, we provide empirical evidence that this specific form of financial intermediation
was substantially reduced at the height of the recent global financial crisis. Our results
suggest that this break-down was due to the hoarding of liquid securities by prime brokers
being eager to avert runs by their clients. The trigger behind this behaviour was an
increase in the observed volatility of market activities reflecting a general increase in
perceived risks. Hence, our findings are consistent with previous evidence on the behaviour
of prime brokers (Singh and Aitken, 2009a) and commercial banks (Berrospide, 2012)
during the crisis.
Beyond that, we provide fresh insights into the distinct dynamic dissemination pattern
of financial shocks through hedge fund illiquidity and prime broker activity. First, we
demonstrate that all adverse shocks which could in some form be observed during the
recent financial crisis induce hedge funds to deleverage. Second, the deleveraging process
impairs the profitability of hedge funds stronger than the one of prime brokers. Third,
the consequences of a particular shock strongly depend on the respective source, whereas
prime brokers’ securities holdings play in any event a central role in the shock transmission.
From a systemic risk perspective, our results emphasise the fact that fairly general shocks
to markets can severely impair one of the potential substitutes for the traditional financial
intermediation chain through banking. Moreover, the central factor in these reactions is
the securities hoarding by prime brokers. Since prime brokers are closely connected with
the traditional banking system, feed-back effects towards commercial banks are highly
probable. In addition, the central role of prime brokers’ securities holdings indicate that
prime brokers are systematically relevant by nature, since they form the central node in
transmitting shock events throughout the entire intermediation chain—apart from the
pure fact that this market segment is anyway highly concentrated. This is why we find,
that central bank interventions on the height of the recent crisis appear to have substan-
tially cushioned the negative effects of financial meltdown on collateral-based financial
intermediation in general.
Several robustness checksvariations in the construction of endogenous variables, a modified
model selection procedure, inclusion of potentially omitted variablesreconfirm that the
estimated heteroskedasticity-robust VEC model eventually provides a sound description of
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the financial intermediation chain established by hedge funds and prime brokers. Building
on this stable structure, future revisions, e.g. the use of a panel data framework, have
the potential to deliver results which reflect also the heterogeneity of the hedge fund
industry. Most notably, such an extension could be useful to explore the transmission of
effects within the hedge fund sector. In such a way, it could be even possible to identify
those funds which are systemically relevant due to characteristics beyond their pure size
properties.
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Chapter 3
Two Sides of the Same Coin?
Financial Integration vs. Financial
Contagion
This chapter is joint work with Steffen Sebastian.
Abstract
Global financial integration benefits financial institutions in normal times, but makes
them vulnerable in turbulent times. This paper explores the financial integration of 21
developed countries during the Subprime Crisis and the Euro Crisis, using their financial
sector co-movement as a proxy. A novel Factor DCCX model allows us to examine the
drivers of financial sector co-movement, while accounting for spillovers from securities
markets, crisis-related regime-shifts and heteroskedasticity. The empirical evidence indi-
cates that the Subprime Crisis was a global event propagated by US and global contagion
following the crash of Lehman Brothers. However, the Euro Crisis was a regional event
marked by a US-driven decoupling of the countries at the centre of investor concerns.
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3.1 Introduction
This study examines the development of global financial integration between 2001 and
2012 and the impact of the global financial crisis of 2007-09 (Subprime Crisis) and the
as yet unresolved European sovereign debt crisis (Euro Crisis) on its progress. The crisis
aspect is particularly interesting since markets frequently “overreact” to negative shocks
elsewhere in episodes of financial turbulence. Economists often call this phenomenon
“contagion”. The common definition that we adopt describes “contagion” as financial
sector co-movement in excess of what is justified by fundamentals.50 Depending on the
geographical source, we further differentiate “US contagion”, “global contagion” and “do-
mestic contagion”. On the other hand, excessive disintegration of financial sectors vis-a`-
vis the US is labelled “flight-to-quality” as it results from investors unilaterally relocating
investments from the periphery to “safe havens”.
In normal times, a high degree of integration between a domestic financial sector and its
US equivalent—the centre of today’s global financial system—is a key criterion to attract
funds from investors. Strong financial sector integration ensures that domestic financial
institutions benefit from both a broad range of products (i.e. market width) and a high
investment volume per asset class (i.e. market depth). Besides, international investors
may easily move their investments across borders. However, in the presence of financial
stress shocks may also quickly spread from one financial sector to the next. This is why the
degree to which a given financial sector connects to the US financial system constitutes
a solid proxy not only of financial integration during tranquil periods, but also for its
vulnerability during periods of turmoil.
Acknowledging the dominant role of the US financial sector, we therefore measure fi-
nancial market integration by the financial sector correlation of 19 developed countries
vis-a`-vis their US equivalent.51 Correlations are determined based on a two-stage Fac-
tor DCCX model in the spirit of Engle (2009). The first-stage estimation builds on the
three-factor asset pricing model of Bekaert et al. (2014). The three factors account for
US-specific, global financial and domestic shocks. The financial sector performance may
further respond to crisis-related regime shifts and investor expectations. Next, we screen
the first-stage residuals for the remaining uncovered co-movement using an extended ver-
sion of Engle’s (2002) dynamic conditional correlation approach. The correlation struc-
ture incorporates extreme US-specific and domestic news shocks as well as tensions in
international securities markets. In the last step, we reassemble the different correlation
components to characterise the aggregate financial sector co-movement and to identify its
sources.
50 Cf. Eichengreen et al. (1996); Bekaert et al. (2005); Bekaert et al. (2014).
51 If two markets display a high level of co-movement, they are well integrated because investors treat
both markets fairly similarly.
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The Factor DCCX model provides a number of advantages. First, the three-factor model
establishes an understanding of the standard shock transmission against which periods of
financial disorder can be benchmarked. Second, the DCCX-implied residual correlation
dynamics help us to determine how acute financial stress interferes with financial sector
integration in the short term. Third, our approach does not suffer from the heteroskedas-
ticity bias described by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) since all the inherent variance processes
are dynamised to reflect financial sector co-movement adequately. Hence, our approach
facilitates the undisturbed detection of even excessive correlation movements and their
sources.
Overall, our results show a high degree of financial integration across countries; however, it
is strongly impeded by contagion and flight-to-quality during episodes of financial stress.
For instance, contagion spread financial turmoil to most countries examined following
the crash of the investment bank Lehman Brothers in the Subprime Crisis. Its average
size was 16.3% of unconditional correlations. By contrast, the countries at the centre
of the Euro Crisis (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain) showed remarkable decoupling from
the US financial sector (-20.1% of unconditional correlations), which even accelerated
over the course of the crisis (from -19.3% to -28.8%). Since spillovers towards other
financial sectors became increasingly unlikely in the latter case, financial stress remained
widely incarcerated in the four crisis countries. The Euro Crisis wss therefore essentially
a regional event, as opposed to the global scope of the Subprime Crisis.
A closer look at what lies behind contagion and flight-to-quality further reveals that the
US component was the primary source of excessive co-movement during both crises. It
boosted the interconnectedness of domestic financial sectors during the Subprime Crisis
and prompted the decoupling of the worst-hit countries in the Euro Crisis. By contrast,
the domestic and residual components had a consistently abating effect on financial sector
co-movement. Thus, the two alleviated the extent of contagion (from 13.3% to 7.5%), but
reinforced flight-to-quality (from -15.2% to -20.1%). The global component merely played
a less prominent role.
These findings have far-reaching implications. First, interventions of US policy makers
have the largest potential to counteract global financial crises due to the observed dom-
inance of the US component in the shock transmission. Second, domestic policy makers
may nonetheless help to isolate financial turmoil given the considerable negative impact
of the domestic and residual component on correlations. This is corroborated by the fact
that residual co-movement was particularly negative following peaks in financial stress,
and thus precisely when governments and central banks most actively intervened in fi-
nancial markets. Such measures included government bailouts and massive central bank
liquidity injections.52 Third, the negative contribution may by itself create new chal-
52 A good overview of policy interventions is provided by the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank’s Crisis
Timeline: http://timeline.stlouisfed.org/index.cfm?p=timeline#.
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lenges for domestic policy makers in the presence of a regional crisis, because it reinforces
excessive capital withdrawals to “safe havens”. This is all the more problematic in the
special case of the Euro Crisis, since flight-to-quality compromises the homogeneity of
the financial sectors within the euro area. As a result, the effectiveness of the monetary
policy may suffer and the vulnerability of the crisis countries’ domestic economies may
increase. Fourth, the proposed Factor DCCX model is particularly suited to modelling
macro-financial risk scenarios, due to the fact that it improves the correlation estimates
when they are needed the most for risk management purposes, such as hedging activities
or value-at-risk calculations.
Our study contributes to the literature on financial crises in two ways. First, it adds
fresh insights regarding the global propagation of financial stress across financial sec-
tors in the Subprime Crisis and the Euro Crisis. Several studies have pointed out that
the stability of financial institutions during the Subprime Crisis rested upon their expo-
sure to the US MBS market (cf. Allen and Carletti, 2008; Acharya and Schnabl, 2010;
Kacperczyk and Schnabl, 2010) and secured money markets (cf. Gorton and Metrick,
2012; Longstaff, 2010; Martin et al., 2012; Taylor and Williams, 2009). Eichengreen et al.
(2009) further identified common factors as major drivers escalating bank counterparty
risk. In a financial network framework, Glasserman and Young (2014) concluded that
highly leveraged financial institutions dependent on interbank funding trigger the fiercest
spillovers. On the other hand, the growing research on the Euro Crisis, though mostly
concentrating on sovereign bond markets, confirms that the crisis made troubled coun-
tries drift apart: Chudik and Fratzscher (2013) observed “a flight-to-safety phenomenon
across asset classes”, which particularly punished the yields of peripheral countries with
weak fundamentals.53 Besides, local factors became the dominant determinants of the
sovereign CDS spreads of the crisis countries (cf. Beirne and Fratzscher, 2013; De Santis,
2012). Finally, Black et al. (2013) showed that when the systemic risk of European banks
peaked in 2011, the risk contribution of Italian and Spanish banks also reached its highest
point.
Second, we propose a new heteroskedasticity-robust framework to quantify the propaga-
tion of financial stress. The work of Bekaert et al. (2014) and Engle (2009) is probably
closest to ours. Engle (2009) proposed a two-step estimation of equity correlations com-
bining factor asset-pricing models and DCC models, but ignored crisis-related dynamics.
Bekaert et al. (2014) studied regime shifts in a sophisticated factor asset pricing model,
yet did not explicitly take into account the exuberant and short-lived correlation dynam-
ics typical of periods of stress.54 Moreover, Chiang et al. (2007) and Forbes and Rigobon
(2002) investigated the shifts in correlation dynamics to reveal incidents and sources of
contagion.
53 Evidence of a flight-to-safety phenomenon in European bond markets can already be found in the
pre-euro era during the Russian debt crisis or the LTCM incident (Beber et al., 2008).
54 Related factor asset pricing models include Bekaert et al. (2005) and Engle et al. (1992).
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes our data set. Section
3.3 outlines the two-stage Factor DCCX model. The empirical results are presented in
Section 3.4 as well as a decomposition of the heteroskedasticity-adjusted overall correla-
tions in its sources. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes and discusses the implications of our
empirical findings for systemic risk and risk management.
3.2 Data
This study uses midweekly equity, interest rate and repo market data between 4 July
2001 and 26 September 2012. This choice allows for the highest possible frequency whilst
sidestepping potential temporal inconsistencies.55 All the variables are measured in US
dollars (USD).56 If not otherwise indicated, the entire data set originates from Thomson
Reuters Datastream.57
The MSCI Country and MSCI Financials total return indices serve as our measures of
overall and sector-specific equity market performance. We cover 20 major developed
countries from four regions: Asia/Pacific (Australia, Japan, Hong Kong), the euro area
(Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain), non-euro European countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK)
and North America (Canada, the United States). We further collect each financial sector’s
weekly dividend yield as an indicator of its profit situation and LIBOR with the same
maturity as a proxy for opportunity costs. Finally, we compile the total number of failed
repo settlements (i.e. “fails to deliver” plus “fails to receive”) from the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York’s primary dealer database as a measure of disruptions in securities
markets.
The study applies four types of variables. The first category includes the dependent
variables. These are the excess returns of the financial sector in country i during week t
(Rit) defined as the financial industry-specific stock return over the corresponding LIBOR
rate with the same tenor. The second category features a US factor (fUSt ), a global
financial factor (fGt ) and a domestic factor (f
D
it ) used as exogenous variables. The US
factor equals the MSCI USA total return. The global financial factor is the residual of
a regression of the MSCI World Financials total return on the US factor. In the same
manner, a country’s domestic factor is computed as the residual from a regression of the
55 Varying time zones and weekends may harm the interpretability of studies with a global focus,
as newly arriving information affects some markets during trading hours, when other markets are
closed. For more detailed discussions on this topic, please refer to Chiang et al. (2007) and Forbes
and Rigobon (2002). One approach (the one employed here) tackling this issue is to make explicit
use of midweek data.
56 We also performed the analysis using returns, dividend yields and interbank offered rates denomi-
nated in local currency. The results remained qualitatively unchanged.
57 For details of the variables and sources, see Table C.1 in the appendix.
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local MSCI total return on the two other factors. This procedure safeguards potential
endogeneity issues.58 The third category covers two regime dummies. The first dummy
(CR1) spans the Subprime Crisis from the onset of global money market stress in early
August 2007 to the trough of global stock markets in March 2009. The second dummy
(CR2) accounts for the Euro Crisis between October 2009 and the end of September
2012.59 The fourth category reflects the state of collateral-based financial intermediation.
Our measure is the unexpected portion of the total number of failed repo settlements
(i.e. “fails to deliver” plus “fails to receive”) involving government and corporate bonds.
Since repos link the secured money market to a variety of asset markets by construction,
settlement failures are generally a solid indicator of counterparty risk and asset price
volatility. The unexpected portion of failed repo transactions, yt, is the residual after
controlling for a constant and serial correlation of order one. Table C.2 in the appendix
exhibits descriptive statistics of the respective variables.
3.3 Modelling Financial Sector Co-movement
In the style of Engle (2009), we determine the co-movement of the US financial sector
with that of other developed countries during the Subprime Crisis and Euro Crisis. This
approach reflects that the US are the centre of the global financial system. Accordingly,
any change in the correlation vis-a-vis the US merely illustrates an alteration in the degree
of a country’s integration into the global financial landscape. Therefore, it is arguably
even possible to draw inferences from the co-movement with the US financial sector about
a country’s financial integration with third countries.60 This property will be particularly
useful when investigating the Euro Crisis.
The analysis proceeds in three steps. The first step estimates a three-factor asset pricing
model to single out common shocks (cf. Bekaert et al., 2014). The second step identifies
residual correlation patterns using an extended version of Engle’s (2002) DCC model,
which includes exogenous variables. The third step assembles the aggregate correlation
from its components. We call this approach a Factor DCCX model.
The Factor DCCX model provides several advantages. First, the three-factor model es-
tablishes an understanding of the standard shock transmission against which periods of
financial disorder can be benchmarked (cf. Bekaert et al., 2014). Second, the residual
correlation dynamics help us to ascertain how acute financial stress interferes with fi-
nancial sector integration in the short term. Third, our approach does not suffer from
58 The orthogonalization procedure yields very similar results when crisis dummies are included
59 The two crisis definitions are consistent with Bekaert et al. (2014) and (Lane, 2012), respectively.
60 Please keep in mind that correlations just mirror the underlying dynamics. In fact, we construct
correlations from a three-factor model. Thus, if a given country’s correlations vis-a-vis the US stand
out, this is because the country responds differently to the underlying factor than other countries
do (including the US).
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the heteroskedasticity bias described by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) as all the inherent
variance processes are dynamised to reflect the financial sector co-movement adequately.
Hence, our approach facilitates the undisturbed detection of even excessive correlation
movements and its sources (cf. Engle, 2009).
3.3.1 The Three-Factor Asset Pricing Model
The first step applies the three-factor asset pricing model of Bekaert et al. (2014) to the
excess return, ERit, of a given domestic financial sector:
ERit = Et−1[ERit] + β
′
iFt + γ
′
iCR1Ft + η
′
iCR2Ft + λiCR1 + τiCR2 + ǫit, (3.1)
Et−1[ERit] = κiRit−1 + ψiDYit, (3.2)
ǫit|It−1 ∼ N(0, hit). (3.3)
The vector F
′
t = [f
D
it , f
G
t , f
US
t ] contains a domestic, global financial and US factor. Two
regime variables, CR1 and CR2, capture crisis-related asymmetries. The expectations of
the current excess return, Et−1[ERit], are a linear function of the lagged excess return
and the local dividend yield, DYit. The vectors β
′
i = [β
D
i , β
G
i , β
U
i S], γ
′
i = [γ
D
i , γ
G
i , γ
U
i S]
and η
′
i = [η
D
i , η
G
i , η
U
i S] contain factor loadings depending on the present regime. λi and
τi are parameters. The residual ǫit denotes a domestic financial sector shock with mean
zero and time-dependent variance, hit. It−1 includes all the information available up to
and including week t− 1.
In the special case of the US financial sector (i = 0), the domestic and US factors coincide.
The above model therefore reduces to a two-factor model, which is incapable of identify-
ing systematic co-movement with the other domestic factors. We propose the following
auxiliary regressions for each country to overcome this shortcoming:
ǫ0t =
(
βi + γiCR1 + ηiCR2
)
fDit + uit. i 6= 0 (3.4)
The error term uit (i 6= 0) is the portion of the US financial sector excess return indepen-
dent of country i’s domestic factor.
Bekaert et al. (2014) remarked on the following. First, a comparable three-factor asset
pricing model may nest three different CAPMs: given that all the other parameters are
zero, the model converges to a domestic (βDi > 0), global financial (β
G
i > 0) or US
(βUSi > 0) CAPM. Second, the model allows us to study crisis-related asymmetries in
excess returns and their sources. If a slope parameter in the vector γ
′
i or η
′
i is significantly
positive (negative), this is evidence of “contagion” (“flight to quality”) since the beta
coefficients systematically underestimate (overestimate) the reaction of financial sector
performance to common shocks. An analogous rationale applies to the parameters λi
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and τi. By contrast, in the absence of crisis-induced asymmetries, the authors referred
to “interdependence”. Third, the correlations between any two countries increase in the
three factors provided that the excess return expectations are idiosyncratic. Thus, the
asymmetries identified in excess returns also persist in correlations.
3.3.2 The Dynamic Conditional Correlation Model
The second step screens the first-stage residuals for as yet unaccounted for residual co-
movement. Since the above asset pricing model removes most information attributable
to common shocks, regime shifts and serial correlation, any remaining systematic co-
dependence is likely to be related to extreme events or spillovers from other financial
markets. Such incidents typically materialise during periods of financial stress. In order
to take care of these features, we modify Engle’s (2002) original dynamic correlation
structure by including asymmetries and exogenous variables.
The starting point of our illustration is his original bivariate DCC approach (Engle, 2002).
As he described, we initially form i−1 pairs of residual excess returns, ε′it = [uit, ǫit], i 6= 0.
In a move to simplify the notation, the residuals are relabelled: ε1t = uit and ε2t = ǫit.
This alteration allows us to prevent the illustration from becoming unnecessarily complex.
The time-varying covariance matrix of a given pair of residuals is:
Ht = DtRtDt, (3.5)
where Dt = diag(
√
h1t, h2t) is a 2× 2 diagonal matrix of conditional standard deviations.
The variances themselves are assumed to follow univariate GARCH(1,1) processes,
hjt = ωj + δjǫ
2
jt−1 + θjh
2
jt−1, j = 1, 2 (3.6)
with parameters ωj, δj and θj.
61 Besides, Rt = (diag[Qt])
−1Qt(diag[Qt])
−1 is the 2 × 2
time-varying correlation matrix of standardised residuals, ξ
′
t = [ξ1t, ξ2t], with a typical
matrix element ρR12t. The standardised residuals are formed by dividing the respective
residual excess return by its standard deviation, ξjt = εjt/
√
hjt (j = 1, 2). The covariance
matrix, Qt, of the standardised residuals takes the form of a quadratic 2× 2 matrix. Its
elements, q11t, q12t and q22t, are used to determine the conditional residual correlation,
ρ12t = q12t/(q11tq22t). The DCC model applies the following correlation structure:
q12t = ρ12(1− α− β) + αξ1t−1ξ2t−1 + βq12t−1, (3.7)
61 We also experimented with asymmetric effects in the conditional variance process as proposed by
Glosten et al. (1993) and Zakoian (1994). However, the inclusion of an additional parameter hardly
contributed to the variances.
91
where ρ12 denotes the unconditional correlation of standardised residuals. The parameters
α and β are estimated subject to the constraint 1 − α − β > 0. Please note that the
parameter β is chosen in accordance with the notation in Engle (2002), but differs from
the β coefficient in the three-factor asset pricing model.
As mentioned earlier, we propose the following augmented DCCX correlation structure
to examine the impact of extreme events and spillovers on residual co-movement:
q12t = DCC12t + (φ1XTRM1t−1 + φ2XTRM2t−1)ξ1t−1ξ2t−1 + φ3yt−1, (3.8)
DCC12t = ρ12(1− α− β) + αξ1t−1ξ2t−1 + βq12t−1.
The two variables XTRMjt, j = 1, 2, identify unexpected domestic news shocks. Each
identifier indicates whether the absolute value of the residual ǫjt in country j = 1, 2 falls
into the highest 2.5 percentile.62 The variable yt controls for spillovers from repo market
failures.63 The term DCC12t stands for the original bivariate correlation structure. φ1,
φ2 and φ3 are parameters.
There is no systematic co-movement in the residual excess returns if all the parameters
in Equations 3.7 and 3.8 are insignificant. Otherwise, the first-stage asset pricing model
miscalculates the actual dependence between financial sectors. Then, the estimated co-
efficients φ1, φ2 and φ3 report the existence and type of systematic co-movement in the
residual excess returns. First, if all the parameters φ1, φ2 and φ3 in equation 3.8 are zero,
the correlation structure corresponds to the DCC model (Engle, 2002). Second, dramatic
news has a positive (negative) asymmetric impact on conditional correlations, if φ1, φ2 > 0
(φ1, φ2 < 0). In the case that the parameters point in opposite directions, simultaneously
appearing domestic news shocks may partly offset one another. The actual bearing on
residual correlations then rests upon the intensity of the signals. Eventually, a significant
coefficient, φ3, implies a spillover from repo market failures onto the residual financial
sector co-movement. If the parameter is positive, unexpected repo failures translate into
higher residual correlations.64
The two-step estimation proceeds as in Engle and Sheppard (2001). The parameters of
62 By selecting events based on the absolute value of the first-stage residual, we let the data generating
process decide whether positive or negative domestic news shocks are considered. The imposed
threshold (2.5 percentile) ensures that extreme events are limited to one event in five months or
about 5% of all weeks.
63 The ideal risk proxy oscillates with mean zero, but may briefly cluster during periods of financial
stress. Unexpected repo failures satisfy these requirements.
64 Under certain conditions, the marginal effect of a change in the exogenous variable can be reversed.
A detailed analytical derivation of this issue is presented in the appendix. As the empirical results
show, the issue is mostly negligible, since it emerges in merely 10 out of 11,134 weekly observations
(≃ 0.09%).
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the GARCH(1,1) process are determined in the first stage:
LLF1 = −1
2
2∑
t−1
[
T log(2π) +
T∑
t−1
(
log(hjt) +
ǫ2jt
hjt
)]
, j = 1, 2, (3.9)
and those of the DCCX model in the second stage:
LLF2 = −1
2
T∑
t−1
[
2log(2π) + 2log|Dt|+ log(|Rt|) + ξ′t−1R−1t ξt−1
]
. (3.10)
3.3.3 Correlation Components
The third step assembles the aggregate correlation based on its components to characterise
financial sector co-movement accurately over time. According to standard statistics, the
correlation coefficient in week t between the US financial sector (i = 0) and any other
country (i 6= 0) is defined as their covariance, Cov(ER0t, ERit), divided by the square
root of their variances, V (ER0t) and V (ERit):
ρ0it =
Covt(ER0t, ERit)√
Vt(ER0t)Vt(ERit)
=
CD0it + C
G
0it + C
US
0it + C
E
0it + C
R
0it√
Vt(ER0t)Vt(ERit)
, i 6= 0. (3.11)
The covariance is composed of a domestic component, CD0it, global component, C
G
0it, US
component, CUS0it , expectations component, C
E
0it and residual component, C
R
0it. All the
covariances but the last are based on parameter estimates of the first-stage three-factor
asset pricing model:
CD0it = (β
D
0 + γ
D
0 CR1 + η
D
0 CR2)(β
D
i + γ
D
i CR1 + η
D
i CR2)V (f
D
it ), (3.12)
CG0it = (β
G
0 + γ
G
0 CR1 + η
G
0 CR2)(β
G
i + γ
G
i CR1 + η
G
i CR2)V (f
G
t ), (3.13)
CUS0it = (β
US
0 + γ
US
0 CR1 + η
US
0 CR2)(β
US
i + γ
US
i CR1 + η
US
i CR2)V (f
US
t ), (3.14)
CE0it = κ0κi
√
V (ER0t−1)V (ERit−1) + ψ0ψi
√
V (DY0t)V (DYit). (3.15)
The inputs of the residual component derive from the second-stage DCCX estimation:
CR0it = ρ
R
0it
√
V (uit)V (ǫit). (3.16)
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In analogy to the covariance, the variance of the US financial sector performance V (ER0t)
is given by:
V (ER0t) = (β
D
0i + γ
D
0iCR1 + η
D
0iCR2)
2V (fDit ) (3.17)
+ (βG0 + γ
G
0 CR1 + η
G
0 CR2)
2V (fGt )
+ (βUS0 + γ
US
0 CR1 + η
US
0 CR2)
2V (fUSt )
+ κ20V (ER0t−1) + ψ
2
0V (DY0t) + V (uit),
where βD0i , γ
D
0i and η
D
0i are parameters derived from the respective auxiliary regressions
and uit is the associated residual US excess return. In the same manner, the variance of
the respective domestic financial sector performance V (ERit):
V (ERit) = (β
D
i + γ
D
i CR1 + η
D
i CR2)
2V (fDit ) (3.18)
+ (βGi + γ
G
i CR1 + η
G
i CR2)
2V (fGt )
+ (βUSi + γ
US
i CR1 + η
US
i CR2)
2V (fUSt )
+ κ2iV (ERit−1) + ψ
2
i V (DYit) + V (ǫit).
The underlying variance processes, V (fUSit ), V (f
G
it ), V (f
D
it ), V (ERit−1), V (DYit), V (uit) and
V (ǫit), follow GARCH(1,1) processes. This dynamization constitutes a generalization of
earlier asset pricing models, which account for crisis-related breaks in the covariance ma-
trix at best (cf. Bekaert et al., 2014; Engle et al., 1992; Fama and French, 1993; Lintner,
1965; Ross, 1976, Sharpe, 1964).
3.4 Financial Integration and Financial Contagion
The following three-step analysis will demonstrate that episodes of turbulence have inter-
fered with financial integration in recent years: US and global contagion drove the trans-
mission of financial stress around the globe after the crash of Lehman Brothers during
the Subprime Crisis. By contrast, in the Euro Crisis, financial stress increasingly concen-
trated in the original crisis countries due to US and domestic flight-to-quality. Hence, the
Subprime Crisis was a global event and the Euro Crisis a regional event. Moreover, we
spot inconsistencies between the correlation decomposition and the three-factor model,
confirming that the fully dynamised Factor DCCX model delivers more reliable correla-
tion estimates than asset pricing models abstracting from continuously time-dependent
variances.
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3.4.1 The Role of Common Shocks
In order to understand the common factors behind financial sector performance we es-
timate the three-factor asset pricing model initially in a panel context and afterwards
running univariate regressions by country. The results indicate that the Subprime Crisis
disseminated globally while the Euro Crisis concentrated on the euro area. Besides, the
panel model discovers major underlying dynamics, but sometimes conceals substantial
country-specific characteristics during the two crisis periods. This is a particular issue
during the Subprime Crisis, when cross-country heterogeneity appeared to be a defining
feature.
Table 3.1 shows the panel estimation results. With an adj. R-squared of 0.831, specifica-
tion (1) already captures the majority of the existing variation. Modifications concerning
cross-sectional fixed effects and cross-sectional weights do not improve the model fit.
There is also no sign of residual serial correlation. Thus, the model seems well calibrated.
However, since an eyeball test suggests heteroskedasticity in the residuals, we base the
inference on heteroskedasticity-robust White standard errors (White, 1980). Moreover,
Table C.3 in the appendix depicts country-specific univariate regressions. The model fit
is again generally high as the adj. R-squared varies around 0.850. In four cases (AUT,
GER, POR, UK), we detect residual serial correlation. Since the inclusion of further
lags or moving averages does not improve the model’s robustness, we leave this statistical
artifact to be exploited in the second-stage DCCX estimation. We further employ Newey-
West heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (Newey and West, 1987), as the residuals
display heteroskedasticity without exception.
The panel estimates in Table 3.1 indicate that the global factor exacerbated the already
high international financial sector integration during the Subprime Crisis, whereas the
various asymmetries in the US, global and domestic factors suggest regional transmission
of the Euro Crisis. Under normal conditions, investor expectations introduce a mean-
reverting element into financial sector performance through lagged excess returns. Beyond
that, all three factors have a considerable positive impact on the performance of domestic
financial sectors as the unconditional factor loadings are close to unity (0.974 to 1.261).
The high relevance of non-domestic factors observed emphasises the international scope of
the financial industry. During the Subprime Crisis, the global factor dependence increased,
whereas the other two factor loadings remained unaltered.65 In the Euro Crisis, the ties
65 A comparison of our results with those of Bekaert et al. (2014) (loc. cit.: Table 8), who performed
a closely related study on the wider stock market during the Subprime Crisis, indicates that a
defining characteristic of shock transmission towards financial sectors in developed economies is
their limited exposure to US and domestic shocks. Neither their emerging market peers nor non-
financial corporations in developed countries show similarly strong exposure. Moreover, our panel
estimates illustrate no crisis-related regime shift beyond changes in factor exposure. Since Bekaert et
al. (2014) did not report such findings, the contagion from unidentified sources during the Subprime
Crisis was apparently limited to financial sectors in emerging markets.
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Table 3.1: Panel three-factor asset pricing model. The table shows panel estimates of the
three-factor pricing model of Bekaert et al. (2014):
Rit = Et−1[Rit] + β
′
Ft + γ
′
CR1Ft + η
′
CR2Ft + λCR1 + τCR2 + ǫit.
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust according
to White. Cross-section fixed effects are either included (Y) or excluded (N). Cross-section weights
are either included (Y) or excluded (N). DW(1) denotes the Durbin-Watson statistic testing for one
period-lagged serial correlation in the residuals. ∗∗∗ (∗∗, ∗) indicates statistical significance at the 1%
(5%, 10%) level.
Domestic Financial Sector Performance
Expectations (1) (2) (3) (4)
Div. Yield -0.007 0.019 0.003 0.012
(-0.91) (1.55) (0.25) (0.36)
AR(1) -0.102*** -0.106*** -0.100*** -0.104***
(-8.26) (-8.46) (-8.07) (-7.86)
Domestic factor
Total 0.974*** 0.977*** 0.907*** 0.910***
(14.55) (14.49) (7.23) (7.23)
Subprime crisis -0.097 -0.101 -0.016 -0.020
(-1.35) (-1.39) (-0.14) (-0.18)
Euro crisis 0.177** 0.174** 0.217** 0.213**
(2.16) (2.12) (2.30) (2.25)
Global factor
Total 1.081*** 1.086*** 1.128*** 1.134***
(15.10) (15.00) (15.55) (15.41)
Subprime crisis 0.172*** 0.166*** 0.186*** 0.179***
(6.04) (5.72) (3.72) (3.56)
Euro crisis 0.202*** 0.196*** 0.253*** 0.247***
(3.45) (3.34) (3.24) (3.15)
US factor
Total 1.258*** 1.261*** 1.235*** 1.238***
(18.21) (18.18) (15.21) (15.20)
Subprime crisis -0.031 -0.033 -0.006 -0.009
(-0.81) (-0.86) (-0.15) (-0.23)
Euro crisis -0.085*** -0.088*** -0.054 -0.058
(-2.18) (-2.24) (-1.22) (-1.31)
Regime Shifts
Subprime crisis -0.033 -0.019 -0.101 -0.051
(-0.63) (-0.39) (-1.56) (-0.86)
Euro crisis -0.023 0.034 -0.061* 0.008
(-0.79) (1.28) (-1.65) (0.17)
Cross-section weights Y Y N N
Fixed effects N Y N Y
DW(1) 2.001 2.002 2.001 2.002
Adj. R-squared 0.831 0.831 0.782 0.782
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of domestic financial sector performance to the domestic factor deepened but loosened
vis-a`-vis the US factor, while the global factor exposure remained elevated. Hence, the
Subprime Crisis seems to have been primarily an international phenomenon, whereas the
Euro Crisis was more of a regional one.
0.963
1.108
1.217
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
Domestic Global US
Figure 3.1: Coefficients of three-factor asset pricing model in normal times. This figure
summarises the average coefficients of the domestic, global and US factor in normal times. Bars denote
the observed minimum and maximum factor loadings. The evidence is based on univariate estimates of
the three-factor capital asset pricing model. Detailed regression results are presented in Table C.3 in the
appendix.
Turning to the country-specific univariate regressions, the results widely reconfirm our
previous findings, but also reveal widespread heterogeneity across countries in episodes
of stress. For instance, the unconditional coefficients, β
′
i, in Figure 3.1 lie in the same
range as before (0.963 to 1.217) and investor expectations pre-dominantly cause the mean-
reversion. Nevertheless, the significance of certain parameters in the panel model is often
backed by rather few countries. This applies particularly to the crisis-related asymmetries
shown in Figure 3.2: during the Subprime Crisis, merely seven countries support a signif-
icant rise in the global factor, whereas two (three) featured an increase in the domestic
factor (US factor) and four (three) a decrease. However, only the global factor survives
in the panel model. A less confused picture arises for the Euro Crisis: six countries show
a significant rise in the global factor, eight (one) countries experienced an increase in the
domestic factor (US factor) and four (six) a drop. This time, the panel model upholds
tighter dependence on the global and domestic factors and looser dependence on the US
factor. This leads us to conclude that cross-sectional heterogeneity disguises some oppos-
ing country-specific characteristics, which the univariate regressions eventually uncover.
The disturbance was most pronounced during the Subprime Crisis.
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Figure 3.2: Crisis-related shifts in country-specific three-factor asset pricing model. This
figure summarises the frequency and direction of crisis-related shifts in the (a) domestic, (b) global, (c)
US factor of the three-factor asset pricing model in the Subprime Crisis and Euro Crisis. The evidence is
based on univariate estimates of the three-factor capital asset pricing model. Detailed regression results
are presented in Table C.3 in the appendix.
Despite the observed heterogeneity, we detect some geographical patterns. In the Sub-
prime Crisis, six of the domestic financial sectors witnessing a rise in global factor depen-
dence were located outside the euro area, three of which are Asian countries. By contrast,
during the Euro Crisis, four (six) of the six (eight) surges in the global factor (domestic
factor) and four of the six drops in the US factor involved financial sectors in the euro
area. Thus, there was an observable geographical shift in the vulnerability of financial
sectors towards the euro area over time.
The auxiliary regressions (cf. Figure C.1 in the appendix) reconfirm this impression.66
The US residuals negatively relate without exception to the other countries’ domestic
factors in normal times. During the Subprime Crisis, a systematic decline occurred in
the domestic factor exposure in all but one country. In the Euro Crisis, one decrease
in domestic factors was accompanied by three surges. All of these affected countries in
66 The residuals obtained from the auxiliary regressions do not display serial correlation, but strong
heteroskedasticity.
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the spotlight of the Euro Crisis (GRE, ITA, SPA) and widely offset the usually negative
dependence. This hints at a decoupling of thedomestic financial sectors at the centre of
upheaval from US excess performance.
In our view, the observed fluctuations in factor dependencies during periods of stress
are likely to be due to evaporating common funding sources in the Subprime Crisis and
sovereign risk exposure in the Euro Crisis. The reliance on common funding sources ex-
plains well why we find an unopposed rise in global factor dependence, while the evidence
for the other two factors is vaguely consistent: as financial institutions were strongly in-
tertwined on a global scale preceding the Subprime Crisis, in particular via short-term
funding (cf. Brunnermeier, 2009, Gorton and Metrick, 2012, Longstaff, 2010), the gradual
drying up of common funding sources culminating after the demise of Lehman Brothers in
September 2008 made financial institutions vulnerable to common shocks. The regional
focus of the Euro Crisis, notably the rise in domestic factors paired with the decoupling
from the US factor, favours sovereign risk as the underlying driver (Lane, 2012). The si-
multaneous and widespread increase of the global factor in the euro area further indicates
that global initiatives on regulatory reform, such as Basle III, agreed on by the G20 coun-
tries in 2010 to 2011, may have added to the sovereign risk. After all, both explanations
are consistent with the observed heterogeneous vulnerability in the former crisis period,
which later shifts towards the euro area. Hence, crisis-related shifts in factor dependence
hint at common funding sources and mounting sovereign risk as the primary sources of
changes in the shock transmission across countries.
3.4.2 The Role of Extreme Events and Repo Market Failure
Now, we examine how extreme events and disorder in the repo market feed back into
the residual performance co-movement of domestic financial sectors around the globe.
Given that the first-stage residuals consistently show volatility clustering, we use the
distinct ability of DCC-type models to deliver undistorted correlation estimates under
heteroskedasticity. To this end, we follow the two-stage estimation procedure in subsec-
tion 3.3.2.
When screening residual excess returns, the DCCX model sometimes reveals substantial
residual co-movement. The first-stage GARCH(1,1) variance estimates are presented in
Table C.5 in the appendix. The residuals from the country-specific three-factor asset
pricing model and the auxiliary regressions display strong heteroskedasticity and a high
level of persistency in all but one case, as the parameters δ and θ are both significant and
close to unity. The results of the second-stage DCC and DCCX estimations are exhibited
in Figure 3.3. The DCC model suggests the widespread existence of systematic residual
co-movement as ten out of nineteen countries show hidden constant correlation. In an-
other four cases, the α coefficient is significant. The richer DCCX model taking extreme
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domestic and US events as well as repo market failure into account deciphers other con-
cealed residual correlation dynamics: eleven domestic financial sectors respond to lagged
unexpected repo failures, six depend on previous extreme domestic news and another
three depend on extreme US shocks. In addition, the number of significant α coefficients
doubles from four to eight. Besides, the correlation differential between the DCCX- and
the DCC-implied residual correlation (cf. Figure C.2 in the appendix) illustrate that the
residual correlations considering asymmetries and repo failures allows vary substantially
more, especially during periods of financial stress. The evidence collected demonstrates
that the DCCX model discovers substantial hidden residual correlation during periods of
financial stress.
Surprisingly, the newly discovered residual correlation dynamics mostly indicate declin-
ing future co-movement. Thus, spillovers from extreme news shocks and repo market
failure primarily produce flight-to-quality rather than contagion according to our previ-
ous notion. More precisely, extreme domestic and US news shocks consistently provoke
lower residual correlations as their respective parameters φ1 and φ2 are negative. The
coefficient φ3 is also mostly negative (eight of eleven). This finding is further corrobo-
rated by the fact that the average residual correlation is lower when markets are stressed
(cf. Figure C.3). However, they experience episodes of formidable amplitude during crisis
periods (cf. Figure C.2 in the appendix) although residual correlations are typically small.
Thus, ignoring residual co-movement would produce erroneously exaggerated correlations
vis-a`-vis the US financial sector. This is an astonishing finding since the diagnostic tests
carried out in subsection 3.4.1 predominantly indicated the absence of such residual serial
correlation.
Portfolio rebalancing activities and policy interventions both offer plausible explanations
for the observed flight-to-quality subsequent to extreme events and repo market failure. In
the case of portfolio rebalancing, the examined disturbances may interfere with portfolio
allocations, creating a need for investors involved in the financial sector to adjust their
portfolios. Provided that investors hold marginally distinct portfolios after the shock,
heterogeneous rebalancing activities eventually lead to decoupling correlations. Another
potential reason is government and central bank interventions. Governments and cen-
tral banks have an incentive to bail out ailing financial institutions at the height of a
financial crisis to avoid losses for voters and spillovers to other financial markets and the
real economy. Extreme events and repo market failures might therefore act as indicators
of imminent bailouts. In fact, over the course of both crises, policy makers massively
intervened following peaks in turmoil: after the Lehman Crash in September 2008, gov-
ernments around the globe equipped struggling financial institutions with equity and state
guarantees, while central banks kept them afloat with unlimited Bagehot-style (1873) liq-
uidity injections (cf. Claessens et al., 2011; Laeven and Valencia, 2010). Later, when
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Figure 3.3: DCC- and DCCX-implied correlation dynamics. This figure summarises the fre-
quency and direction of the correlation dynamics resulting from the DCC and DCCX models. The
evidence is based on estimates of the DCC and DCCX model. Detailed regression results are presented
in Table C.6 in the appendix.
Greece, Ireland and Portugal were incapable of rolling over their sovereign debt, orches-
trated bailouts protected bond investors from losses and the European Central Bank’s
Outright Monetary Transactions Program secured the liquidity position of financial in-
stitutions (Cour-Thimann and Winkler, 2013). As a result, the tensions in the financial
markets receded (cf. Cour-Thimann and Winkler, 2013; Claessens et al., 2011; Laeven
and Valencia, 2010).
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In summary, the proposed DCCX correlation structure reveals otherwise hidden flight-
to-quality following extreme news shocks and mounting repo failures. Two plausible
rationales for this behaviour are portfolio rebalancing and policy interventions, such as
government bailouts or central bank interventions. As a result, financial sectors decouple
vis-a`-vis their US equivalent following peaks in financial turmoil, thereby diminishing the
global systemic risks.
3.4.3 The Role of Contagion and Flight-to-Quality in Financial
Integration
The final step of our analysis is to accurately characterise the financial sector co-movement
over time. Therefore, we inspect the aggregate correlation and its components visually
and by running regressions. We uncover that US and global contagion became pivotal
in infecting financial institutions around the world after Lehman Brothers crashed in the
Subprime Crisis, whereas progressively accelerating US and domestic flight-to-quality best
characterise the Euro Crisis. Moreover, we spot prominent inconsistencies between the
correlation decomposition and the three-factor asset pricing model.
Although the correlations and thus financial integration vis-a`-vis the US financial sec-
tor seem generally stable, some exceptional patterns materialised during the two crises
(cf. ??): with the early signs of turmoil arriving in August 2007, the correlations initially
ramped up, before rapidly easing again. Having reached their crisis lows in mid-2008
(0.5x mean correlation), the financial sector co-movement swiftly gained momentum over
the summer—especially after the demise of Lehman Brothers in September—eventually
hitting their crisis peaks in October 2008 (1.5x mean correlation). Later, during the Euro
Crisis, the four countries at the centre of investor concerns—GRE, ITA, POR, SPA—also
showed the most prominent behaviour: while correlations by and large tended to stabilise
at pre-crisis levels, these countries strongly decoupled vis-a`-vis the US financial sector, in
particular subsequent to the last IMF-led bailout in May 2011.67 This tendency was only
briefly interrupted by two episodes of surging correlations: the smaller one occurred in
mid-2010, following the Greek bailout, and the larger one in mid-2011 (1.5x mean cor-
relation), when investors became increasingly concerned about the Italian and Spanish
sovereign risk (Lane, 2012).
Investigating the sources of financial integration, a visual inspection of Figures 3.5 and 3.6
reveals that the US and global components were both positive, while the domestic one was
consistently negative. The US component alone accounted for roughly two-thirds of the
overall correlation, followed in size by the global and domestic ones.68 As for the aggregate
67 The IMF-led bailout of Cyprus in March 2013 lies outside our sample period.
68 This finding is partly due to the construction of the global factor and domestic factors. Since the
orthogonalization procedure essentially removes some variation from the global and domestic factors,
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correlation, the three components were remarkably stable prior to financial stress. During
both crises, the US component dominated the aggregate correlation dynamics, such as
the ramp-up in September 2008 and the gradual decoupling of GRE, ITA, POR and SPA
since late 2009. By contrast, the domestic component alleviated some of the increased
co-movement in the Subprime Crisis, but reinforced the decoupling of the four crisis
countries in the Euro Crisis. Furthermore, the DCCX-implied residual correlations shown
in Figure 3.6 (the expectations component is negligibly small and therefore omitted) were
typically small (a mean of 0.02 percentage points), but drastically fluctuated during crisis
episodes, reducing (increasing) the overall correlations by up to -21.9 (17.6) percentage
points. Hence, the impact of the different components on financial integration, particularly
during episodes of stress, remains to some extent inconclusive.
In order to clear up these ambiguities, we perform the following complementary country-
specific (i 6= 0) univariate regressions in the tradition of Chiang et al. (2007) to explore
the regime shifts in financial sector dependence over and above expectations in the wake
of financial turmoil. The first contains one regime dummy for each crisis (CR1 and CR2):
ρ0it = υi0 + υi1ρ0it−1 + υi2CR1 + υi3CR2 + zit. (3.19)
The second one breaks each crisis down further into a pre- and post-Lehman Brothers
period (Subprime Crisis: CRPre1 and CR
Post
1 ) and a pre- and post-IMF bailout period
(Euro Crisis: CRPre2 and CR
Post
2 ):
ρ0it = υi0 + υi1ρ0it−1 + υi2CR
Pre
1 + υi3CR
Post
1 + υi4CR
Pre
2 + υi5CR
Post
2 + zit. (3.20)
υi0 measures the unconditional correlation and υi1 controls for first-order serial correla-
tion.69 The parameters υi2, υi3, υi4 and υi5 identify regime shifts during the Subprime
Crisis and the Euro Crisis. zit is the error term.
Our results in Figure 3.7 portray how vigorously contagion hit numerous financial sectors
around the globe following the demise of Lehman Brothers in September 2008:70 Thir-
teen domestic financial sectors display positive regime shifts with an average magnitude
of about 16.3% in terms of the unconditional correlation. However, in the period leading
up to the bank’s collapse, we find zero contagion and instead five cases of flight-to-quality
averaging - 12.8%. When considering the Subprime Crisis in its entirety, contagion sur-
vives in merely six cases and flight-to-quality in another one. Thus, despite being fierce,
both contagion and flight-to-quality were obviously rather short-lived. Regarding the
sources of contagion, the US component and the global component already account for all
their variances are lower, too, thereby losing weight in the calculation of correlations.
69 One reason for including a first-order autoregressive term in the equation is to exploit serial correla-
tion in the expectations and residual correlation component. Second, since all the variances follow
a GARCH(1,1) process, the aggregate correlations might show the same pattern.
70 The detailed regression results are presented in the appendix.
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Figure 3.4: Aggregate correlations. This figure shows the weekly overall correlations of the US financial sector vis-a-vis its respective domestic equivalents
between July 4, 2001 and September 26, 2012. The left (right) grey-shaded area denotes the Subprime Crisis (Euro Crisis).
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Figure 3.5: US, global and domestic correlation components. This figure shows the weekly correlations of the US financial sector vis-a-vis its respective
domestic equivalents attributable to the US, global and domestic components between July 4, 2001 and September 26, 2012. The upper dashed line denotes the US
factor, the solid line the global financial factor and the lower dashed line the domestic factor. The left (right) grey-shaded area denotes the Subprime Crisis (Euro
Crisis).
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Figure 3.6: Residual correlation component. This figure shows the weekly correlations of the US financial sector vis-a-vis its respective domestic equivalents
attributable to the residual component between July 4, 2001 and September 26, 2012. The left (right) grey-shaded area denotes the Subprime Crisis (Euro Crisis).
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the cases of contagion and flight-to-quality in the overall correlations. The domestic and
residual correlation components are nevertheless relevant, since they not only eliminated
some cases of contagion (13 vs. 16), but also mitigated the size of contagion over the en-
tire crisis period (7.5% vs. 13.3%). Hence, the contagion was widespread and particularly
intense following the crash of Lehman Brothers.
On the other hand, the Euro Crisis was marked by considerable flight-to-quality and
clearly concentrated in Europe, particularly in the euro area, as Figure 3.8 further high-
lights. Prior to and after the IMF-led bailouts, five Euro member states consistently
displayed sizeable flight-to-quality (around -20.1%) and another member state contagion.
At the centre of investor concerns were four of the former countries—GRE, ITA, POR,
SPA—, while the sole contagion country (FIN) was an AAA-rated euro member. Thus,
investors tended to relocate their funds towards “safe havens” within the currency area.
Besides, since the intensity of flight-to-quality (- 19.3% to - 28.8%) and contagion (16.6%
to 24.0%) accelerated over the course of the Euro Crisis, so did the observed excessive
disintegration of financial sectors. Regarding the drivers, the US component emerges
as the single most important source, not only accounting for all the detected cases of
flight-to-quality and contagion, but also closely resembling their sizes. The domestic
components further appear to have reinforced flight-to-quality in the post-IMF-bailout
period. The Euro Crisis was accordingly a regional event characterised by gradually in-
creasing disintegration of European financial sectors—most notably those of the four crisis
countries—from the US and thus the largest financial system in the world.
When contrasting the investigated sources of overall correlation dynamics with those of the
three-factor asset pricing model we observe widespread inconsistencies. First, the three-
factor panel model predicts rising co-movement during the Euro Crisis driven by the global
factor, but the global correlation component displays no analogous increase. Second, the
country-specific regressions indicate far more global contagion during the Subprime Crisis
(7 vs. 3) and the Euro Crisis (8 vs. 0) than the correlation decomposition.71 Turbulent
periods therefore tend to dominate even variance processes incorporating crisis-related
jumps as they do not adequately account for volatility peaks. Hence, even a sophis-
ticated three-factor asset pricing model would appear to mischaracterise financial sector
co-movement, were it to ignore the continuous time-varying variances. Since in the present
case all the factors and most residuals experience considerable volatility clustering, the
proposed Factor DCCX model provides substantial improvements in examining financial
sector integration.
In a nutshell, the correlation decomposition uncovered that after Lehman Brothers crashed
during the Subprime Crisis, US and global contagion became pivotal in infecting financial
institutions around the world, whereas the Euro Crisis was characterised by progressively
71 It is impossible to benchmark the domestic correlation component against the domestic correlation
implied by the three-factor model as the former depends on auxiliary regressions of the US residual.
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Figure 3.7: Contagion and flight-to-quality in the Subprime Crisis. This figure summarises
the frequency (pie charts) and size (bar charts, in %) of contagion and flight-to-quality in the Subprime
Crisis. The analysis is split into subsamples (pre- and post-Lehman) and components (US, US and
global). The evidence is based on country-specific regressions of aggregate financial sector co-movement
on a set of control and regime variables. More details are given in Panel A of Table C.7 and Table C.8
in the appendix.
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Figure 3.8: Contagion and flight-to-quality in the Euro Crisis. This figure summarises the
frequency (pie charts) and size (bar charts, in %) of contagion and flight-to-quality in the Euro Crisis.
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accelerating US and domestic flight-to-quality. Hence, the US financial sector constituted
an important channel for spreading financial stress in the former crisis, but helped to
contain turmoil regionally in the latter. Judging by their respective transmissions the
Subprime Crisis can be considered a global event and the Euro Crisis a more regional one.
Moreover, we identified prominent inconsistencies between the correlation decomposition
and the three-factor model. These findings demonstrate the superior ability of the Factor
DCCX model to disentangle the dynamics underlying financial contagion and flight-to-
quality over the course of crisis periods.
3.5 Conclusions
The US financial sector is today unparalleled in terms of size and liquidity in the world.
For this reason, it represents a natural benchmark for assessing the degree of integration
of any other country into the world financial system. We studied how well 19 countries are
integrated with the US financial sector and the effect that the Subprime Crisis (2007-09)
and the Euro Crisis (2009 until recently) had on these ties.
It emerged that financial integration, measured by the co-movement of domestic finan-
cial sector performance vis-a`-vis its US equivalent, is globally high. However, excessive
co-movement deviating from fundamentals interfered with financial integration during
the Subprime Crisis and the Euro Crisis. In the former crisis, US and global conta-
gion spread financial turmoil around the world after the collapse of the investment bank
Lehman Brothers, whereas US-driven flight-to-quality initiated progressive decoupling of
European crisis countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain) from their US equivalent during
the latter crisis. Nevertheless, domestic and residual shocks added a flight-to-quality ele-
ment to financial sector co-movement in both turmoil periods. They thereby remarkably
lowered the magnitude of contagion in the Subprime Crisis (from 13.3% to 7.5%) and
reinforced the flight-to-quality in the Euro Crisis (from -15.2% to -20.1%). Although the
domestic component is usually more influential, residual co-movement becomes sizeable
in the wake of stress when unexpected repo failures as well as extreme news shocks spill
over negatively into residual correlations. Hence, contagion and flight-to-quality impaired
financial integration during both crises, while their size considerably depended on the
various components.
Our findings provide important insights from a systemic risk perspective. The rescue
measures implemented supposedly contributed to isolating both crises, as central banks
and governments strongly intervened in financial markets following peaks in turmoil. In
this regard, the interventions of US policy makers promised greater potential to contain
financial stress from spreading than those of domestic policy makers. However, the exact
implications of rescue measures depended on the nature of shock transmission in the re-
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spective crisis. Faced with contagion, the mitigating effect of domestic and residual shocks
is desirable to bring co-movement back to its fundamentals, for instance after the Lehman
collapse. On the other hand, the same effect might create unintended new challenges in
the light of flight-to-quality, similar to the Euro Crisis. In fact, flight-to-quality may
encourage excessive risk-taking on the side of financial institutions domiciled outside the
euro area due to swift capital inflows. By contrast, the European Central Bank should be
worried about flight-to-quality from certain member states, as it impedes the homogene-
ity of financial sectors—a pre-requisite for maintaining an effective monetary policy in a
currency union (Mundell, 1961). Bearing this in mind, it is particularly alarming that
flight-to-quality as a mirror of excessive capital withdrawals from the crisis countries even
accelerates over time. From a national regulator’s point of view, flight-to-quality also in-
creases the probability of inter-sectoral propagation within crisis countries, since receding
financial integration results in a growing lack of accessible capital for corporations, too.
Hence, the consequences of policy actions taken to contain the dissemination of financial
stress have the potential to create new challenges with respect to systemic risk.
Finally, the proposed Factor DCCX model forms an effective tool for risk management
purposes because it is tailored to filter out correlation patterns that are otherwise hidden
by volatile market conditions. In the present case, we decipher flight-to-quality concealed
in the residual excess returns following extreme domestic and US news shocks as well as
unexpected repo market failures. Given the extent of inconsistencies observed between
the correlation decomposition and the three-factor asset pricing model, taking more com-
plex correlation structures and continuous heteroskedasticity into account actually pays
off. Hence, when quantifying a portfolio’s or financial institution’s vulnerability towards
macro-financial risk scenarios, the Factor DCCX model yields superior correlation esti-
mates in comparison with less elaborate asset pricing models.
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Appendix A
Housing Market Downturns
Table A.1: Model Parameterization. This table contains the parameters and variables by model.
MP (UP, FS, PS) denotes “monetary policy” (“urban policy”, “financial stimuli”, “policy scenarios”).
Model Variables Reserv. Supply Cross-Segm. Banking Shock
Price Elast. Comp. Sector Co-Move.
Homogeneous r δ T ltv1 ltv2 α10 α20 β1 β2 γ1 γ2 l1 l2 φ1 φ2 ρ
Standard 0.05 0.02 10 — — 2 — 1 — — — 1 — 0.03 — —
Heterogeneous
Standard 0.05 0.02 10 — — 2 2 1 1 0.5 0.5 1 1 0.03 0.03 0.5
Cross-Segment Competition
#1 0.05 0.02 10 — — 2 2 1 1 0.0 0.0 1 1 0.03 0.03 0.5
#2 0.05 0.02 10 — — 2 2 1 1 0.1 0.1 1 1 0.03 0.03 0.5
#3 0.05 0.02 10 — — 2 2 1 1 0.5 0.5 1 1 0.03 0.03 0.5
#4 0.05 0.02 10 — — 2 2 1 1 0.9 0.9 1 1 0.03 0.03 0.5
Co-Movement
#1 0.05 0.02 10 — — 2 2 1 1 0.5 0.5 1 1 0.03 0.03 0.0
#2 0.05 0.02 10 — — 2 2 1 1 0.5 0.5 1 1 0.03 0.03 0.1
#3 0.05 0.02 10 — — 2 2 1 1 0.5 0.5 1 1 0.03 0.03 0.5
#4 0.05 0.02 10 — — 2 2 1 1 0.5 0.5 1 1 0.03 0.03 0.9
Policy variables
MP: #1 0.01 0.02 10 — — 2 2 1 1 0.5 0.5 1 1 0.03 0.03 0.5
MP: #2 0.05 0.02 10 — — 2 2 1 1 0.5 0.5 1 1 0.03 0.03 0.5
MP: #3 0.09 0.02 10 — — 2 2 1 1 0.5 0.5 1 1 0.03 0.03 0.5
UP: #1 0.05 0.01 10 — — 2 2 1 1 0.5 0.5 1 1 0.03 0.03 0.5
UP: #2 0.05 0.02 10 — — 2 2 1 1 0.5 0.5 1 1 0.03 0.03 0.5
UP: #3 0.05 0.03 10 — — 2 2 1 1 0.5 0.5 1 1 0.03 0.03 0.5
FS: #1 0.05 0.02 5 — — 2 2 1 1 0.5 0.5 1 1 0.03 0.03 0.5
FS: #2 0.05 0.02 10 — — 2 2 1 1 0.5 0.5 1 1 0.03 0.03 0.5
FS: #3 0.05 0.02 15 — — 2 2 1 1 0.5 0.5 1 1 0.03 0.03 0.5
PS: #1 0.01 0.03 15 — — 2 2 1 1 0.5 0.5 1 1 0.03 0.03 0.5
PS: #2 0.05 0.02 10 — — 2 2 1 1 0.5 0.5 1 1 0.03 0.03 0.5
PS: #3 0.09 0.01 5 — — 2 2 1 1 0.5 0.5 1 1 0.03 0.03 0.5
US Housing Market Crash
Standard 0.05 0.02 10 0.9 0.8 2 3.45 1 1 0.5 0.5 1 2 0.06 0.06 0.5
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(d) Inventory over home sales.
Figure A.1: Cross-segment competition. This figure characterises the optimal sales decision of
homeowners in a heterogeneous market for varying levels of the cross-segment competition. Sections
(a) to (d) exhibit different properties of the model: the share of withdrawn oversupply, price discounts,
price elasticity and housing inventory. The respective properties are depicted on the vertical axis. The
percentage decline in the reservation price is on the horizontal axis. For details on the parameterization
please confer to Table A.1 in the appendix.
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(d) Inventory over home sales.
Figure A.2: Shock co-movement. This figure characterises the optimal sales decision of homeowners
in a heterogeneous market for varying levels of the shock co-movement. Sections (a) to (d) exhibit
different properties of the model: the share of withdrawn oversupply, price discounts, price elasticity and
housing inventory. The respective properties are depicted on the vertical axis. The percentage decline
in the reservation price is on the horizontal axis. For details on the parameterization please confer to
Table A.1 in the appendix.
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Appendix B
Hedge Funds and Prime Brokers
Consolidation Process of Hedge Fund Data
In general, hedge funds are not required to disclose any performance information. For
marketing reasons, however, they often choose to provide such information to one or more
private data providers. Each of these databases covers merely a portion of the entire hedge
fund universe. Hence, there is a need to merge data from different sources. At the same
time, one hedge fund might appear in several databases. Thus, a structured consolidation
process is needed to identify and remove duplicates.
In our case, data stems from four different databases: Barclayhedge, Eurekahedge, Hedge
Fund Research, TASS. Since we are interested in the most systemically relevant funds,
we identify the 100 largest global active hedge funds by AuM in each database as of
December 2011. Based-on this pre-selection, we proceed in three steps similar to Patton
and Ramadorai (2013) and Joenvaara et al. (2012).
1. Management companies: We detect the name of the management company behind
each reported hedge fund. Next, we delete punctuations, spaces as well as filler words
that do not yield essential information (e.g. ‘LLC’, ‘Fund’). Then, by grouping all
funds related to the same management company, we identify 206 fund families.
2. De-duplication: To identify duplicates, we compare the performance data of all
hedge funds within each fund family. For this, we apply the metric proposed in
Joenvaara et al. (2012) and allow for a 10% tolerance. In addition, we employ a
statistic based on the median absolute deviation between the records of two funds.
Both procedures yield the same conclusions.
3. Selection: To create a unique data entry for the identified hedge fund duplicates, we
first select the record with the longest available time horizon. Any missing values
in hedge fund performance are then filled in using the information provided by the
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duplicates. The same applies to administrative information, especially prime broker
relations. Moreover, we require 12 months of consecutive reported fund performance.
As a result, we detect 306 unique hedge funds.
Details of Prime Brokers
The table below reports all prime brokers considered in the calculations. We observe 21
active relations. Due to unavailability of stock market data five relations are excluded
from the calculations (Banco BTG, Fortis, LaSalle, Man Group, MF Global). Moreover,
for representativeness considerations we add those major prime brokers to the sample that
merged or collapsed in the wake of the 2007-2008 financial crisis (Bear Stearns, Lehman
Brothers, Merrill Lynch). At last, Newedge, a joint venture of Credit Agricole and Societe
Generale, is replaced by its parent companies. Thus, there are finally 20 constituents.
Table B.1: Prime broker details. This table contains the names and accumulated mandates of prime
brokers linked to hedge funds in our dataset, and whether they are excluded from the calculations. Also
included are two different weight measures (uniform and mandate-weighted).
Prime Broker Identified Reported Added Excluded Uniform Mandates
Relations Mandates Weight as Weight
(in %) (in %)
AIG Yes 1 5.0 0.5
Banco BTG Yes 1 Yes
Bank of America Merrill Lynch Yes 5 5.0 2.5
Barclays Yes 9 5.0 4.5
Bear Stearns Yes 5.0 NA
BNP Paribas Yes 6 5.0 3.0
Citigroup Yes 10 5.0 5.0
Credit Suisse Yes 17 5.0 8.5
Deutsche Bank Yes 13 5.0 6.5
Fortis Yes 4 Yes
Goldman Sachs Yes 38 5.0 19.0
JP Morgan Yes 34 5.0 17.0
LaSalle Yes 1 Yes
Lehman Brothers Yes 5.0 NA
Man Group Yes 1 Yes
Merrill Lynch Yes 5.0 NA
MF Global Yes 1 Yes
Morgan Stanley Yes 22 5.0 11.0
Newedge (Joint Venture): Yes (13)
Credit Agricole 6.5 5.0 3.3
Societe Generale 6.5 5.0 3.3
Nomura Yes 1 5.0 0.5
Royal Bank of Scotland Yes 2 5.0 1.0
SEB Yes 17 5.0 8.5
Swedbank Yes 1 5.0 0.5
UBS Yes 11 5.0 5.5
Total 21 210 3 5 100.0 100.0
Please note that merely 45% of all funds actually report any values. Nonetheless, we are
confident that our selection is highly representative for the set of active prime brokers,
since most identified prime brokers account for at least more than one mandate.
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Table B.2: Variable definitions and sources. This table contains the names, data sources, brief descriptions and previous use in the literature of each variable.
Variable Data Source Description Use in the Literature
PBER Bloomberg, Datastream The excess return of banks attributable to prime brokerage calculated
as the residual from a regression of a prime broker index return on a
general bank index return.
Boyson et al. (2010)
HFILLIQ Barclayhedge, Eurekahedge, Hedge Fund Re-
search, Lipper TASS
The proportion of aggregated returns of the largest global hedge funds
attributable to portfolio liquidity. It is computed as the residual from a
regression of aggregated hedge fund returns on five lookback straddles,
a put option proxy and a constant.
Agarwal and Naik (2004), Boyson et al. (2010), Fung
and Hsieh (2001)
NETPOS Federal Reserve Bank of New York The net position of primary dealers registered with the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York.
Adrian and Fleming (2005)
FINANCING Federal Reserve Bank of New York The overnight net financing of primary dealers registered with the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of New York.
Adrian and Fleming (2005)
LENDING Federal Reserve Bank of New York The term net financing of primary dealers registered with the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York.
Adrian and Fleming (2005)
BOND Barclays The monthly return of the Barclay’s global aggregate bond index. Boyson et al. (2010)
CURRENCY Federal Reserve Board The monthly return of the US dollar exchange rate vis-a-vis the Euro. Boyson et al. (2010)
DEFRISK Moody’s The monthly return of the credit spread between Moody’s Baa yield
and the 10-year constant maturity US government bond yield.
Fama and French (1993), Fung and Hsieh (2001),
Longstaff et al. (2005)
EQUITY MSCI The yearly return of the global equity market. Fung and Hsieh (1997)
GOLD London Gold Bullion The yearly return of the gold spot price. Fung and Hsieh (1997)
HOUSE Standard & Poors The monthly growth of the S&P Case/Shiller 20-city composite house
price index.
NA
HOUSETREND Standard & Poors The fraction of yearly house price growth not explained by monthly
growth. It is computed as the residual from a regression of the yearly
growth on the monthly growth.
NA
LIQRISK British Bankers Association, Federal Reserve
Bank of New York
The growth of the TED spread computed as the difference between the
3-month USD-Libor and the 3-month US treasury bill yield.
Campbell (2003), Taylor and Williams (2009)
OIL International Commodities Exchange The yearly return of the Brent oil price index. NA
Fund flows Barclayhedge, Eurekahedge, Hedge Fund Re-
search, TASS
The difference between realised AuM and approximated AuM. The ap-
proximation involves past realised AuM adjusted by contemporaneous
performance.
Boyson et al. (2010), Fung et al. (2008), Getmansky
(2012)
Global bank index return Datastream The monthly return of a broad-based global bank index. Chan et al. (2006), Boyson et al. (2010)
Asset-based strategy factors David Hsieh Lookback option straddles on bonds, commodities, currencies, equities
and interest rates
Fung and Hsieh (2001)
MSCI put option MSCI, own calculations The negative portion of the monthly MSCI percentage change. Agarwal and Naik (2004), Boyson et al. (2010)
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Appendix C
Financial Sector Integration
Other :
0
Negative:
19
Stable
3
Rise
0
Decline
16
Stable
15
Rise
1
Decline
3
(a) Normal times (b) Subprime Crisis (c) Euro Crisis 
Figure C.1: Auxiliary regressions. This figure summarises the frequency and direction of relations
between the residual US excess return and the domestic factors of the other i− 1 countries in (a) normal
times, (b) the Subprime Crisis, (c) the Euro Crisis. The evidence is based on country-specific auxiliary
regressions to the three-factor capital asset pricing model. Detailed regression results are presented in
Table C.4 in the appendix.
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Figure C.2: DCCX vs. DCC correlations. This figure shows the time-varying residual correlation of the US financial sector vis-a-vis its respective domestic
equivalents between July 4, 2001 and September 26, 2012 after subtracting the DCC-implied correlation from the DCCX correlation. The resulting correlation
differential informs about the contribution extreme news shocks and repo failures make over and above the standard DCC model. The left (right) grey-shaded area
denotes the Subprime Crisis (Euro Crisis).
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Figure C.3: DCCX-implied residual correlations. This figure shows the DCCX-implied time-varying residual correlations of the US financial sector vis-a-vis
its respective domestic equivalents between July 4, 2001 and September 26, 2012. The left (right) grey-shaded area denotes the Subprime Crisis (Euro Crisis).
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Table C.1: Variables and sources. This table reports on variables and data sources. Note that i is chosen in accordance with the subindices throughout the
paper.
Dependent External
Benchmark i Country Market Type Source* Return Type N Index Ticker Index Ticker
USA 0 United States Equity Indices MSCI MSRI 587 Financials M1USFN$
Comparables
AUS 1 Australia Equity Indices MSCI MSRI 587 Financials M1AUFN$ Country MSAUST$
AUT 2 Austria Equity Indices MSCI MSRI 587 Financials M1ATFN$ Country MSASTR$
BEL 3 Belgium Equity Indices MSCI MSRI 587 Financials M1BEFN$ Country MSBELG$
CAN 4 Canada Equity Indices MSCI MSRI 587 Financials M1CAFN$ Country MSCNDA$
DEN 5 Denmark Equity Indices MSCI MSRI 587 Financials M1DKFN$ Country MSDNMK$
FIN 6 Finland Equity Indices MSCI MSRI 587 Financials M1FIFN$ Country MSFIND$
FRA 7 France Equity Indices MSCI MSRI 587 Financials M1FRFN$ Country MSFRNC$
GER 8 Germany Equity Indices MSCI MSRI 587 Financials M1DEFN$ Country MSGERM$
GRE 9 Greece Equity Indices MSCI MSRI 587 Financials M1GDFN$ Country MSGDEE$
HKG 10 Hongkong Equity Indices MSCI MSRI 587 Financials M1HKFN$ Country MSHGKG$
ITA 11 Italy Equity Indices MSCI MSRI 587 Financials M1ITFN$ Country MSITAL$
JAP 12 Japan Equity Indices MSCI MSRI 587 Financials M1JPFN$ Country MSJPAN$
NEL 13 Netherlands Equity Indices MSCI MSRI 587 Financials M1NLFN$ Country MSNETH$
NOR 14 Norway Equity Indices MSCI MSRI 587 Financials M1NOFN$ Country MSNWAY$
POR 15 Portugal Equity Indices MSCI MSRI 587 Financials M1PTFN$ Country MSPORD$
SPA 16 Spain Equity Indices MSCI MSRI 587 Financials M1ESFN$ Country MSSPAN$
SWE 17 Sweden Equity Indices MSCI MSRI 587 Financials M1SEFN$ Country MSSWDN$
SWI 18 Switzerland Equity Indices MSCI MSRI 587 Financials M1CHFN$ Country MSSWIT$
UK 19 United Kingdom Equity Indices MSCI MSRI 587 Financials M1UKFN$ Country MSUTDK$
Global Factors
G Global Equity Indices MSCI MSRI 587 Financials M1DWFN$
US United States Equity Indices MSCI MSRI 587 Country MSUSAM$
Other Data
LIBOR United States Interest Rates BBA 587 Country BBUSD1W
Repo failures United States Other FRBNY 587 Country
* MSCI = Morgan Stanley Capital International, BBA = Britisch Bankers Association, FRNBY = Federal Reserve Bank of New York
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Table C.2: Data characteristics. This table portrays various characteristics of the used variables.
Descriptive statistics include the mean, median, minimum, maximum and standard deviation. The
skewness, kurtosis and p-values of the Jarque-Bera statistics are reported to test for normality. The
p-values of the Ljung-Box test statistics (LB(q)) give indicative information on serial correlation up to
order q. Assessments of individual and joint stationarity are based on p-values of the Augmented-Dickey
Fuller (ADF). The correlations illustrate co-movement patterns vis-a-vis the US financial sector excess
performance in normal times and during the Subprime Crisis and Euro Crisis.
Panel A: Financial Sector Excess Returns
....... Asia/Pacific ....... ................................................ Euro ................................................
Descriptive Stats AUS HKG JAP AUT BEL FIN FRA GER GRE ITA
Mean 0.189 0.169 -0.085 0.028 -0.192 0.296 0.003 -0.095 -0.448 -0.166
Median 0.504 0.154 -0.200 0.461 0.454 0.438 0.347 0.351 -0.004 0.173
Max 16.270 15.993 20.750 27.263 22.488 13.441 27.189 23.958 32.660 18.178
Min -22.484 -18.303 -20.995 -33.286 -44.337 -19.285 -24.235 -20.796 -31.240 -18.620
Std. dev. 3.801 3.690 4.439 5.892 5.919 4.054 5.749 5.334 6.468 5.065
Normality (Jarque-Bera)
Skewness -0.677 -0.023 -0.162 -0.948 -1.137 -0.636 -0.097 -0.413 -0.434 -0.153
Kurtosis 8.152 5.902 5.322 8.649 10.598 5.421 5.865 5.933 6.452 4.986
Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Autocorrelation (Ljung-Box)
LB(1) 0.142 0.271 0.145 0.369 0.396 0.015 0.000 0.004 0.041 0.060
LB(2) 0.219 0.285 0.125 0.240 0.034 0.039 0.000 0.002 0.119 0.046
LB(3) 0.009 0.014 0.026 0.000 0.071 0.019 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
Stationarity (Augmented Dickey-Fuller)
ADF 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Correlations vis-a-vis the US financial sector
Whole sample 0.645 0.545 0.391 0.656 0.653 0.601 0.741 0.704 0.421 0.657
Subprime Crisis 0.690 0.614 0.569 0.708 0.600 0.647 0.770 0.722 0.586 0.708
Euro Crisis 0.720 0.574 0.471 0.751 0.735 0.738 0.768 0.773 0.319 0.671
Observations 586 586 586 586 586 586 586 586 586 586
.............. Euro .............. ........................ Non-Euro ........................ North America
Descriptive Stats NEL POR SPA DEN NOR SWE SWI UK CAN US
Mean -0.136 -0.386 0.005 0.051 0.175 0.146 -0.043 -0.065 0.191 -0.082
Median 0.308 -0.046 0.158 0.400 0.704 0.364 0.192 0.071 0.402 0.103
Max 33.108 28.000 19.728 20.547 34.333 18.825 20.974 20.284 13.021 22.303
Min -30.637 -23.410 -24.815 -26.515 -35.352 -27.883 -22.263 -26.405 -17.307 -27.228
Std. dev. 7.149 5.143 5.196 4.714 6.051 4.952 4.977 4.513 3.295 4.065
Normality (Jarque-Bera)
Skewness -0.428 -0.069 -0.165 -0.585 -0.833 -0.638 -0.375 -0.495 -0.335 -0.520
Kurtosis 7.527 7.508 5.080 7.083 10.863 6.849 6.525 8.170 6.496 11.004
Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Autocorrelation (Ljung-Box)
LB(1) 0.016 0.820 0.174 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.127 0.000
LB(2) 0.043 0.794 0.395 0.003 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.308 0.000
LB(3) 0.001 0.012 0.203 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.270 0.000
Stationarity (Augmented Dickey-Fuller)
ADF 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Correlations vis-a-vis the US financial sector
Whole sample 0.679 0.402 0.644 0.564 0.614 0.677 0.760 0.778 0.783 1.000
Subprime Crisis 0.604 0.586 0.689 0.653 0.686 0.697 0.800 0.784 0.780 1.000
Euro Crisis 0.743 0.399 0.645 0.540 0.691 0.767 0.769 0.815 0.824 1.000
Observations 586 586 586 586 586 586 586 586 586 586
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Table C.2 continued
Panel B: Domestic and Global Factors, and Unexpected Repo Market Failures
....... Asia/Pacific ....... ....................................................... Euro .......................................................
Descriptive Stats AUS HKG JAP AUT BEL FIN FRA GER GRE ITA NEL
Mean 0.240 0.157 0.028 0.113 0.083 -0.043 0.052 0.081 -0.191 0.011 0.051
Median 0.369 0.145 0.125 0.221 0.228 0.099 0.104 0.120 0.304 0.118 0.095
Max 8.303 8.636 8.749 10.895 6.344 13.599 8.484 7.923 12.602 10.814 7.751
Min -9.577 -10.088 -7.852 -15.454 -20.993 -19.077 -8.986 -11.711 -16.606 -8.551 -9.173
Std. dev. 2.177 2.294 2.256 2.700 2.279 3.340 1.821 2.040 3.683 2.106 1.868
Normality (Jarque-Bera)
Skewness -0.362 -0.073 -0.043 -0.734 -1.966 -0.428 -0.118 -0.611 -0.506 0.089 -0.479
Kurtosis 4.448 5.047 3.985 5.969 17.682 6.795 6.064 6.928 4.750 5.556 6.389
Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Autocorrelation (Ljung-Box)
LB(1) 0.004 0.273 0.068 0.833 0.495 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.763 0.022 0.002
LB(2) 0.015 0.506 0.173 0.945 0.701 0.048 0.000 0.001 0.562 0.064 0.002
LB(3) 0.006 0.706 0.310 0.406 0.688 0.107 0.000 0.003 0.401 0.057 0.005
Stationarity (Augmented Dickey-Fuller)
ADF 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Correlations vis-a-vis the US financial sector
Whole sample -0.148 -0.111 -0.131 -0.127 -0.169 -0.113 -0.222 -0.212 -0.124 -0.205 -0.225
Subprime Crisis -0.152 -0.189 -0.187 -0.203 -0.292 -0.414 -0.598 -0.553 -0.356 -0.525 -0.606
Euro Crisis 0.199 0.005 -0.043 0.439 -0.115 0.164 0.320 0.149 0.138 0.382 0.060
Observations 586 586 586 586 586 586 586 586 586 586 586
....... Euro ....... ........................... Non-Euro ........................... North America Global Repo
Descriptive Stats SPA POR DEN NOR SWE SWI UK CAN US Fails
Mean 0.063 0.119 0.206 0.212 0.159 0.140 0.080 0.153 0.066 -0.075 0.000
Median 0.077 0.144 0.346 0.373 0.159 0.112 0.035 0.265 0.208 -0.074 -0.006
Max 10.208 9.183 9.199 15.332 8.829 5.799 7.793 5.612 10.365 8.817 0.568
Min -10.348 -10.374 -11.911 -14.881 -11.790 -7.086 -7.173 -7.140 -16.672 -11.825 -0.243
Std. dev. 2.507 2.361 2.249 3.254 2.489 1.621 1.546 1.841 2.560 1.804 0.059
Normality (Jarque-Bera)
Skewness -0.284 0.021 -0.431 -0.505 -0.355 -0.143 0.229 -0.496 -0.671 -0.414 3.049
Kurtosis 5.141 5.088 5.368 6.245 5.720 4.280 6.135 4.403 8.225 11.132 28.805
Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Autocorrelation (Ljung-Box)
LB(1) 0.000 0.135 0.007 0.019 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.163 0.066 0.003 0.032
LB(2) 0.001 0.307 0.009 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.374 0.183 0.001 0.068
LB(3) 0.002 0.486 0.006 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.241 0.225 0.000 0.115
Stationarity (Augmented Dickey-Fuller)
ADF 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Correlations vis-a-vis the US financial sector
Whole sample -0.120 -0.192 -0.159 -0.156 -0.162 -0.159 -0.192 -0.127 0.880 0.325 0.044
Subprime Crisis -0.257 -0.518 -0.245 -0.181 -0.431 -0.504 -0.363 -0.188 0.863 0.512 0.126
Euro Crisis 0.268 0.242 0.070 0.203 0.025 -0.001 0.138 0.041 0.939 0.181 0.023
Observations 586 586 586 586 586 586 586 586 586 586 586
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Table C.3: Individual three-factor asset pricing model. The table shows the estimates of the three-factor pricing model of Bekaert et al. (2014):
Rit = Et−1[Rit] + β
′
iFt + γ
′
iCR1Ft + η
′
iCR2Ft + λiCR1 + τiCR2 + ǫit.
The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust (Newey and West, 1987). LB (LB2) denotes the p-value of a
Ljung-Box test on one period-lagged serial correlation (heteroscedasticity) in the residuals. ∗∗∗ (∗∗, ∗) indicates statistical significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level.
.............. Asia/Pacific .............. ........................................................... Euro area ...........................................................
Expectations AUS HKG JAP AUT BEL FIN FRA GER GRE ITA
Div. Yield 0.005 -0.005 -0.153* 0.121 -0.054*** 0.020 -0.011 -0.050 -0.010 -0.031
(0.49) (-0.38) (-1.67) (1.23) (-3.45) (1.62) (-0.59) (-0.98) (-0.48) (-1.46)
AR(1) -0.129** 0.003 -0.134** -0.104* -0.193* -0.119** -0.168*** -0.106 -0.097 -0.052
(-2.40) (0.06) (-2.44) (-1.81) (-1.89) (-2.19) (-2.57) (-1.52) (-1.39) (-1.06)
Domestic factor
Total 0.941*** 1.170*** 1.412*** 0.945*** 1.220*** 0.174*** 0.916*** 1.117*** 1.232*** 0.932***
(24.89) (34.53) (29.67) (12.92) (30.17) (3.69) (13.57) (17.72) (42.87) (21.21)
Subprime crisis -0.158** -0.025 -0.190 0.095 0.205 0.397*** -0.447** -0.330** -0.058 -0.025
(-2.44) (-0.55) (-1.48) (0.60) (1.38) (3.46) (-2.40) (-2.37) (-1.16) (-0.36)
Euro crisis 0.092* -0.042 -0.300*** 0.240** -0.555*** 0.199** 0.257** -0.299*** 0.015 0.658***
(1.74) (-1.10) (-4.29) (1.97) (-4.95) (2.16) (2.30) (-3.43) (0.08) (6.55)
Global factor
Total 0.833*** 0.586*** 1.064*** 1.469*** 1.238*** 1.062*** 1.445*** 1.236*** 1.380*** 1.287***
(16.49) (9.04) (13.12) (10.56) (20.58) (6.73) (20.67) (10.23) (20.27) (26.26)
Subprime crisis 0.270*** 0.164** 0.376*** 0.149 0.185 -0.170 0.114 0.146 0.162** 0.054
(2.99) (2.30) (3.04) (0.77) (1.31) (-0.78) (1.10) (1.02) (2.12) (0.63)
Euro crisis 0.089 0.026 -0.030 0.081 0.996*** 0.129 0.559*** 0.454*** 0.206 0.116
(1.02) (0.36) (-0.24) (0.43) (5.69) (0.68) (3.54) (2.96) (0.66) (0.87)
US factor
Total 0.891*** 0.837*** 0.546*** 1.252*** 1.532*** 0.872*** 1.761*** 1.599*** 1.171*** 1.397***
(23.02) (46.62) (12.04) (13.62) (33.97) (9.57) (20.46) (18.31) (29.22) (26.15)
Subprime crisis 0.050 0.028 0.032 0.341*** 0.079 0.196 -0.375*** -0.163 -0.060 -0.217***
(0.80) (0.87) (0.36) (2.54) (0.95) (1.58) (-3.08) (-1.45) (-1.04) (-3.00)
Euro crisis 0.067 -0.073*** 0.018 -0.045 0.114 0.271** -0.138 -0.201** -0.465*** -0.293***
(1.37) (-2.88) (0.31) (-0.39) (1.10) (2.51) (-1.19) (-1.96) (-2.58) (-3.68)
Regime Shifts
Subprime crisis -0.104 0.131 0.354 -0.396 0.249 0.085 0.260 0.394 -0.186 0.117
(-0.62) (1.20) (1.62) (-1.24) (1.47) (0.34) (1.26) (1.45) (-0.90) (0.74)
Euro crisis 0.021 -0.006 0.492 -0.163 -0.003 0.304** 0.109 0.251 -0.298 -0.048
(0.22) (-0.10) (1.89) (-0.73) (-0.02) (2.43) (0.78) (1.11) (-0.67) (-0.40)
LB 0.209 0.977 0.670 0.021 0.338 0.877 0.389 0.007 0.204 0.810
LB2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adj. R-squared 0.911 0.962 0.827 0.845 0.913 0.640 0.902 0.892 0.831 0.929
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Table C.3 continued
................. Euro area ................. ................................ Non-Euro area ................................ ... North America ...
Expectations NEL POR SPA DEN NOR SWE SWI UK CAN USA
Div. Yield -0.013 -0.008 -0.020 -0.013 0.011 -0.021 -0.090*** -0.004 0.045** -0.044**
(-0.49) (-0.22) (-1.04) (-0.40) (0.27) (-0.75) (-2.81) (-0.19) (2.15) (-2.24)
AR(1) -0.035 -0.105* -0.068 -0.061 -0.079 -0.114** -0.199** -0.058 -0.052 -0.221***
(-0.66) (-1.81) (-1.43) (-1.27) (-1.46) (-2.14) (-2.46) (-0.70) (-1.34) (-4.02)
Domestic factor
Total 1.064*** 1.045*** 1.131*** 0.839*** 0.764*** 0.877*** 0.934*** 0.727*** 0.657***
(9.53) (9.52) (17.49) (13.52) (10.84) (14.96) (13.49) (10.90) (12.00)
Subprime crisis 0.616** -0.271 -0.113 -0.044 -0.002 0.071 -0.488*** 0.100 -0.132
(2.43) (-1.57) (-1.24) (-0.36) (-0.02) (0.53) (-3.65) (0.56) (-1.03)
Euro crisis 0.298 0.302* 0.134* 0.149 0.237** -0.002 -0.281*** 0.030 -0.090
(1.46) (1.66) (1.84) (0.85) (2.08) (-0.03) (-2.87) (0.30) (-1.10)
Global factor
Total 1.929*** 0.942*** 1.288*** 0.956*** 0.996*** 1.117*** 1.319*** 1.166*** 0.571*** 0.658***
(12.14) (8.28) (19.49) (7.61) (9.14) (13.34) (11.29) (11.78) (9.46) (5.30)
Subprime crisis 0.404 0.023 0.111 0.326* 0.906*** -0.029 0.033 0.211 0.217** 0.148
(1.34) (0.15) (1.30) (1.69) (3.52) (-0.20) (0.23) (1.04) (2.10) (0.98)
Euro crisis 0.060 1.109*** -0.002 0.651** 0.233 0.070 0.335** 0.177 -0.073 -0.195
(0.27) (4.20) (-0.02) (2.44) (1.16) (0.59) (2.21) (1.39) (-0.75) (-1.45)
US factor
Total 1.968*** 0.755*** 1.456*** 1.005*** 1.213*** 1.381*** 1.558*** 1.248*** 0.967*** 1.306***
(20.93) (10.06) (17.00) (14.60) (15.18) (24.24) (22.27) (23.83) (24.20) (24.73)
Subprime crisis -0.161 -0.027 -0.151 -0.051 0.283** -0.044 -0.217* 0.105 -0.027 0.192**
(-0.91) (-0.25) (-1.22) (-0.48) (2.06) (-0.44) (-1.82) (1.31) (-0.19) (2.18)
Euro crisis 0.061 -0.105 -0.295*** 0.069 0.081 0.035 -0.292*** 0.029 0.034 -0.031
(0.47) (-0.53) (-3.15) (0.42) (0.80) (0.49) (-3.65) (0.45) (0.55) (-0.49)
Regime Shifts
Subprime crisis 0.093 -0.835** 0.093 -0.341 0.183 0.119 0.457* -0.265 -0.211 0.086
(0.23) (-2.35) (0.57) (-1.45) (0.45) (0.43) (1.70) (-1.03) (-0.72) (0.36)
Euro crisis -0.169 -0.514 0.151 -0.152 0.028 0.162 0.252* -0.028 -0.114 -0.026
(-0.86) (-1.49) (0.93) (-0.69) (0.13) (1.23) (1.76) (-0.25) (-0.98) (-0.32)
LB 0.492 0.017 0.932 0.248 0.394 0.916 0.734 0.008 0.251 0.799
LB2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adj. R-squared 0.857 0.629 0.936 0.711 0.751 0.871 0.893 0.893 0.827 0.890
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Table C.4: Auxiliary regressions. The table shows country-specific auxiliary regressions of the US residual derived from the US three-factor model on the
respective domestic factor according to equation [4]:
ǫ0t = (βi + γiCR1 + ηiCR2)f
D
it + ǫ0it.
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust (Newey and West, 1987). LB (LB2) denotes the p-value of a Ljung-
Box test on one period-lagged serial correlation (heteroscedasticity) in the residuals. ∗∗∗ (∗∗, ∗) indicates statistical significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level.
............... Asia/Pacific ............... ........................................................... Euro area ...........................................................
AUS HKG JAP AUT BEL FIN FRA GER GRE ITA
Total -0.185** -0.154** -0.189** -0.087** -0.219** -0.360** -0.053** -0.315** -0.133** -0.319**
(-5.80) (-4.79) (-5.89) (-2.27) (-5.00) (-7.01) (-2.43) (-7.06) (-5.96) (-5.95)
Subprime crisis -0.208*** -0.187*** -0.249** -0.303*** -0.119* -0.203* -0.270*** -0.142 -0.228*** -0.195**
(-2.67) (-2.65) (-2.42) (-5.63) (-1.84) (-1.85) (-4.69) (-1.63) (-3.86) (-2.48)
Euro crisis -0.029 0.080 0.047 -0.038 -0.029 0.056 -0.019 0.027 0.105*** 0.144**
(-0.71) (1.55) (0.92) (-0.77) (-0.46) (0.85) (-0.47) (0.43) (3.85) (2.35)
LB 0.982 0.137 0.266 0.200 0.329 0.852 0.014 0.751 0.019 0.759
LB2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adj. R-squared 0.215 0.132 0.178 0.216 0.232 0.337 0.140 0.315 0.223 0.320
................. Euro area ................. ................................... Non-Euro area ................................... ... North America ...
NEL POR SPA DEN NOR SWE SWI UK CAN
Total -0.308** -0.141** -0.307** -0.188** -0.108** -0.166** -0.265** -0.338** -0.125**
(-5.93) (-3.48) (-6.15) (-5.83) (-5.16) (-5.33) (-5.01) (-6.55) (-3.73)
Subprime crisis -0.334*** -0.157 -0.140* -0.253*** -0.171*** -0.244*** -0.232 -0.302** -0.369***
(-3.69) (-1.53) (-1.65) (-3.77) (-3.44) (-2.74) (-1.49) (-2.04) (-6.19)
Euro crisis -0.034 0.038 0.182*** 0.017 -0.065* -0.035 0.018 -0.062 0.011
(-0.52) (0.73) (3.24) (0.31) (-1.74) (-0.66) (0.24) (-0.75) (0.18)
LB 0.930 0.079 0.348 0.509 0.411 0.083 0.952 0.666 0.816
LB2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008
Adj. R-squared 0.382 0.126 0.290 0.248 0.250 0.229 0.166 0.311 0.193
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Table C.5: Residual variances. The table shows parameter estimates of time-varying variances of the respective (country-specific) US residuals and domestic
residuals. The variances follow a GARCH(1,1) process:
hit = ωi + δiǫ
2
it−1 + θih
2
it−1.
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust (Bollerslev and Wooldridge, 1992). ∗∗∗ (∗∗, ∗) indicates statistical
significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level.
Panel A: US residuals (country-specific)
.............. Asia/Pacific .............. ......................................................... Euro area .........................................................
AUS HKG JAP AUT BEL FIN FRA GER GRE ITA
Constant 0.020* 0.023* 0.016 0.022* 0.014** 0.019* 0.019 0.014* 0.014 0.018*
(1.78) (1.69) (1.48) (1.90) (1.98) (1.69) (1.59) (1.68) (1.61) (1.68)
δ 0.110*** 0.100*** 0.098*** 0.098*** 0.083*** 0.137*** 0.090*** 0.118*** 0.079*** 0.117***
(3.19) (3.07) (3.06) (3.01) (3.06) (3.07) (3.03) (3.26) (3.13) (3.22)
θ 0.872*** 0.882*** 0.890*** 0.883*** 0.903*** 0.849*** 0.895*** 0.871*** 0.908*** 0.870***
(25.98) (29.95) (29.44) (28.25) (36.27) (19.69) (30.19) (26.45) (40.50) (23.73)
................. Euro area ................. ................................ Non-Euro area ................................ ... North America ...
NEL POR SPA DEN NOR SWE SWI UK CAN
Constant 0.027* 0.022* 0.012* 0.014 0.024* 0.019** 0.021* 0.028** 0.021*
(1.70) (1.90) (1.80) (1.56) (1.84) (1.98) (1.87) (2.10) (1.67)
δ 0.097*** 0.092*** 0.086*** 0.097*** 0.106*** 0.101*** 0.106*** 0.168*** 0.099**
(2.82) (2.58) (3.23) (2.76) (3.55) (3.26) (2.58) (2.72) (2.55)
θ 0.875*** 0.889*** 0.903*** 0.894*** 0.874*** 0.883*** 0.876*** 0.817*** 0.887***
(22.10) (25.36) (33.71) (30.93) (27.51) (32.07) (22.59) (19.28) (26.11)
Panel B: Domestic residuals
.............. Asia/Pacific .............. ......................................................... Euro area .........................................................
AUS HKG JAP AUT BEL FIN FRA GER GRE ITA
Constant 0.018 0.018** 0.053 0.119** 0.031 1.141** 0.054** 0.134** 0.021 0.022
(1.58) (2.28) (1.47) (2.06) (1.50) (2.30) (2.10) (2.00) (0.87) (1.52)
δ 0.064* 0.074** 0.081** 0.135*** 0.170** 0.193*** 0.095** 0.114** 0.116*** 0.086***
(1.94) (2.36) (3.53) (3.77) (2.30) (2.85) (2.38) (2.55) (2.72) (3.33)
θ 0.917*** 0.878*** 0.902*** 0.842*** 0.839*** 0.606*** 0.891*** 0.833*** 0.893*** 0.905***
(25.27) (24.03) (34.15) (21.99) (15.17) (4.66) (23.40) (16.23) (28.37) (34.26)
................. Euro area ................. ................................ Non-Euro area ................................ ... North America ...
NEL POR SPA DEN NOR SWE SWI UK CAN
Constant 0.053 0.045 0.098 0.036 0.208* 0.045 0.053* 0.027** 0.046
(1.17) (1.37) (1.33) (1.19) (1.93) (1.57) (1.88) (1.97) (1.63)
δ 0.096*** 0.123*** 0.086 0.087*** 0.090*** 0.087*** 0.099*** 0.105** 0.089**
(3.27) (4.24) (1.60) (4.27) (3.27) (3.74) (3.78) (4.11) (2.50)
θ 0.901*** 0.885*** 0.859*** 0.911*** 0.880*** 0.899*** 0.880*** 0.885*** 0.885***
(30.57) (38.01) (10.95) (47.18) (26.21) (34.40) (28.35) (41.69) (28.40)
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Table C.6: Time-varying residual correlations. The table shows parameter estimates of dynamic conditional correlations. The correlation dynamics follow
either a DCC(1,1) process (Engle, 2002),
q12t = ρ12(1− α− β) + αξ1t−1ξ2t−1 + βq12t−1.
or a modified DCCX(1,1) process including asymmetries and external regressors:
q12t = ρ12(1− α− β) + (α+ φ1XTRM1t−1 + φ2XTRM2t−1)ξ1t−1ξ2t−1 + βq12t−1 + φ3yt−1.
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are asymptotic. ∗∗∗ (∗∗, ∗) indicates statistical significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level.
.............. Asia/Pacific .............. ......................................................... Euro area .........................................................
DCC(1,1) AUS HKG JAP AUT BEL FIN FRA GER GRE ITA
ρ 0.161*** 0.036 0.077** 0.116** 0.015 -0.322*** 0.018 -0.062 0.062*** 0.123**
(3.13) (1.08) (1.97) (1.97) (0.13) (-9.15) (0.35) (-1.16) (2.68) (2.16)
α 0.039 -0.014 -0.018 0.023 0.018 0.016 0.005 0.096*** -0.007 0.010
(1.45) (-1.40) (-0.95) (1.58) (1.22) (0.95) (0.64) (2.55) (-0.93) (0.67)
β 0.799*** 0.935*** 0.732*** 0.925*** 0.968*** -0.861*** 0.972*** 0.627*** 0.992*** 0.967***
(5.55) (17.54) (2.73) 21.377 (30.34) (-2.95) (24.38) (4.91) (112.34) (16.84)
DCCX(1,1)
ρ 0.163** 0.045 0.086*** 0.142*** 0.043 -0.305*** 0.045 -0.041 0.041 0.146***
(2.88) (1.25) (11.96) (3.19) (0.48) (-7.91) (0.88) (-0.75) (1.26) (3.84)
α 0.045 -0.020 -0.040*** 0.026 0.036 0.045 0.008 0.088** -0.062*** -0.058**
(1.31) (-1.06) (-4.35) (1.09) (1.05) (0.82) (0.24) (2.26) (-5.72) (-2.08)
β 0.818*** 0.928*** 0.996*** 0.727*** 0.936*** -0.197 0.768*** 0.629*** 0.590*** 0.529
(5.33) (23.31) (88.70) (7.11) (13.09) (-0.62) (2.13) (3.52) (31.34) (1.60)
φ1 -0.030 -0.003 0.007 -0.042* -0.022 0.177 -0.036 0.095 0.164 0.118
(-0.48) (-0.11) (1.23) (-1.71) (-1.14) (0.72) (-1.09) (0.50) (1.30) (0.74)
φ2 -0.003 -0.012 0.009 -0.075*** -0.066* -0.199 0.411 -0.081 -0.109*** 0.244
(-0.04) (-0.56) (0.97) (-3.05) (-1.67) (-0.81) (0.51) (-1.10) (-8.62) (1.09)
φ3 0.265 0.410* -0.295*** -0.695*** 0.224 -0.381** -0.065 -0.380** 1.422** -0.746***
(0.67) (1.65) (-3.96) (-4.99) (0.86) (-1.97) (-0.33) (-1.72) (1.91) (-3.03)
................. Euro area ................. ................................ Non-Euro area ................................ ... North America ...
DCC(1,1) NEL POR SPA DEN NOR SWE SWI UK CAN
ρ 0.046 0.042 0.017 -0.085** -0.028 -0.102** -0.099** 0.086 0.204***
(0.88) (1.47) (0.51) (-2.39) (-0.91) (-2.05) (-2.00) (0.71) (4.02)
α 0.019 -0.012 -0.027*** -0.021 -0.052*** 0.019 0.057* 0.005 0.051
(1.19) (-1.27) (-44.43) (-1.54) (-4.13) (0.87) (1.86) (0.91) (1.53)
β 0.909*** 0.978*** 0.826*** 0.831*** 0.784*** 0.881*** 0.669*** 0.991*** 0.795***
(11.70) (44.33) (6.77) (5.51) (7.57) (7.26) (3.80) (99.27) (6.67)
DCCX(1,1)
ρ 0.023 0.059 0.011 -0.101*** -0.027 -0.080** -0.094 0.100 0.203***
(0.53) (1.57) (0.26) (-2.92) (-0.89) (-1.98) (-1.57) (1.48) (3.88)
α -0.009 -0.018 -0.003 -0.072*** -0.017 -0.002 0.064** 0.021** 0.062*
(-0.47) (-1.12) (-0.07) (-2.70) (-1.13) (-0.06) (2.10) (1.96) (1.71)
β 0.954*** 0.896*** 0.639** 0.687*** 0.864*** 0.561*** 0.778*** 0.951*** 0.750***
(21.70) (11.77) (3.24) (4.41) (17.74) (3.79) (9.30) (51.42) (3.53)
φ2 0.062 0.031 -0.007 0.055 -0.019** 0.048 0.006 -0.041** 0.006
(1.40) (0.20) (-0.10) (1.01) (-2.38) (1.18) (0.09) (-2.29) (0.07)
φ2 -0.028 -0.025* -0.086 -0.005 -0.036*** -0.070* -0.066 -0.004 -0.040
(-1.16) (-1.65) (-0.95) (-0.20) (-2.95) (-1.76) (-1.12) (-0.23) (-0.40)
φ3 -0.600*** -0.097 0.286 0.608 -0.133* 0.049 0.962* -0.207** 0.474
(-2.96) (-0.21) (0.93) (1.40) (-1.69) (0.16) (1.77) (-2.04) (0.66)
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Table C.7: Correlation decomposition. The table illustrates whether a country experienced contagion (C) or flight-to-quality (F). The magnitude of excessive
correlation movements, measured in terms of the unconditional correlation coefficient, is given in parentheses. Panel A shows the results of the Subprime Crisis and
Panel B those of the Euro Crisis. We further distinguish the Subprime Crisis into a Pre-Lehman and a Post-Lehman era and the Euro Crisis into a Pre-IMF and
Post-IMF bailout era. In addition to the overall correlation (left), we also report results based on the US component alone (middle) as well as the US and global
component. A summary of the number of identified contagion and flight-to-quality together with their average impact is finally presented on the bottom of each
panel. Please note that to be considered as contagion or flight-to-quality, the respective time-varying correlations need to display significant regime-shifts at least at
the 10% significance level, after eliminating serial correlation. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust (Newey and West, 1987). For details on the underlying
regressions results please refer to the appendix.
Panel A: Subprime Crisis
Overall US US + Global
Asia/Pacific Pre-Lehman Post-Lehman Aggregate Pre-Lehman Post-Lehman Aggregate Pre-Lehman Post-Lehman Aggregate
AUS — — C (17.4%) C (5.9%) — — C (14.9%) — — — — C (14.7%) C (10.5%)
HKG F (-23.0%) C (25.9%) — — F (-16.9%) C (22.2%) — — — — C (22.9%) — —
JAP — — C (13.9%) — — — — C (21.4%) — — C (16.4%) C (16.8%) C (24.6%)
Euro area
AUT — — C (14.4%) C (5.6%) — — C (20.6%) — — C (11.5%) C (18.6%) C (16.4%)
BEL — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
FIN — — C (38.7%) — — — — C (34.3%) C (14.8%) — — C (29.0%) C (17.3%)
FRA — — — — — — F (-13.0%) — — F (-10.5%) F (-2.9%) — — — —
GER — — C (9.3%) C (8.0%) — — — — — — — — C (6.9%) C (5.6%)
GRE — — — — — — — — C (18.6%) — — — — C (13.3%) C (8.7%)
ITA — — C (7.2%) — — F (-14.2%) — — — — F (-4.3%) C (5.9%) — —
NEL F (-18.4%) — — F (-16.9%) F (-18.0%) — — F (-16.1%) F (-9.7%) — — F (-8.4%)
POR — — C (21.9%) C (9.0%) — — C (20.8%) — — — — C (21.6%) C (14.3%)
SPA — — C (9.1%) — — — — — — — — — — C (6.9%) — —
Non-Euro
DEN — — C (13.6%) — — — — — — — — — — C (11.1%) C (6.9%)
NOR — — C (23.3%) C (8.8%) — — C (17.3%) — — — — C (19.0%) C (15.6%)
SWE F (-8.8%) — — — — — — C (14.1%) — — — — C (10.7%) — —
SWI — — C (8.0%) C (7.7%) — — — — — — — — C (4.3%) — —
UK F (-6.4%) — — — — — — C (10.3%) — — — — C (5.1%) — —
North America
CAN F (-7.3%) C (8.7%) — — — — C (11.8%) — — — — C (9.2%) — —
Total
Contagion 0 — 13 (16.3%) 6 (7.5%) 0 — 11 (18.8%) 1 (14.8%) 2 (13.9%) 16 (13.5%) 9 (13.3%)
Flight-to-quality 5 (-12.8%) 0 — 1 (-16.9%) 4 (-15.5%) 0 — 2 (-13.3%) 3 (-5.6%) 0 — 1 (-8.4%)
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Table C.7 continued
Panel B: Euro Crisis
Overall US US + Global
Asia/Pacific Pre-IMF Post-IMF Aggregate Pre-IMF Post-IMF Aggregate Pre-IMF Post-IMF Aggregate
AUS — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
HKG — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
JAP — — — — — — — — C (27.3%) C (21.3%) — — — — — —
Euro area
AUT — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
BEL — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
FIN C (16.6%) C (24.0%) C (18.0%) C (19.8%) C (26.2%) C (23.0%) C (14.5%) C (20.3%) C (16.7%)
FRA F (-7.2%) F (-12.0%) F (-9.2%) — — F (-9.7%) F (-7.4%) F (-8.1%) F (-13.1%) F (-10.1%)
GER — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
GRE F (-33.1%) F (-44.9%) F (-35.6%) F (-31.9%) F (-46.3%) F (-36.4%) F (-31.6%) F (-46.7%) F (-25.3%)
ITA F (-19.8%) F (-37.1%) F (-21.7%) F (-14.9%) F (-27.6%) F (-19.6%) F (-19.3%) F (-34.2%) F (-18.5%)
NEL — — — — — — — — — — — — F (-6.0%) F (-6.3%) F (-6.5%)
POR F (-23.0%) F (-40.4%) F (-27.4%) F (-22.3%) F (-37.5%) F (-27.0%) F (-23.6%) F (-40.1%) F (-25.2%)
SPA F (-13.4%) F (-25.1%) F (-17.2%) F (-11.9%) F (-19.9%) F (-15.2%) F (-15.3%) F (-25.8%) F (-18.3%)
Non-Euro area
DEN — — F (-13.2%) F (-9.7%) — — F (-13.0%) F (-10.2%) F (-11.3%) F (-16.9%) F (-13.3%)
NOR — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
SWE — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
SWI — — — — — — — — — — — — F (-4.6%) F (-5.6%) F (-4.7%)
UK — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
North America
CAN — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
Total
Contagion 1 (16.6%) 1 (24.0%) 1 (18.0%) 1 (19.8%) 2 (26.8%) 2 (22.2%) 1 (14.5%) 1 (20.3%) 1 (16.7%)
Flight-to-quality 5 (-19.3%) 6 (-28.8%) 6 (-20.1%) 4 (-20.3%) 6 (-25.7%) 6 (-19.3%) 8 (-15.0%) 8 (-23.6%) 8 (-15.2%)
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Table C.8: Correlation decomposition regressions. The table shows country-specific regressions of financial sector co-movement to identify crisis-related
excessive correlation movements after controlling for first-order serial correlation. Regime shifts are allowed to differ over the course of the Subprime Crisis and Euro
Crisis,
ρ0it = υi0 + υi1ρ0it−1 + υi2CR
Pre
1 + υi3CR
Post
1 + υi4CR
Pre
2 + υi5CR
Post
2 + zit, i 6= 0.
Note that during the Subprime Crisis there are two regime shifts covering the period prior and after the demise of Lehman Brothers (CRPre1 and CR
Post
1 ). During
the Euro Crisis there are another two regime shifts covering the period prior and after the last IMF-led sovereign bailout occured (CRPre2 and CR
Post
2 ). t-statistics
are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust (Newey and West, 1987). LB denotes the p-value of a Ljung-Box test on one period-lagged
serial correlation in the residuals. ∗∗∗ (∗∗, ∗) indicates statistical significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level.
.............. Asia/Pacific .............. ............................................................ Euro area ............................................................
Overall correlations AUS HKG JAP AUT BEL FIN FRA GER GRE ITA
Constant 0.601*** 0.483*** 0.324*** 0.624*** 0.699*** 0.462*** 0.835*** 0.674*** 0.475*** 0.702***
(34.13) (24.18) (10.45) (66.82) (70.98) (24.21) (139.16) (49.87) (25.40) (44.94)
Pre-Lehman -0.016 -0.111*** 0.002 0.027 -0.043 -0.042 -0.027 0.022 -0.029 -0.047
(-0.66) (-4.75) (0.24) (1.40) (-1.34) (-1.01) (-1.38) (0.59) (-1.45) (-1.57)
Post-Lehman 0.104*** 0.125*** 0.045*** 0.090** 0.004 0.179*** 0.009 0.063*** 0.075 0.051**
(5.50) (2.73) (4.78) (2.52) (0.16) (6.70) (0.59) (4.77) (1.52) (2.16)
Pre-IMF -0.013 0.036 0.010 -0.021 0.004 0.077 -0.060*** 0.041 -0.157*** -0.139**
(-0.48) (0.97) (0.29) (-0.75) (0.12) (1.66) (-2.83) (1.55) (-2.98) (-2.44)
Post-IMF -0.015 0.029 0.022 -0.054 -0.009 0.111** -0.100*** 0.016 -0.213*** -0.260***
(-0.34) (0.58) (0.46) (-1.62) (-0.31) (2.39) (-4.09) (0.57) (-4.78) (-4.38)
AR(1) 0.865*** 0.840*** 0.941*** 0.792*** 0.774*** 0.823*** 0.817*** 0.798*** 0.867*** 0.874***
(39.98) (31.87) (84.88) (22.44) (19.70) (30.30) (31.74) (34.08) (33.57) (32.29)
LB(1) 0.408 0.278 0.152 0.267 0.025 0.020 0.539 0.546 0.220 0.268
Adj. R-squared 0.775 0.744 0.896 0.671 0.610 0.761 0.776 0.661 0.872 0.885
US component
Constant 0.530*** 0.483*** 0.254*** 0.505*** 0.614*** 0.450*** 0.680*** 0.631*** 0.427*** 0.626***
(33.02) (30.53) (19.19) (37.13) (47.37) (26.71) (51.29) (50.95) (24.30) (38.93)
Pre-Lehman -0.057 -0.082* -0.013 0.000 -0.085 -0.018 -0.108* -0.070 -0.044 -0.100*
(-0.87) (-1.81) (-0.34) (0.00) (-1.33) (-0.27) (-1.87) (-1.03) (-0.84) (-1.79)
Post-Lehman 0.090** 0.107** 0.069*** 0.129*** 0.051 0.159*** 0.039 0.055 0.088** 0.068
(2.36) (2.42) (2.75) (3.52) (1.20) (8.54) (0.74) (1.24) (2.11) (1.42)
Pre-IMF 0.012 0.022 0.058 0.007 -0.010 0.091* -0.043 0.010 -0.152*** -0.105**
(0.36) (0.64) (1.45) (0.19) (-0.29) (1.86) (-1.63) (0.33) (-2.72) (-2.47)
Post-IMF 0.024 0.013 0.089** -0.011 -0.035 0.121*** -0.081** -0.013 -0.220*** -0.194***
(0.56) (0.27) (1.99) (-0.29) (-0.98) (2.79) (-2.50) (-0.41) (-5.11) (-4.44)
AR(1) 0.850*** 0.834*** 0.851*** 0.834*** 0.839*** 0.825*** 0.851*** 0.826*** 0.869*** 0.868***
(37.71) (33.88) (36.93) (33.72) (35.45) (28.39) (35.11) (32.93) (35.27) (42.28)
LB(1) 0.363 0.837 0.211 0.706 0.666 0.821 0.636 0.355 0.329 0.578
Adj. R-squared 0.730 0.709 0.779 0.678 0.709 0.753 0.756 0.686 0.864 0.829
US + global component
Constant 0.643*** 0.562*** 0.378*** 0.633*** 0.729*** 0.566*** 0.815*** 0.744*** 0.531*** 0.759***
(50.06) (36.45) (19.42) (66.82) (91.96) (37.82) (154.53) (92.01) (22.80) (59.94)
Pre-Lehman 0.016 -0.032 0.053*** 0.072*** -0.030 0.015 -0.024* 0.015 0.013 -0.030**
(0.49) (-1.47) (3.68) (3.83) (-1.15) (0.45) (-1.85) (0.62) (0.61) (-2.03)
Post-Lehman 0.088*** 0.111*** 0.054*** 0.116*** 0.013 0.134*** 0.009 0.047*** 0.063*** 0.041***
(11.33) (5.00) (5.35) (9.99) (0.72) (7.05) (0.61) (5.45) (3.93) (2.94)
Pre-IMF -0.015 0.004 0.009 -0.020 -0.014 0.067 -0.068*** 0.006 -0.150* -0.136**
(-0.62) (0.15) (0.30) (-0.82) (-0.56) (1.79) (-3.45) (0.30) (-1.93) (-2.46)
Post-IMF -0.008 -0.010 0.024 -0.044 -0.035 0.094*** -0.110*** -0.018 -0.222*** -0.240***
(-0.23) (-0.23) (0.57) (-1.51) (-1.38) (2.73) (-5.50) (-0.84) (-3.22) (-4.86)
AR(1) 0.853*** 0.849*** 0.925*** 0.813*** 0.800*** 0.829*** 0.788*** 0.784*** 0.914*** 0.872***
(35.66) (35.33) (64.65) (31.02) (24.72) (31.37) (26.91) (30.32) (41.90) (34.57)
LB(1) 0.569 0.370 0.905 0.298 0.043 0.217 0.372 0.759 0.215 0.497
Adj. R-squared 0.754 0.746 0.883 0.750 0.651 0.779 0.779 0.632 0.937 0.912
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Table C.8 continued
................. Euro area ................. .................................... Non-Euro area .................................... ... North America ...
Overall correlations NEL POR SPA DEN NOR SWE SWI UK CAN
Constant 0.727*** 0.465*** 0.635*** 0.546*** 0.543*** 0.656*** 0.756*** 0.769*** 0.737***
(78.09) (31.92) (36.54) (37.95) (29.74) (40.67) (76.96) (99.70) (42.59)
Pre-Lehman -0.134*** 0.016 -0.014 0.016 0.010 -0.058*** 0.035 -0.049* -0.054*
(-4.37) (0.58) (-0.37) (0.62) (0.28) (-2.91) (1.25) (-1.71) (-1.75)
Post-Lehman -0.019 0.102*** 0.058*** 0.074** 0.126*** 0.065 0.061*** 0.040 0.064*
(-0.47) (4.62) (2.94) (2.18) (3.84) (1.11) (5.15) (1.34) (1.82)
Pre-IMF -0.035 -0.107** -0.085** -0.038 0.007 0.013 -0.018 -0.019 0.020
(-1.23) (-2.32) (-2.23) (-1.13) (0.18) (0.36) (-0.89) (-0.85) (0.61)
Post-IMF -0.033 -0.188*** -0.159*** -0.072* 0.005 0.031 -0.015 -0.010 0.018
(-0.98) (-4.26) (-3.15) (-1.86) (0.10) (0.85) (-0.56) (-0.43) (0.48)
AR(1) 0.808*** 0.843*** 0.878*** 0.832*** 0.863*** 0.833*** 0.819*** 0.810*** 0.885***
(28.45) (38.11) (47.31) (30.31) (31.48) (29.97) (36.60) (30.64) (34.65)
LB(1) 0.361 0.297 0.415 0.601 0.088 0.434 0.349 0.731 0.136
Adj. R-squared 0.743 0.840 0.817 0.720 0.750 0.720 0.703 0.676 0.806
US component
Constant 0.634*** 0.385*** 0.599*** 0.505*** 0.501*** 0.598*** 0.648*** 0.661*** 0.643***
(40.15) (30.57) (41.31) (32.82) (26.55) (38.06) (50.86) (43.34) (34.75)
Pre-Lehman -0.131*** -0.036 -0.085 -0.062 -0.044 -0.080 -0.083 -0.079 -0.086
(-2.77) (-0.69) (-1.42) (-1.23) (-0.71) (-1.39) (-1.27) (-1.20) (-1.32)
Post-Lehman 0.036 0.097*** 0.065 0.057 0.094** 0.093* 0.059 0.079* 0.087*
(0.66) (3.44) (1.50) (1.16) (2.31) (1.83) (1.28) (1.67) (1.79)
Pre-IMF -0.005 -0.104*** -0.075** -0.044 0.019 0.031 -0.020 0.004 0.039
(-0.15) (-2.61) (-2.32) (-1.43) (0.44) (0.79) (-0.73) (0.11) (0.87)
Post-IMF -0.005 -0.174*** -0.127*** -0.071* 0.016 0.049 -0.034 0.007 0.049
(-0.11) (-4.49) (-3.02) (-1.78) (0.31) (1.26) (-0.96) (0.20) (1.06)
AR(1) 0.863*** 0.837*** 0.857*** 0.851*** 0.871*** 0.842*** 0.845*** 0.865*** 0.876***
(42.52) (32.90) (43.50) (38.32) (39.41) (38.73) (36.79) (38.99) (43.81)
LB(1) 0.319 0.626 0.577 0.288 0.556 0.628 0.636 0.525 0.440
Adj. R-squared 0.777 0.808 0.776 0.733 0.755 0.727 0.717 0.743 0.790
US + global component
Constant 0.776*** 0.493*** 0.717*** 0.616*** 0.597*** 0.705*** 0.776*** 0.801*** 0.731***
(98.05) (36.83) (57.98) (53.01) (37.54) (57.62) (115.55) (103.45) (48.78)
Pre-Lehman -0.070*** 0.026 -0.003 0.024 0.043 -0.022 -0.006 -0.015 -0.011
(-3.97) (1.38) (-0.16) (1.62) (1.28) (-1.49) (-0.32) (-0.76) (-0.33)
Post-Lehman 0.007 0.100*** 0.043*** 0.061** 0.103*** 0.070** 0.033*** 0.039** 0.068***
(0.28) (10.88) (5.55) (3.46) (11.92) (2.37) (3.78) (2.03) (4.31)
Pre-IMF -0.044* -0.110** -0.097** -0.062** 0.001 0.010 -0.035* -0.024 0.015
(-1.90) (-2.42) (-2.39) (-2.33) (0.04) (0.34) (-1.88) (-1.26) (0.47)
Post-IMF -0.045* -0.187*** -0.164*** -0.092*** -0.006 0.026 -0.042** -0.018 0.019
(-1.65) (-3.98) (-4.03) (-2.80) (-0.14) (0.93) (-2.04) (-0.95) (0.51)
AR(1) 0.844*** 0.862*** 0.877*** 0.843*** 0.873*** 0.835*** 0.803*** 0.836*** 0.881***
(32.93) (42.36) (44.50) (32.45) (33.85) (30.48) (32.34) (28.30) (41.47)
LB(1) 0.557 0.310 0.622 0.517 0.499 0.572 0.427 0.462 0.326
Adj. R-squared 0.765 0.884 0.857 0.776 0.775 0.725 0.685 0.703 0.788
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Marginal Effect of Exogenous Variable
In DCC-type models the marginal effect of an exogenous variable on residual correlations
is ambiguous as Li (2011) argues. The reason is that the exogenous variable affects the
residual covariance and variance processes differently, thereby allowing changes in the
covariance being overcompensated by those in the variance.
For an analytical examination recall the definition of the residual correlation coefficient,
ρR12t =
q12t√
q11tq22t
=
C12t + φ3Xt−1√
(C11t + φ3Xt−1)(C22t + φ3Xt−1)
(C.1)
where
C11t = (1− α− β) + (α + φ1XTRM1t−1 + φ2XTRM2t−1)ξ21t−1 + βq11t−1
C12t = ρ12(1− α− β) + (α + φ1XTRM1t−1 + φ2XTRM2t−1)ξ1t−1ξ2t−1 + βq12t−1,
C22t = (1− α− β) + (α + φ1XTRM1t−1 + φ2XTRM2t−1)ξ22t−1 + βq22t−1.
The partial derivation of the correlation coefficient with respect to the exogenous variable
is ∂ρ
Reso12t
∂Xt−1
= φ3√
q11tq22t
(
1 − q12t(q11t+q22t)
2q11tq22t
)
. Hence depending on the signs of φ3 and q12t as
well as the size of (q11t + q22t)/(2q11tq22t), the marginal effect of Xt−1 is either positive or
negative. If q12t = 0, the second term in equation (10) is positive since q11t and q22t are
both non-negative. Given these circumstances, an increase (decrease) in the global risk
factor provokes a rise (decline) in the residual correlation. If q12t > 0, the same result
follows as long as (q11t + q22t)/(2q11tq22t) < 1/q12 is satisfied. Once the latter condition is
violated, the effect reverses. This is the case, when an increase in Xt−1 has a sufficiently
stronger impact on variances than on the covariance. Hence, the residual correlation may
decrease, even if the estimated parameter φ3 is positive.
Li (2011) describes a less complex analytical derivation. However, his remarks rely on the
simplifying assumption that (q11t+q22t)/(q11tq22t) = 1. Since q11t and q22t are time-varying
we relax this restriction.
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